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ABSTRACT 
Transformation of Kurdish Islamism: the Case of Free-Cause Party of Turkey 
 
Yaşaroğlu,  Tuğba 
MA, Department of Modern Turkish Studies 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Hüseyin  Alptekin 
February 2015, 136 pages 
 
Kurdish issue has been one of the most important and problematic topics in Turkish 
politics. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the official policy of the state 
has been built on propagation of secularism and Turkish nationalism for the 
foundation and continuation of a homogeneous nation-state. Therefore ethnic as well 
as religious groups have been suppressed with both violent and nonviolent methods 
for decades. Kurdish Islamists have been the greatest victims of such social 
engineering and suppression. Until the 1990s some manifestations of Kurdish 
Islamists appeared time   to   time.  Nonetheless,  with  Kurdish  Hezbollah’s  operations,  
Kurdish  Islamism’s  political  formation  emerged.  Hezbollah  appealed  to  violence  and  
adopted armed struggle and then was abolished and went underground in the early 
2000s. However, its mass base has continued to redefine and reorganize themselves 
with non-governmental organizations and social platforms. After the ban on the 
community’s  most  important  social  organization  Mustazaflar Hareketi, it decided to 
carry its activities to the formal political sphere. Therefore, in 2012 the Free Cause 
Party   was   established   and   started   to   manifest   Kurdish   peoples’   problems   with an 
Islam-centered agenda. This thesis aims to analyze Kurdish  Islamists’  transformation  
with a special reference to the moderation theory.   
Key Words: Islamism, nationalism, political parties, the Kurdish question, 
moderation theory. 
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ÖZ 
Kürt  İslamcılığının  Dönüşümü:  Hür  Dava  Partisi  Örneği 
 
Yaşaroğlu,  Tuğba 
MA,  Modern  Türkiye  Çalışmaları Bölümü 
Tez  Danışmanı:  Yrd.  Doç.  Dr.  Hüseyin  Alptekin 
Şubat  2015, 136 sayfa 
 
Kürt   meselesi   Türkiye   siyasetinin   en   önemli   ve   bir   o   kadar   da   problemli  
konularından  biridir.  Cumhuriyet’in  kurulmasından  beri  devletin  resmi  siyaseti  Türk  
milliyetçiliği   ve   sekülerliğin   topluma   kazandırılarak   homojen   bir   ulus-devlet 
düzeninin  oluşturulması  ve  devamıdır.  Bu  nedenle  etnik  gruplar  ve    öncelikli olarak 
inanç toplulukları  uzun  yıllar  baskı   görmüştür.  Siyasi oluşumları   yeni  olsa  da  Kürt  
İslamcıları  bu mühendislik  ve  baskı  ortamının    başlıca  mağdurlarından  olagelmiştir.  
1990’lara   kadar   çeşitli   şekillerde   Kürt   İslamcılığının   tezahürleri   görülse   de,  
Hizbullah’ın   etkinlikleriyle  Kürt   İslamcılığının   siyasi   oluşumu   kendini   gün   yüzüne  
çıkarmış;;  şiddet,  tehdit  ve  silahlı  mücadele  yolunu  benimseyen  Hizbullah,  2000’lerin  
başında  bitirilmiş  yahut  yer  altına  inmek  zorunda  bırakılmıştır.  Bununla  beraber  hitap  
ettiği   topluluklar   kendilerini   STK   ve   platformlar   üzerinden   tanımlamaya   ve  
organizasyonlarını  biçimlendirmeye  devam  etmiştir.  Bu  topluluk  2012’de  Hür  Dava  
Partisi’nin   (Hüda-Par)   kurulmasıyla   kendini   siyasi   olarak   da   ifade   etmeye   ve  Kürt  
toplumunun  problemlerini  İslam  merkezli  olarak  ortaya  koymaya  başladı.  Elinizdeki  
tez   Kürt   İslamcılığı’nın   dönüşümünü   ılımlılaşma   teorisi   üzerinden   incelemeyi  
hedeflemektedir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler:   İslamcılık,   milliyetçilik,   siyasi   partiler,   Kürt   meselesi,  
ılımlılaşma  teorisi. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis explains the developments in Kurdish Islamism. The central task 
is to examine whether there has been any moderation from a more radical and anti-
system to a moderate and system friendly one among Kurdish Islamists and more 
specifically among the Hezbollah community. In other words to what extent has the 
Huda-Par moderated Kurdish Islamism and what has caused this moderation? In 
order to answer my main question, I will pose few secondary questions.  Can we talk 
of a common umbrella of Kurdish Islamism?  How did Kurdish Islamism evolve 
over time?  Why did it fail to appear as a political movement until recently? What are 
the similarities and differences between Kurdish and Turkish Islamisms? In what 
ways does Kurdish Islamism differ from Kurdish nationalism with regards to 
Kurdish identity debates? What is the triggering event in the establishment of the 
Kurdish Islamist Free Cause  Party  (Hür  Dava  Partisi- Huda-Par)? What differentiates 
the Party from other Kurdish political movements? Is it possible to link Huda-Par 
with the Kurdish Hezbollah – the Party of God- that was a militant organization that 
existed between 1980 and the 2000s and was known for the mobilization of Kurdish 
Islamists for political causes? Can Huda-Par be explained with the moderation of the 
radical Hezbollah movement? What is the impact of the Hezbollah  “era  of  terror”  in  
this transformation as well as the Kurdish “opening” carried out by the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP – Adalet   ve   Kalkınma   Partisi)   government?   Have   the  
beliefs and practices of Kurdish Islamists changed over time? What processes, 
mechanisms, events and institutions helped the promotion of this moderation? What 
are the Huda-Par’s   political   ambitions? How does it differ from the Hezbollah’s  
position? With the AKP in government, has the gap between the Kurdish and the 
state been filled?   
Islamism and the Kurdish issue have been two problematic concepts since the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. One way or another, proponents of 
Islamism and Kurdish nationalism suffered   deeply   from   the   state’s   founding  
principles of strong laicism and Turkish nationalism. What I am interested in is when 
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and where Islamism and an ethnic identity –namely the Kurdish one- have 
intersected and been politicized. 
Since both Islamism and Kurdish nationalism were seen as threats to the 
survival of the newly built Republic, for decades the ideas and movements somehow 
related to them were suppressed and not allowed to become politically active. 
Squeezed between the leftist and militarist PKK (Partiya   Karkeren   Kürdistani   – 
Kurdistan   Workers’   Party) and successive political parties close   to   the   PKK’s  
position as well as conservative and nationalist mainstream Turkish right-wing 
parties, the voice of Kurdish Islamists has been marginalized over the years. Given 
the special importance of religion and the power of different religious orders among 
Kurdish people, Islam is an important binder among them. As a socially conservative 
government that has a history with the National Outlook Movement (which was 
popular among Kurdish people to some degree), Kurdish Islamists were supposedly 
better off with the AKP government. Despite the fact that the AKP has obtained a 
great sum of votes1 from the Southeast region –where Kurdish people are heavily 
populated- in succeeding elections in addition to Halkların  Demokratik  Partisi  (HDP  
- People’s  Democratic  Party), there are still groups that are not fully compatible with 
the  AKP’S   the Kurdish policy and the HDP’s   approach   to Islam. This thesis will 
place the Huda-Par as a case study of the moderation of the radical and militant 
Kurdish Islamists; in other words from an anti-system to a system-friendly standing.    
In the second chapter, theory and methodology are explained. In the third 
chapter, I am going to examine the moderation literature, definitions, connotations 
and its applications in the Kurdish case. In the fourth chapter, the definition of 
Islamism, its transformation, its relationship with nationalism, and its applications in 
contemporary Turkey for both Kurdish and Turkish Islamists are studied. The fifth 
chapter is reserved for the Hezbollah. I will analyze the foundation of Hezbollah, 
major events related to and ideas of the movement and its tragic end or going 
underground. The sixth chapter is reserved for the Huda-Par and the transformation 
of  Kurdish   Islamism.  The  party’s  foundation,   the  movement’s  co-organizations, the 
party’s  political  orientation will be examined.  In the last chapter conclusion is made. 
                                                          
1 In 2014 local elections, the AKP obtained %44,27 of the votes in the Southeastern 
Region; while in 2011 parliamentary elections the AKP had obtained %51,38 of the 
votes from the region. 
 (http://www.haberturk.com/secim/secim2014/yerel-secim?source=aa, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2011/06/110612_election_results.shtml ).  
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1.1. The Hypothesis 
 
  My main argument for this research is that neither the AKP nor the HDP is 
effective and convincing for the Kurdish Islamists in addressing the Kurdish identity 
problem. Throughout my research I will show empirical evidence for the AKP’s  
inclination for Islamism fed with Turkish nationalism, and the HDP’s  unconvincing  
and artificial standing point with regards to Islam. This will lead to a hypothesis that 
there is a group among Kurdish people who might change the track of events in the 
following years, if they gain the trust of the Kurdish masses.   
The main hypothesis is related to the transformation of Kurdish Islamism. 
This hypothesis advocates that positive changes in the social, political and economic 
spheres in Turkey and further democratization enabled moderation of former 
Hezbollah and contemporary Huda-Par in terms of their perception towards formal 
politics. The “Moderation   theory”   is used for testing this hypothesis. According to 
the thesis, repressive and exclusionary state policies may contribute to the 
radicalization of political Islamic movements, while inclusion and accommodation 
may have an opposite effect (Kubikova, 2009, p.139).  This thesis examines Kurdish 
Islamists groups in Turkey to test this theory. The inclusion can be introduced 
through the mechanisms such as political openings, the introduction of pluralism in 
multiparty systems, the guaranteeing basic human rights, the conducting the fair 
elections, etc. In this case, what effects could such political openings have on the 
behavior of Kurdish Islamists will be investigated. It will also be examined whether 
the behavioral moderation of the group, the ideological moderation of the group, or 
the ideological moderation of the individuals are in the forefront of this 
transformation.  
Although the literature on moderation is growing, Kurdish Islamism has some 
sui generis characteristics, which require further examination and a deeper 
engagement with the empirical context. Moderation theories do not explain why, in 
the same sociopolitical environment and geography, some Islamist groups chose to 
pursue violence to gain their ends, while others do not. Despite all the limitations my 
theory has, it provides a perspective, which can be used as a solution to the existing 
problems.  
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1. 2. Methodology 
 
In addition to the review of the related literatures, I have carried out this 
research on the ideas of the prominent leaders of the Huda-Par. My primary data 
source is the interviews I conducted throughout the process. First, I have contacted 
the head office of the Huda-Par immediately after the 30 March 2014 local elections.  
I visited the Istanbul  branch   to  meet   the  Party’s   Istanbul   chairman Mehmet 
Ali Gönül in the mids of March 2014. Nevertheless, Gönül refused to give an 
interview to me. Instead, I met with the Kağıthane  district  president  Çetin  Karakaya  
from whom I received very valuable and important commentaries and information 
regarding the Party. Karakaya also gave me the Turkish, English and Kurdish 
versions of the Party program, together with several magazines and newspapers of 
the Movement.  I could also interview the Party’s   Spokesperson   and General 
Secretariat Mehmet Yavuz in the party headquarters in Ankara on 29 April 2014, and 
the  Party’s  Spokesperson  and  the  Vice  President  Responsible  for the Foreign Affairs 
Said   Şahin, in the Istanbul office of the Party on 27 May 2014. Lastly, I made a 
series of email interviews with Aynur  Sülün  who  is  a member  of  the  Party’s  General  
Management Council and Vice President responsible for Family and Social Policies. 
I also conducted an additional interview with Faruk Bildirici, a journalist who 
follows the Kurdish issue closely, on 2 December 2014, in Ankara.  
I have also used newspaper and magazine interviews with the Party members, 
in addition to the commentaries available on the  Party’s  website.  Lastly,  I  carried out 
research on the websites such as Hür-Seda Haber and Mustazaflar Cemiyeti that are 
connected with the Party. The Huda-Par is not a product of recent phenomenon. 
Rather, it has a history and is connected to a higher and comprehensive umbrella, the 
Kurdish Islamism. Surely, it is not possible to conceive Kurdish Islamists as a whole 
and unified group. Nonetheless, Huda-Par can be considered as having the largest 
organizational potential –which showed itself on large-scale during the Kutlu  Doğum  
(Holy Birth of Prophet Mohammed) activities organized by the NGOs of the Huda-
Par masses- among Kurdish Islamists. Since 2012, the group has completed its legal 
formation and established the Party. Therefore my research period starts in 2012, 
after the foundation of the Huda-Par. 
My hypothesis will be tested based on the answers I received from the 
interviews that I conducted. The test will especially be on three subjects in order to 
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see whether a transformation has taken place: the  Party’s   the position vis-à-vis the 
regime, the position vis-à-vis the PKK, and the political pragmatism. If -at least 
rhetorically- the Huda-Par chooses a path of a system friendly stance vis-à-vis the 
regime, adopt an unarmed confrontation with the PKK, and the will to compromise 
for political ends, and then it can be considered that a high level of moderation has 
taken place. If the discourse and behaviors are developed in the opposite direction, 
then moderation has not taken place for the movement. If one or two factors 
changed, then partial moderation has taken place. 
 I used semi-structured interviews where I although had a list of questions to 
be asked, sought to be open to any kind of connotations related to the topic. During 
the interviews, I took small notes to recall what is said afterwards. Immediately after 
interviews, I returned back to the notes and added the remaining. 
After gathering all the data together, I grouped them into my categories of 
analysis. Process tracing method which centers on causal mechanisms is deployed in 
order to comprehend to what extent moderation has taken place and why. Process 
tracing explains how an X factor results in producing a Y phenomenon. By looking 
upon the causal mechanisms, this process validates or invalidates a certain theory or 
prediction. In order to find out whether the proposition and/or hypothesis is valid for 
the case, interviews, historical data, and other similar documents can be used 
(George, 2005, p.6).  In this case, whether more democracy and political opening in 
Turkey resulted in moderation of a radical group is tested. For this reason, I 
structured my questions on certain areas (the Kurdish issue, the Hezbollah, and 
moderation, etc.) and specifically sought to conduct interview inside the Party.  
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CHAPTER 2 
MODERATION LITERATURE 
 
 
Islamic/Islamist fundamentalism, radicalism, and even terrorism are widely 
used expressions to identify the characteristics of marginal Muslim groups that might 
appear in the forms of a small community of people, a non-governmental 
organization, and also as   a   political   party.   Given   the   terms’   mishmash   and  
unfavorable connotations, they are used in one way or another in academic works to 
express what I want to explain in the Kurdish  Islamists’  experience  of  political  Islam  
in Turkey. Though reluctantly I might appeal to all the terms heavily burdened with 
such orientalist sentimentalism.  
Applying labels to groups such as moderate, radical or fundamental, 
modernist…etc. can be misleading. Labeling might result in ignoring the variations 
within one particular group. For instance, an Islamist group may have moderate 
views in regarding the participating democratic system and/or elections, but not 
concerning the political rights of religious minorities, or women. Thus, even though 
dropping weapons is a clear signal of moderation for this case, I will also look 
closely on three subjects in order to see whether moderation has taken place. 
 
2.1. Definitions  
 
Moderation in simplest terms is defined as “working within existing political 
system rather than trying to overthrow it” (Schwedler, 2006, p.16). In order to be 
considered in the context of the moderation theory, a transformation from radicalism 
to moderation needs to be observed for one particular group/organization. 
Moderation as a term is seen as directly related with individual rights, toleration, 
pluralism, and cooperation (Schwedler, 2011, p. 2429).  
“Moderate”  is  a  term associated  with  ‘peace’. However, it does not mean that, 
moderates do not pursue goals that conflict with  others’  goals.  Moderates  attain their 
goals within the existing system of affairs. They do not seek to violate the current 
lines. While radicals seem to be uncompromising, moderates are more open to 
dialogue.  
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Ayoob explains the norms of moderation as being non-violent opposition, 
respecting for the results of free and fair elections, and willingness to give up power 
if voted out of office (2007, p.158). By  the  term  “radical”,  it  is  meant  the  ones  who  
pursue their goals through an anti-system approach. In other words, a radical 
person/group does not bother with thinking of the sustainability of the current affair. 
For him/it, goals or causes are much superior to the system itself. Therefore, he/it 
sees every means just as long as they serve to their causes including armed struggle.   
Kubikova defines moderate Islamists as “pragmatists who seek gradual 
societal  and  political  reforms  within  the  existing  systems”;;  on  the  other  hand  “radical  
Islamists seek to impose radical changes through revolutionary means and often 
violence”  (2009, p.141).    
Fundamentalists on the other hand look at the Holy text for the question and 
derive a theology through making deductions. Contrary to the Sufi line, 
fundamentalists do not like to have anything between the text and themselves. The 
term fundamentalist is not a synonym of the term radical. Nonetheless, a 
group/person might well be both fundamentalist and radical. 
Political inclusion means ensuring the participation of a marginal group to the 
formal sphere of politics through different mechanisms and institutions. Mechanisms 
include law making and execution. Inclusion may also be defensive in character. 
Governments/regimes may also face a strategic choice between limited political 
initiations and challenges of the radical groups. In order to avoid further 
marginalization, regimes might choose their inclusion, which serves as a tool to 
moderate challenges to the existing system. Consequently, inclusion enables the 
participation of the former radicals to the system. Even if a failure in elections does 
not mean opting out of the system, there is always the possibility of future success. 
Schwedler argues that even in less than democratic countries such as Egypt, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey political actors consider incentives for 
participation in the political system in order to outweigh the costs (Schwedler, 2006, 
p.36).  
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2.2. Moderation Theory 
 
In order to be more moderate, political actors and/or organizations need to be 
more amenable to the idea that other perspectives might also be valid. Moderation 
might be empowered through political structure changes (amendments in the political 
system, legalization of political expression, etc.), and changes in the existing political 
discursive limitations. Pressures from opposition groups, their bases and general 
discomfort with existing political status might lead political leaders to consider the 
inclusion as a means of encountering and containing the dissent. In fact, deciding on 
who to include and who to exclude is a sign of power. Therefore inclusion can be 
considered as a tool for state control over political dissent. 
Despite the existence of a developed literature on democratization as well as 
in conflict resolution, both disciplines are insufficient to schema the stages of 
transformation or provide knowledge of how each and every case will likely to 
proceed and conclude. Each case keeps its authenticity. Schwedler points out that the 
democracy might not follow predictable stages or a steady line (2011, p.249).   
Interestingly, an important body of scholarship argues that parties taking on 
“radical”  positions  have  powerful  inclinations  to  moderate  themselves  once  they  start  
to operate as vote seeking political parties (Tezcür, 2010, p.69). This moderation 
process will likely help the sustaining democratic consolidation in the venue state. In 
theory, interaction enables the introduction of multiple, divergent voices and 
worldviews that supposedly overcome the existing problems. Contact hypothesis 
offers that inter group interaction and communication reduce biases and encourage 
mutual understanding (Pettigrew, 1998, p. 66).  
Every dialogue and interaction might not result in moderation. First and 
foremost, groups might not be committed to democratic norms and even aim to 
benefit from the electoral processes to gain undemocratic results. On the other hand, 
the inclusion of deviant groups is necessary since they might represent an important 
segment of the society and exclusion might end in the marginalization of the group 
as well as the promotion of radicalism. Thus, in line with the second argument, those 
who are included into the democratic processes will supposedly become more 
moderate. From another point of view, moderation occurs because of the self-
interests  of   the  organization.  According   to  Tezcür,  opposition   leaders  moderate  not  
because   of   an   ideological   transformation   or   learning,   but   because   of   “strategic  
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interests”   (2010, p.72). This brings forward the idea that moderation comes after 
inclusion. In other words, one body, party, or organization moderate after their 
inclusion into the system, not vice versa.  
  According to Schwedler, the knowledge of how these processes might result 
is little. Especially in the states, where democratic institutions and practices are not 
yet well established, stakes of getting political inclusion is very high (2006, p.1). 
Another possibility is having strong democratic norms and institutions in order to 
reduce radical challenges to the existing political system. In that case marginal 
groups  would  eventually  learn  to  “play  by  the  rules  of  the  game”  (Schwedler, 2011, 
p.352). 
 Huntington suggests the ‘participation-moderation   trade   off’   in   which  
marginal and radical groups moderate when they decide to play by the rules of the 
game in order to benefit from the institutional advantages (1991, p.165). At the same 
time, relying solely on democratic institutions might create an unintended outcome: 
the paradox of democracy. This is the idea that democratic processes might result in 
undemocratic consequences. A political group may rise to the political management 
through democratic participation. But this does not mean that they would make 
undemocratic calculations or rather they would not impose an undemocratic agenda.   
Schwedler proposes that inclusion results in moderation through different methods: 
turning radicals into moderates, turning fence-sitters into moderates, moderates 
becoming more moderate, and providing moderates more visibility and efficacy 
(2006, p.13). 
Despite the vastness of the literature, only few in-depth case studies on the 
hypothesis that inclusion leads to moderation are analyzed. In fact, Schwedler argues 
that in many cases only success stories are told about moderate actors who were not 
really radical in real sense but considered to be such due to their dissent with the 
existing regime (2006, p.15). Thus, the  theory’s  applicability  to each and every case 
study is debatable. Hence, measuring an increase in moderation as a result of 
political inclusion is proved to be difficult. On the other hand, whether political 
exclusion results in radicalization is another dimension of the theory and has mixed 
evidence that the exclusion results in conflict (Schwedler, 2006, p.16). 
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2.3. Moderation in Islamist Groups  
 
  Today’s  Islamist  groups  such  as  Morocco’s  Justice  and  Development  Party,  
Jordan’s   Islamist Action Front (IAF) and   Muslim   Brotherhood,   Egypt’s   Muslim  
Brotherhood,   Turkey’s   National   Outlook  Movement   and   Justice   and  Development  
Party,   Tunisia’s   Islamic Renaissance Movement, and the Pakistani Jamaat-i Islami 
Party are not included in the category of radical since they do not clearly aim to bring 
down the existing regimes in their countries through violent means. However, 
Middle Eastern countries harbor a number of radical Islamist groups. Several 
decades’  long  imperial  pressure,  being  torn  as   the  battle  ground  between   two  super  
powers during the Cold War, domestic social, political and economic issues of each 
country, and inspiration from the 1979 Iran Islam Revolution resulted in witnessing 
an unprecedented increase in the number of Islamist groups in the Islamic world who 
sought revolutionary change through radical means in 1980s and 1990s. This resulted 
in a breaking point between the existing conservatives and emerging Islamic 
fundamentalists in the Muslim world. Fundamentalists were posing threat to the 
existing regimes.  
With the Iranian Revolution, this perception of threat became imaginable 
(Schwedler, 2006, p.125). With this, political Islam included two components: 
moderates and radicals. Between moderate Islamists and radical Islamists division 
has been measured by the legitimacy on the use of violence. Ayoob challenges this 
argument by advocating that there are some major cases where mainstream Islamist 
political groups such as the Hamas in Israeli occupied Palestine and Hezbollah in 
Lebanon oscillated between violent and nonviolent methods directed to the foreign 
occupation (2007, p.19).   
In case of Egypt, the radicalization of the Islamist groups is considered to be 
the result of governmental repression. Kassem suggests that the leaders of the 
Islamist movements came to realize in the late   1990s   that   the   state’s   use   of  
aggression baited them into retaliation where they entered into a fight that they could 
never   win   (Tezcür, 2010, p.86). This recognition leads to another realization that 
once the groups fight back against the state, they increasingly opt out of political 
activity and marginalize.  
Michels suggests that two mechanisms cause radical tendencies to decline:  
the pursuit of votes and organizational survival (Tezcür, 2010, p.71). Party elites 
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make a strategic choice between their ideological thorns and large segments of 
electorates when they decide to join the elections. Willingly or unwillingly 
transformation takes place in order to stay as a political reality. In the farthest 
extreme, even a leftist party might incline towards the center and even conservatism, 
and vice versa. Thus, strategic interests might transform a radical stance towards 
pragmatism, vote seeking and consequently a more moderate position through 
behavioral   change.  However,   this  would   not   safeguard   the   existing   regimes’   fears.  
Moderate groups may also threaten the existing regimes, as radicals. For example, 
the Mubarak regime in Egypt had avoided the inclusion of moderate Islamists for 
years (Schwedler, 2006, p.18). Instead, clerics of al-Azhar  were  seen  as  the  regime’s  
trusted allies. The Muslim Brotherhood tried to be included in the national dialogue 
in 1994; however the government declined the official representation request. 
Nevertheless, the Brotherhood appealed to unofficial representation through unions. 
Moussalli argues that the reason for the violence in Egypt had been related to the 
governmental exclusion policies (1999, p.80).  
As a result of exclusion from political participation, groups are compelled to 
turn into radicals since there remains no other option for political expression and 
contestation.  Imposing laws such as the law against terrorism and law of emergency 
are among others are also other means for political exclusion. Implementation of 
such laws harms the expression of plurality in the political sphere and makes certain 
groups’  participation  to  the  political  system  impossible.  Under these circumstances, 
alternative/divergent voices are compelled to hide themselves from the   regime’s  
apparatus and find other and mostly informal ways for visibility.  An alternative to 
the exclusion and radicalism can be made available by permitting the foundation and 
operation of a party through which all the grievances of the fundamentalists can be 
expressed and therefore they can find a way to participate into the political life. 
For  instance,  the  regime’s  attitude  towards  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  in  Egypt  
resulted in the expansion of the grievances of the people which in turn made the 
Brotherhood the victim and therefore popular. In a similar perspective, Tuğal  argues  
that in the case of Turkey, decades of secular state policies resulted in the emergence 
of strong Islamist movements (2009, p.235). 
 Kemal Karpat holds a different position from his counterparts. According to 
him, Islam has played a key role in the democratization process in Turkey (2011, 
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p.116). He argues that religion itself mobilized the leaders and masses, and also 
benefited from the freedoms brought by the democracy.  
Religion, that is, Islam, played a key role in the process of 
democratization.   While   it   served   as   a   means   for   the   leaders’  
mobilization of and identification with the masses, it also became the 
beneficiary of the freedoms brought by democracy and economic 
development. In other words, both the development of democracy and 
democracy itself facilitated the acceptance of Islam as the basic 
cultural right of the individual Turk, a secular right rather than a divine 
ordainment. 
Concentrating on defending its enhanced position may result in 
institutionalization and moderation as well for political organization and/ movement 
(Schwedler, 2006, p.12). Hamas is a good example of such kind. In order to defend 
its position in the Palestine issue in international platforms, it maintained and 
strengthened party organization institutionally.  
Perhaps, one of the most important processes from radicalism towards 
moderation is the stage of learning. An actor and/or organization comes to a point 
where it understands that without some compromise, cooperation or transformation, 
there is no possibility of attaining the existing goals and even a chance of termination 
becomes explicit. At this point, the organization makes a strategic choice between 
moderation   and   further   radicalization.   Within   any   political   context,   an   actor’s  
perception of possibilities would shape its activities and the agenda (Schwedler, 
2006, p. 150).  This might be an explanation of why the Iranian Revolution in 1979 
had inspired and excited the many Islamic groups to institutionalize and pursue their 
goals through radical means.      
Kubikova argues that under inclusive and open political systems, Islamist 
parties are inclined to cooperate with other political players in order to accomplish 
their objectives (2009, p.142). She suggests that this voluntary cooperation will 
likely to increase tolerance among competitors, and this would gradually eliminate 
the possibility to use violence.  Moussalli agrees against Kubikova’s   ideas.  
According to him, what distinguishes the radical views from moderate ones is the 
method preferred to transform the political agenda to reality (1999, p.104). However, 
an organization might not necessarily follow a constant and consistent line of 
strategies and methods to pursue its goals. In other words, the idea of terrorism exists 
as a fact; but not every act of fundamentalists is a terrorist activity. Therefore, rather 
than  seeing  the  solution  to  the  people’s  grievances  in  a security dilemma context, it 
 
 
13 
 
should be enlightening and in the long term, useful to address and problematize the 
underlying causes. 
As mainstream Islamist political movements become moderate and integrate 
into the existing political systems, Ayoob argues that a number of extremist factions 
breakaway and appeal to the use of violence (2007, p.85). These factions do not 
possess large-scale popular support; however their participation to the sounding 
events makes them known domestically and internationally. On the other hand, 
getting power requires compromise, pragmatism which in turn leads to moderation. 
 
2.4. Moderation in Turkish Islamist Context 
 
The Huda-Par has been associated with the Hezbollah in Turkey. The Turkish 
Hezbollah was founded in 1979 and became publicly known with its struggle against 
the PKK including the use of violence and assassinations. Even though the Huda-Par 
officials continuously refuse the claims about their alleged ties with the Hezbollah, 
many of them are claimed to have some direct or indirect links to the Hezbollah case. 
Some of them have been tried for their membership in Hezbollah. Some of them 
were imprisoned for their connection to Hezbollah activities. Even the lawyer of 
Hezbollah suspects (Hüseyin  Yılmaz) is one of the top leaders of the Huda-Par. The 
Huda-Par  leaders’  statements  regarding  the Hezbollah’s  position  on  different matters 
or defending them before the public confuses the minds. These connections created a 
sense that the Huda-Par is the continuation of the Hezbollah and the Party might 
have a hidden agenda. Nevertheless, even if we assume that the Huda-Par and its co-
organizations are directly linked to the Hezbollah, this does not mean that the new 
initiatives are likely to appeal to violence as it was in the case of the Hezbollah. 
 Experts on democratic transformation argue that moderation occurs mostly in 
democratic, pluralist, and inclusive societies; while radicalism is observed in 
exclusive, repressive and authoritarian societies. The Kurdish Hezbollah’s  appeal  to  
violence and marginalization had occurred starting from the late 1980s and early 
1990s. The time period mentioned is considered as politically ambiguous and socio-
economically devastating years of Turkey because of unsuccessful management of 
the economy, the high-inflation rates as well as the state’s  struggle  with  the  PKK and 
its backlashes on the status of the Kurdish identity and cultural and political rights in 
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the society. In the following years, especially with 28 February 19972 and its 
aftermath when the pressures on Muslims in the country were intensified, the 
Hezbollah’s activities were also restricted and in turn pulled its position into a more 
radical line that was to be ended in 2000 with a sudden police raid in its premise in 
Beykoz, Istanbul.  
After two years, when the AKP came into power in Turkey, and it started its 
democratization program and Kurdish initiative, and it would not be wrong to argue 
that the Kurdish Islamists found ways to re-express themselves through different 
mechanisms starting from NGOs to political parties which in turn enabled them to 
retake a political position in the country’s  political  structure.  According  to  Tuğal, the 
AKP’s  victory  in  the 2002 elections and its formation of the government has started a 
transformation for Islamists from radicalism to a moderate stand. He proposes that 
after the AKP government, Islamists’ street actions have ended. The number of 
people in favor of an Islamic state in Turkey declined from 20 % in the 1990s to 9 % 
in 2006.  And former radicals, who even opposed party politics in 1980s, joined the 
AKP  (Tuğal, 2009, p.148).   
As it will be mentioned in the following chapters, all the Huda-Par leaders 
that were interviewed are in the same opinion that with the AKP government, the 
problematic gap between the Kurdish identity and state has been filled to some 
degree. They also think that the AKP government contributed a lot to 
democratization process within the country, which enabled them to consider over 
finding a political party to enhance their activities and represent their bases. 
According to Ayoob, wherever democracy has begun to appear in the Muslim world, 
the result has been the moderation of Islamist parties to sustain their activities (2007, 
p.110).      
Radical or anti-system parties are defined as parties/organizations that oppose 
to the  existing  regime  and  consider  it  as  illegitimate  (Tezcür, 2010, p.70). Given the 
definition, Huda-Par is an anti-system party; since in the party program and also in 
                                                          
2 28 Februrary process is considered a post-modern coup who was made by high-
level military postulates against the conservative Welfare Party government through 
dictating a list of decisions by the National Security Council in 28 Februrary 1997. 
The list contained secular measures (abolition of religious schools, religious clothing 
in public spheres, etc.) to combat religious reactionary structuring. After the 
resignation of the government in 18 June 1997, the process continued through 
imposation of the decision. Years following had been painful for the Islamists of 
Turkey.   
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the statements of party leadership, it is claimed that the Party has problems with the 
current system of affairs: 
Other goals of the movement; 
 To redefine the state and the politics, 
 To carry the basic principles and values of the community to the politics and to make 
them dominant, 
 To make the system harmonious with the beliefs and values of the community, not 
the community with the system, 
 To revive the humanly and Islamic values that are degenerated consciously or 
unconsciously…  (the  Huda-Par Party Programme, 2013, p.10) 
Even though the Huda-Par openly reveals itself as an anti-system party in the 
party program by asserting itself with the purpose of redefining the state and politics, 
this does not mean that in practice it will realize the purported vision. Moussali 
argues that fundamentalist Islamic thought has been considered as a reaction to 
existing political, social and economic conditions (Moussali, 1999, p.19). In other 
words, the radicalization or marginalization of one particular group is directly related 
to the political, social, and economic environment. Considering both the Hezbollah 
line and the Huda-Par’s   stance,   exclusion   from   the political representation of both 
Islam and the Kurdish ethnic identity has resulted in the marginalization and 
radicalization of the alienated groups. On the other hand, even an involuntary 
acceptance of one political organization to the political process will likely result in 
the moderation of the radicals. Thus, as the Hezbollah did, sooner or later the Huda-
Par will likely tone down its anti-systemic principles. 
Ayoob argues that Islamist movements have increasingly left the fundamentalist 
perspectives and leaving behind the idea of an Islamic state directed them to 
highlight other themes such as justice and freedom (2007, p.36). This transformation 
directed Islamist political movements away from the conceptions of Islamic polity 
and towards democratic conceptions, which replaced God’s sovereignty with 
people’s  sovereignty.  
Even though inclusion might be considered as a compromise made by the regime 
and/or political elites, in the long term the boundary drawn is a powerful authority 
enjoyed and benefited by the elites of the regime and/or the government itself. 
Restructuring participatory regulations enables the inclusion of only the targeted 
group and only in certain terms. Bans on ethnicity based political parties in Turkey 
resulted in the division of Kurdish electorate among right wing conservative parties 
and the PKK, and successive political parties such as the HADEP, the DEP, the 
BDP, the HDP, etc., which  have  been  close  to  the  PKK’s  position  in the Parliament . 
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None of the political parties –both conservative and leftist- mentioned above has 
been successful in expressing   and   advancing   Kurdish   people’s   interests   through  
democratic institutions and mechanisms. And perhaps because of ideological 
differences with the mass base they represent, eventually they might become a 
burden for Kurdish people politically and socially for raising their voice for their 
rights   and   the   region’s   real problems. This dilemma shows how political actors 
control the dissenting groups through different mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion.  
Tuğal,   in Passive Revolution, implements a very different approach from its 
counterparts’. In his ethnographic work in Sultanbeyli (one of the poorest districts in 
Istanbul) with former Islamist radicals, he theorizes capitalism’s absorption of 
radicals   into   moderates.   According   to   him,   today’s   moderate   Islamists are not 
contemporaries of nineteenth century Islamists.  They are rather the product of the 
mobilization   of   ‘broad   sectors   under   the   banner   of   radicalizing   Islam,   defeat   of  
radicalism  and  the  radicals’  strategic  change  after  the  defeat’  (Tuğal, 2009, p. 3). For 
him, in the case   of   ‘irresolvable,   total   crisis   of   the   whole   system’,   the remaining 
option is building the ‘independent,   non-institutional, revolutionary, 
uncompromising  organization’  but  it loses its influence and becomes radicalized and 
marginalized   (Tuğal, 2009, p.237). In other words, the crisis of the state generates 
the proper conditions for the emergence of radical movements as in the early 1990s 
with the state-PKK struggle.  
Another troublesome issue regarding moderation is the possibility of inability 
to manage the expectations of the masses.      For   instance,   the   WP’s   Just   Order  
program was not considered radical enough for the radical wing of the Party; and too 
radical and utopian for the growing capitalist wing within   the   Party   (Tuğal, 2009, 
p.249). Therefore, the Party had gradually moved away from the program. When the 
AKP gained strength, a totally new understanding of Islamic ethics of business 
replaced the Just Order: preaching working hard and privatization as an integral part 
of  religion  (Tuğal, 2009, p.249). At the end, the government was taken over by the 
Islamists, but did not become Islamic.  
Eligür  argues   that   the   Islamist  social  movements   in  Turkey  show  that   if   the 
political system offers political opportunity structures, social movements do not 
necessarily appeal to violence or carry out anti-regime social protests even if their 
final goal is overthrowing the existing regime (2010, p.276). She advocates that 
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political opportunity structures (for instance the Turkish Islam Synthesis project of 
military rulers after the 1980 military coup, and the presence of movement 
entrepreneurs etc.) make social movements reorganize politically via legal forms. 
Duran points out that Islamist political discourses can lean to both 
authoritarian/totalitarian and democratic inclinations; these formulations could 
provide a substantial amount of material from the tradition of Islamist political 
thinking (2010, p.130). 
In conclusion, the moderation literature is vast source, and it is fed by 
multiple disciplines. However, given the few number of in-depth case study analyses 
as well as the authenticity of each case makes it more difficult to make 
generalizations. Nonetheless, moderation is considered to be connected to the 
inclusion and democratic openings. Radical group/party/organization is affected by 
surrounding political and societal conditions. These conditions with internal 
variables enable the group to adopt the violent and revolutionary methods. Political 
and societal conditions are also influential for moderate groups.  
Moderates and radicals are not realities that stand alone. Even the slightest 
changes in the political surroundings might prompt the internal dynamics of the 
organization and result in an unexpected manner. The Huda-Par either as a 
continuation of the Hezbollah or as a new initiative is bound to the conditions of the 
political environment in Turkey. If democratization keeps moving in a positive 
direction, expectations from the Huda-Par would go in the same direction. On the 
contrary, if the regime in Turkey, once again, is shaken by other forces, and Kurdish 
people are compelled to marginalize again, there would be no guarantee of keeping 
things salient in terms of conducting legal forms of existence for the Huda-Par and 
organizations similar to it.  
In this thesis, my aim is to explain the dynamics behind the observed 
moderation of Kurdish Islamists in Turkey. In which areas has this transformation 
taken place? Why did the Community end up forming a new political organization? 
Why did it take so long for them to get politically organized?  
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CHAPTER 3 
ISLAMISM AND NATIONALISM IN TURKEY 
 
 
The emergence of Islamist ideas can be traced back to the nineteenth century. 
After centuries, the long golden age of Muslim empires in the East, starting from the 
seventeenth century, material decline (e.g., economic, scientific, territorial) became 
the inevitable pattern in the following periods.  When the Ottoman Empire was 
forced to pull back from the places it previously ruled, the imperial Western forces 
replaced it in its former territories. The Empire had to give up its territories in 
Europe, Africa and the Middle East and stay only in the Eastern Thrace, Anatolia and 
some Middle Eastern provinces, which were tied to the State on the basis of Islam 
and the Caliph. As an ideology Islamism was considered a way to sustain the 
survival of the Ottoman Empire during the traumatic dissolution process.  
Even though the issues of Islam and nationalism had started to be discussed 
after the 1860s, with the emergence of Neo-Ottomans in the history of Turkish 
political thought, the foundation of the contexts of Islamism and nationalism came 
later in the Constitutional Period (Duran, Çetinsaya and others, 2010, p.420). Islamist 
movements’ most important starting point is the spread of the idea “Islam   is   not  a 
hindrance  for  progress”3. The reason  for  the  decline  is  Muslims’  retrieval  from  living  
upon the   Islam’s   great   spirit,   justice   and   civilization.  The Muslim world had been 
considered to be enslaved by unnecessary habits, superstitions and bid’at 
(innovation) (Tunaya, 2007, p.15). Based on this idea, modern Islamist thinkers had 
reasoned about the existing status of the Muslim world and concluded that previous 
generations understood and lived Islam wrongfully; as a result followers also lived 
(Kara, 2010, p. 36). The alleged reason of the defeat was not in Islam; but in a form 
of Islam that was misunderstood and wrongfully experienced.  
 
3.1. Definitions of Islamism 
 
Because there is no agreed definition of Islamism, people or groups who have 
been considered as Islamists in theory, might not label themselves as Islamists in 
                                                          
3 In  Turkish:  İslamiyet  mani-i  terakki  değildir. 
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practice. The reason behind this rejection is acceptance of Islamism as an ideology as 
liberalism, communism or nationalism by many. Some also perceive Islamism as a 
political project. Thus, it sometimes might be associated with a degradation of 
religion to an ideology, program or project and therefore this term is harshly 
criticized and rejected.  
During the research process of this thesis, I personally had difficulty in 
getting the attention of the interviewees regarding the topic, since when they heard of 
the label Islamism they would easily attempt to reject it.  Persons from the group 
with which I conduct interviews do not associate themselves with Islamism directly 
and do think that Islamism is against the Islamic values in the first place. However, 
when the definitions of Islamism are repeated with all connotations, we could come 
to a mutual understanding. Nonetheless, it is observable that Islamism as a concept is 
often misunderstood.  As  Aktaş  points out, there is confusion in Turkey in terms of 
the self-definition of Muslims and Islamists, which she traces back to the alphabet 
reform and the harsh Republican policies towards Muslims in the early years of the 
Republic (2014, p.17).  
Aktaş  argues  that  the  emergence  of  Islamism  was  related  to  “a  consciousness”  
that could not cope in the Islam’s  position  as  a  religion  interested  only  with  afterlife, 
without important claims on life itself and is retreated in the face of Western 
modernization on the basis of worldly arguments (2014, p.23). She defines Islamism 
as a movement that is bound by time and place, without forgetting that Islam is the 
religion.  
According to Aktay, Islamism before everything else is a movement to return 
to the Qur’an and Sunnah in essence (Bezci and Miş, 2012, p. 3). As a salvation 
ideology in the nineteenth century, Islamism is historical. However, it gets its 
legitimacy from its claim of returning to the text.  
Bulaç  defines  Islamism  as  an  intellectual,  moral,  societal,  economic,  political  
and inter-state movement based on the founding principles of Islam which aims to 
make a   “new”   human,   society,   politics/state   and   imagination of world, which 
depends on a new social organization model and universal Islamic unity (21 July 
2012). 
The Grand Vizier of the last years of the Ottoman Empire, Said Halim Pasha 
defines Islamism as follows (Tunaya, 2007, p.13):  
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Acknowledging Islam as a social religion which covers religion and 
the world, materiality and spirituality; Islamization means, according 
to  the  necessities  of  time  and  place,  in  a  truest  way,  Islam’s  system  of  
faith, moral, sociology and political is construed and accorded. 
 
Hayrettin Karaman, a very important theologian and Islamist does not 
consider people Islamists if they live in their own world as Muslims but are not 
concerned with living Islam even in their own family. According to him, Islamists 
are those who want to spread Islam from their closest circles to the most distant 
places on earth, ones who care about  real  Islam’s  corruption  and  protect  Islam  from  
any form of decay, and those who sacrifice physically and morally for this cause (8 
July 2012).  
Kara’s   definition   of   Islamism   is one of the most comprehensive ones. 
According to this definition: 
Islamism is a movement emerged in the 19-20th centuries whose 
activists and eclectic dimensions are dominant, collection of political, 
intellectual and scholarly works, pursuits in order to remake Islam as a 
whole   (belief,   ritual,   moral,   philosophy,   politics,   law,   education…)  
dominant over life and save Muslim world from the Western 
exploitation, from tyrants and despotic rulers, from slavery, imitation, 
superstition with a rationalist method, civilize, unite and develop. (13 
August 2012) 
 
In addition, Kara suggests that Islamism desires to have a state and therefore 
is a political movement. Since Islamism foresees the purification of Islam from 
superstitions and deviations from the early practices, it might be considered as a 
fundamentalist movement. Perhaps, in comparison to the other movements of the 
time (nationalism, Westernism, socialism, liberalism etc.) Islamism can be thought as 
traditionalist. However, Islamism although based on the Qur’an and Sunnah, in 
interpreting   the   holy   texts   for   individuals’   and   societies’   needs   and   necessities,   it  
highlights reason and science. Certainly, it has a more religious discourse and targets 
a more conservative society and future. Although it is a modern movement, at the 
same time Islamism is a challenge to modernity. Its modernism arises from its 
affiliation   with   rationality.   Bezci   and   Miş   distinguish between conservatives and 
Islamists arguing that the latter follows a cause and originates from the text; people 
who perceive Islam as a meditation tool between the Creator and created cannot be 
Islamists (2012, p.7). Another distinction between Islamists and conservative people 
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is the former’s   support of the status quo, while the latter is a reaction against the 
status quo (Uslu, 2009, p.217).  
 
3.2. Islamism and Nationalism in the Turn of the 20th Century 
 
According to Tunaya, Islamism has had a twofold mission; one is an 
individual plan, the other is a collective plan (2007, p.19). It aims at regulating the 
life of individuals in the Muslim world by having a voice in their personal lives and 
determining road maps. As a collective plan, it foresees for people who have not 
been nationalized and nations which have not freed yet, a way for salvation, 
constitution and development through Islamic unity and based on norms which 
ensure relations. In short, Islamism is considered to be a life norm for people and 
societies of the Muslims world. 
Bulaç’s  categorization  of  Islamists  is  worth  for further attention. He separates 
Islamists into three generations (23 July 2012): The first generation of Islamists 
between the years of 1850-1924, the second generation of Islamists between the 
years of 1950-2000, and the third generation of Islamists starting from the twenty 
first century  have  been  on  the  stage.  According  to  Bulaç,  the  main  contextual  frame  
of the first generation of Islamists was to return to the Qur’an and Sunnah. Their 
political themes and inclinations centered on the survival of the Ottoman State whose 
founding principles and legitimacy was based on Islam and the existence of the 
Caliph.  
The French Revolution and the idea of nationalism affected the Ottoman 
Empire as it did other multiethnic empires/states of Europe at the time. Despite the 
secessionist movements of the Serbs, Greeks, and Albanians in the nineteenth 
century, the millet system and the existence of the Caliph had prevented most of the 
Muslim ethnic groups to rupture from its sphere of influence. Because of the idea of 
nationalism,   the   Empire’s   ethnic   groups, especially non-Muslim groups had 
secessionist claims. Therefore the ideological initiatives such as Ottomanism did not 
find much acceptance among the masses. On the other hand, Islamism could be a 
powerful means for at least holding Muslim groups together.  
According to Islamist thinkers, reforms in order to save the Empire from its 
decline were to be made in line with the Qur’an and Sunnah through jurisprudence. 
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Muslim thinkers in the nineteenth century such as Tahtawi, Nadim, Abduh identified 
nationalism with patriotism (Enayat, 2005, p.112). For the Muslim entities of the 
Ottoman Empire it did not pose a threat  to  the  Empire’s existence; on the contrary it 
should  have  been  useful.  Kirişçi   and  Winrow  perceive   the  protection  of   the  Sultan  
and the Caliph as the main factors of this patriotism (1997, p.95).  
Following the end of WWI, remaining Ottoman territories were under the 
occupation of the Allied forces. The sultan was unable to resist the Western 
occupiers. However, an irregular army was brought together in Anatolia in order to 
defeat the Occupiers and save the Caliph; and eventually it became successful. The 
occupiers were defeated in Anatolia; a new state was built in 1923. Zubaida argues 
that the ideology and political projections of pan-Islamism advanced after the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire along with pan-Islamism and the renewal of a 
preferably Arab caliphate (2004, p.409). Therefore in the first decades after the 
Ottoman Empire, many Arab thinkers did not see a contradiction between 
nationalism and Islam.  
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and emergence of the nation states 
in the Middle East, nationalism began to create an ideological controversy among 
Muslim intellectuals regarding the contradiction between Islam as a universalist 
message and nationalism   related   to   a  particular  group’s  needs   and  wishes   (Enayat, 
2005, p.112).. For instance, among Islamists, Islamist Turkish nationalists argue that 
nationalism does not contradict with Islam. They envisage a kind of federation 
constituted by different nationalities, a family of Islam, and a unity of Islam (Tunaya, 
2005, p.73).  Tunaya’s  ambiguous  connection  of   Islamism  and  nationalism  however  
do not reflect the realities of the Ottoman society right before its collapse. As a 
reaction to the nationalism in the Balkans, Turkish nationalism was on the rise. 
Kurdish nationalism emanated as a response to Turkish nationalism. 
Tunaya poses the question of whether Islamism can consort with Turkism as 
follows: 
Can Islamism consort with Turkism? From a political angle, 
nationalism’s  benefit  is  obvious  in  the  twentieth  century.  Nationalism  
is   also   compliant   with   the   sharia’s   requirements.   Because,   sharia   is  
based on national realities and beliefs. (2007, p.74) 
 
Enayat  opposes  to  Tunaya’s  argument.  He  argues  that  the Arab  nationalism’s  
connection with Islam makes it more understandable in terms of its conformity with 
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Islam. On the other hand, in the case of non-Arab nationalisms of the Muslim world 
such as Turkish and Iranian nationalisms, there was no intrinsic link between 
nationalism and Islam. According to him, nationalism sometimes objected Islam 
(Enayat, 2005, p.115).   He   presents   Atatürk’s   and   Rida   Shah’s   cultural   reforms   as  
being  directed  at  eliminating  Islam’s  power  in  Turkish  and  Iranian  identities.   
During the process of the dissolution of great empires in the early twentieth 
century, as states were shrinking the Islamic movements moved towards micro-
nationalism  (Altuntaş, 2010, p. 432).  Altuntaş  argues  that  although  they  retreated  to  
national borders, Islamists still alleged to be global as in the case of Wahhabi Islam 
of Saudi Arabia and Shiite Islam of Iran (2010, p.432). For Islamist thinking, 
state/governance has an important place as it has been considered as an important 
supplement of religion. For instance,  Eşref  Edib  –an important Islamist intellectual 
and publisher who lived between years of 1882-1971 – advocates that after the God 
and his prophet Muhammad, Muslims anticipated everything from their states and 
governments: 
Because there is no spirituality in Islam, governments/rulers, not the 
religious scholars, have been the means between Muslims and the 
God. By knowing that the benefits of their world and afterworld 
coexist only with their state and government, Muslims consider 
sacrifice of their own lives for the sake of the state as the biggest deed. 
(Duran,  Çetinsaya  and  others, 2010, p.132) 
 
The emergence of nation states in the Middle East started controversies 
among Islamist thinkers over the contradiction of nationalism and Islam. 
According to Duran, although Islamism in the first place implemented a total 
rejection of nationalism, in the course of time nationalism has been internalized 
(Duran,   Çetinsaya   and   others, 2010, p.154). Under the new conditions of Turkey, 
starting from 1918, criticism towards nationalism neither in theory nor in practice is 
observable on the writings of Islamists (Duran,  Çetinsaya  and  others, 2010, p.432). 
Collaboration between Islamists and Turkists, and the empowerment of one another 
had been directed towards imperialist forces during the Independence War. But after 
the war and with the foundation of the Republic this collaboration may have 
offended Kurdish Islamists who were loyal to the Islamic cause and less inclined to 
nationalism than their Turkish counterparts.  
After  WWI,   Islamism   lost   its   first   position   and   inclined   towards   “Islamism  
united with nationalism or Islamism-Turkism”   (Duran,  Çetinsaya  and  others,  2010,  
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p. 436). According to Kara, Islamism in Turkey and Islamism worldwide carried 
chronological and contextual similarities until   1924   (Özkan,   12   August   2012).  
According to him, after the Lausanne Peace Treaty, Turkey broke away from the 
Islamic world as well as from Islamism until the end of WWII and its aftermath.   
 
3.3. Transformation of the State and Responses of Turkish and Kurdish 
Nationalists and Islamists 
 
3.3.1. Kurdish Nationalism and Its Sources 
 
Kurdish nationalism emerged earlier than the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923. Like the other nations of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish 
population   had  met   with   the   idea   of   nationalism   in   the   nineteenth   century.   Çevik  
argues that the centralist administrative reforms of the nineteenth century resulted in 
split between the Ottoman governance and Kurdish provincial leaders which resulted 
in earlier Kurdish revolts and can be seen as the first signs of nationalism among 
Kurdish people (2012, p.90). According to Turan, the Tanzimat reforms awakened 
Kurdish nationalism (2011, p.226). Because the reforms were equalizing the non-
Muslim minorities with Muslims in legal terms, ignoring that the Sharia was a 
contract for Kurdish people with the State and its deactivation would mean the start 
of a period where there remained no binding constitution for Kurdish people (Turan, 
2011, p. 226). 
Turan attributes three sources of Kurdish nationalism after the Party of Union 
and Progress4, 1908: the Bedirhan dynasty and the Damascus school, Mullahs who 
became socialists for Kurdism such as the poet Cegarxwin, and the organizations 
such as the PKK, KUK (Kurdistan National Salvation) who used Kurdism for 
socialist ends after the 1960s (2011, p.365). The Bedirhan dynasty was an old 
Kurdish family with important figures who sought to follow a similar path to Turkish 
nationalism (Latinizing the alphabet, secular schooling) in order to spread and 
strengthen Kurdish nationalism among Kurdish people. However, Kurdish rebellions 
have been much more influential and sounding in bringing Kurdish nationalism to 
the forefront. First and greatest Kurdish revolts against the Ottoman and its successor 
Turkish state were championed by religious leaders such as Sayed Ubeidullah Nehri 
                                                          
4 İttihat  Terakki  Fırkası. 
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(in 1880), Sheikh Abdusselam Barzani (1913), Molla Selim (1914), Sheikh Said (in 
1925),  and Sheikh Mahmood Barzinji (in 1919, 1922, and 1931). All these 
rebellions were considered religious as well as nationalistic movements and 
suppressed violently. The Ottoman government preferred sending rebellious leaders 
to exile rather than giving them death sentences. Kurdish people are known to be 
loyal to the unity of the Ottoman state. During the years of WWI and its aftermath, 
moderate Kurdish leaders were in favor of autonomy of Kurdistan rather than 
secessionism  (Özbey, 2009, p. 49).    
One of the prominent leaders of the Kurds, Sayyid Abdulkadir Nehri founded 
the Committee of Unity and Progress5 in 1908 and its founding document is 
important in terms of reflecting the ideas of important Kurdish figures of the time 
(Özbey, 2009, p. 43). For  Olson,  Nehri’s   leadership of Kurdish people marked the 
first stage of Kurdish nationalism (1989). Some articles from the document are 
important to notice:  
Protection of the Constitution that is based on Sharia and the official 
document of the unity and security of state and people. 
Protection of the unity of the Ottoman state. 
Not having any kind of privilege of one community over another. 
(Özbey, 2009, p. 43). 
 
The Bedirhanis left the Committee later in 1920 on the grounds of the division 
from   Nehri’s   management,   who   opposed   the independency but rather preferred 
autonomy  under  Turkish  custody  (Özbey, 2009, p. 50). 
With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the relations between Kurdish 
people and the state changed. Especially after the Sheik Said rebellion, almost all 
participants many of whom were sheikhs and mullahs were hanged without a proper 
court decision6. According to Olson (1989), the Sheikh Said rebellion was a result of 
the culmination of four distinct stages of Kurdish nationalism. Following the 
quashing of the rebellion, hundreds of Muslim, Kurdish and Turkish people were 
decided  to  be  hanged  by  the  Independence  Courts  (Özbey, 2009, p. 99). Immediately 
after the rebellion, mass deportations of Kurdish populations towards Western cities 
were organized. In the winter of 1926-1927, hundreds of thousands of people were 
deported   to   the   Western   Anatolia   and   hundreds   of   villages   were   burned   (Özbey, 
                                                          
5 Teavun  ve  Terakki  Cemiyeti  that  later  became  Kürdistan  Teali  Cemiyeti. 
6 According  to  Özbey,  660  people  were  sentenced  to  death  (129). 
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2009, p.105). These policies resulted in the flee of many Kurdish people to 
neighboring countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria as well as many small and large 
scale   insurrections   such  as  Ağrı  Revolt   (1926-1930),  Şemdinli  Revolt,   and Dersim 
Revolt (1937). The groups in exile found Xoybun in 5 October 1927, which was led 
by Celadet Bedirhan and his brother Kamuran Bedirhan. Xoybun is considered as the 
first organization of Kurdish nationalism (Turan, 2001, p.367).   Former members of 
the  Society  of   the  Rise  of  Kurdistan  (Kürdistan  Teali  Cemiyeti)  opposed  Xoybun’s  
program and eventually left the organization; therefore Xoybun remained and 
maintained   as   a   much   more   secular   and   nationalist   organization   (Özbey, 2009, 
p.144).   It   declared   independence   of  Kurdistan   according   to  Sevres’   provisions   and  
Ağrı  as  its  temporal  capital  in  1927.  The Ağrı  Insurrection  lasted long and in 1930 it 
could hardly be detained.    
According to Turan, among Kurdish people four ideas emerged regarding the 
Sheikh Said rebellion and they have been represented up to the date:  
1. Sheikh Said movement was a pure Islamic movement which was 
against the abolition of the Caliphate and Islamic law. 
2. It was a nationalist movement which was a result  of  Cibranlı  Halil  Bey  
and   Bitlisli   Yusuf   Ziya’s   efforts   in   spreading the idea of Kurdish 
nationalism. However, the movement was led by religious leaders and 
therefore Islamic tone was overemphasized. 
3. Sheikh Said did not accept the oppression and our ancestors also 
helped him. 
4. Because of the movement, we lost what we previously had. It did 
harm the Kurdish religious life. (2011, p.184) 
 
Turan categorizes the Kurdish political map through four distinct categories of 
opinions on the Sheikh Said rebellion: The first idea emerges as a pure Islamic 
understanding, the second idea appears as secular-nationalist movement, the third 
idea joins to the conservative Turkish political wing (Democrat Party and its 
successors) and lastly the apolitical wing (2011, p.284). According to Atasoy, the 
Sheikh  Said   rebellion’s   significance   aroused from the ban on Sufi orders and their 
lodges, which created a space for the emergence of Kurdish ethnic nationalism 
(2009, p. 44).  For  Çevik,   it   resulted   in   the differentiation among Kurdish Islamists 
and Turkish Islamists. The latter was accepted as more conformist than its Kurdish 
counterparts (2012, p.90).  
According to Karaman, Islamists’   attitudes and reactions towards Republican 
reforms were different, where all of them were legitimate according to their 
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jurisprudence and its products (08 July 2012). He exemplifies two Saids: Sheikh Said 
who prefers rebellion; Said-i Nursi who prefers the spread of religion through 
education. Interesting enough, two Saids are embraced by the Kurdish Islamists and 
accepted as two important figures for their movement. Said Nursi is known for his 
attempts to improve Kurdish regions and educate the Kurdish society; however he 
was not in favor of an independent Kurdish state and was not either Kurdish 
nationalist (Özbey,  2009,  p.89). Sheikh Said who chose activism and rebellion was 
an important religious figure in the Nakshibendi line and a respondent from religious 
schools   (madrasa)   of   the   region   (Özbey, 2009, p.116). Tutar while explaining the 
sources and inspirers of the Hezbollah, points to the two Saids, Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt, struggle methods deployed in Iran before the Revolution, Mawdudi and 
Iqbal in Pakistan both appealing to methods of violence and education (2011, pp.159, 
163).  
 
3.3.2. Transformation of the Turkish State  
 
According  to  Eligür,  the  idea  of  a  territorial  nation  state  based  on  the Turkish 
nation appeared in the early days of the Independence War (2010, p.41). Ahmad 
argues that during the War, nationalists were forced to use Islamic propaganda in 
order   to   counter   Istanbul’s   propaganda   against   them   (1991, p.6). The struggle was 
called “national   struggle”,   however,   back   at   the time the word nation in Turkish 
“millet”  was  used  as  a  religiously  comprehensive  meaning.   
During the opening ceremony of the new Parliament in 1920, Mustafa Kemal 
acknowledged that the Parliament was not constituted by the representatives of 
Turks, Kurds, Circassians and Laz; but the members of the Islamic community that 
was brought together by a powerful bond (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997, p.95). Despite 
the fact that the new regime founded in 1923 declared autonomy was to be granted to 
the   Kurds,   ‘Kurdistan policy’   of   the   Ministry   of   Council   on   27   June   1921   was  
defined  ‘building  a  local  government   in   the  lands  inhabited  by  Kurds’  and  Mustafa  
Kemal’s   acknowledgment   regarding   the   autonomous   status   of  Kurdish   land   before  
the public, with the constitutional change  in  1924  Kurdish  people’s  status  had  been  
changed  (Yeğen, 2009, p.599).  
The new constitution defined the Turkish nation in a more planned fashion. 
The new form was excluding the varieties of the people on the one hand, but 
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certainly in the idea that this formulation will give birth to a nation. Thus, it was 
much more a declaration of the intention and was very much shaped by Mustafa 
Kemal’s   understanding and expectation (Kirişçi   and   Winrow, 1997, p.100). The 
desire of the homogeneity of people and uniformity of the state is felt throughout this 
definition.  Mustafa Kemal defined the nation as a group of people who is living in 
the same geography, governed by the same rules, shared a common language and 
moral;;   put   great   emphasize   on   the   “will   of   living   together”   (Kirişçi   and  Winrow, 
1997, p.101). The idea of Islamic community was replaced with Turkish Nation: 
What is Turkish Revolution?(...) In order to maintain the existence of 
the nation the common bond among individuals had been changed in 
shape and context; in other words, instead of religious and sectarian 
bonds, the nation (millet)  with  the  linkage  of  “Turkish  Nation”  gather  
individuals. (Özbey, 2009, p.92) 
 
With   the   foundation   of   the   Republic,   Atatürk’s   concept   of   Turkish  
nationalism became one of the most important state ideologies of the Republic. 
During   Atatürk’s   presidency,   “the glorious past of the Turks since their earliest 
origins” started  to  be  studied  (Eligür, 2010, p.41). Secularism was the other pillar of 
the newly built Republic. Islamism was marginalized  (Hanioğlu,  9  July  2012).    From  
this time onward, Kurdish people were denied of collective rights. There was no 
more an ethnic population that demands their political rights, but a group of Turkish 
citizens who got involved in reactionary politics, tribal problems, and 
underdevelopment issues.  
Sarıgil   adds   that   the   state’s   official position over the Kurdish issue is that 
there is no ethno-political problem in Turkey but rather a problem of socio-economic 
backwardness in the Southeastern region (2010, p.532). According to Tutar, the most 
radical Republican reform was the change in the Second Article of the 1924 
Constitution  that  “the  religion  of  the  state  is  religion  of  Islam”  with  “Turkish  State  is  
republican, nationalist, populist, statist,   laic   and   reformist”   on 5 February 1937 
(2011, p.121).  
The new system in the Republican Turkey had been founded on a radical 
approach to the indivisibility of the state and had assimilationist practices towards 
marginal/minority groups (Mardin, 1997, p.71). During the Ottoman Empire and the 
Turkish Independence War, religion had played an important role in holding people 
together, establishing the bridges between different social groups and answering 
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‘existential   questions’   (Mardin, 1997, p.71). However, this sense of religion was 
much more horizontal   in   shape.   According   to   Kırmızı   and   Bölme,   the   sense   of 
belonging   to   a   common   religion  had  been   the  most   important   ground   for  Turkey’s  
nation building process (2007). In Lausanne, minorities had been identified on 
religious terms. Therefore, Turkish Republic was able to deploy the  policy  of  “there  
is   no   Muslim   minority”   and   had   been   successful   in   the   implementation   towards  
Albanians, Bosnians and Pomaks since they had been successfully fused into Turkish 
identity; nonetheless Kurdish people still were otherized even though they were not 
new comers or immigrants  (Kırmızı  &  Bölme,  2007).  This  resulted  in  the  change  of  
the sense of religion as a binder of social groups to a vertical way where official 
Sunni Islam regarded as the formal religion of the state and cultural deviations 
among people had to be melted into this hierarchical structure. 
With the new regime, the Kurds have been regarded as part of Turkishness 
and have been subjected to intense Turkification (Yeğen, 2009, p.598). In order to 
prove the Turkishness of Kurdish people, the new regime showed great effort. 
According   to   this   “scientific   notion”,  Kurds  were   constituted   from  Turkish   people  
who lost their language as a result of cultural exchange (spoke broken Persian) and 
lived in Turkey,   Iran   and   Iraq   (Kirişçi   and   Winrow, 1997, p.108). The regime 
deployed many practices to Turkify the Kurdish population which included the 
compulsory settlements of the Kurdish people to the West, state-sponsored education 
programs, encouraging marriages between Turkish civil servants and Kurdish girls, 
bans on traditional Kurdish religious schools, strong incentives for the boarding 
schools, and the  allowance  of  land  to  the  civil  servants  in  the  region  (Yeğen, 2009, p. 
602). Perhaps, one of the most important practices of this kind was the Settlement 
Law of 1934 which divided people and geography into three: Turks and Turkish 
speakers, counted from Turkish culture but non-speaker of Turkish, and unfamiliar to 
Turkish culture and non-speakers  of  Turkish  (Kirişçi  and  Winrow, 1997, p.103).  
Non-speakers and speakers of Turkish were made closer to each other in 
order to melt the cultural and linguistic differences through settlement policies. Some 
Kurds forcefully immigrated to the Western Anatolia as some Turks immigrated to 
the Kurdish regions.  This law directed at creating a homogeneous group of people 
who spoke a common language. In contrary to the exclusionary policies regarding 
the non-Muslims of Turkey, Kurdish people were subject to direct assimilation.  
Sarıgil   argues   that   pro-Islamic intellectuals believed that by endorsing secular and 
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anti-religious nationalism, official Turkish nationalism promoted the rise of Kurdish 
nationalism (2010, p.536). 
According to Ahmad, Republican reforms served the Kemalist recognition of 
the importance of the religion in Kurdish revolts as well as for the masses (1991, 
p.7). Therefore, responses of the political elites of the regime towards the revolts 
were harsh. It based on the idea of almost total prohibition of collective religious 
practicing such as the abolition of Sufi orders and their lodges.  Mardin has a 
different angle on the issue.  Parallel to the   early   Republican   era’s   failure   to  
understand the power of Islam within the society, he points to the existence of an 
inability   to   address   the   significance   of   Islam   which   caused   ‘unnecessary 
consternation’ among Turkish intellectuals upon the rise of political Islam in Turkey 
(1997, p.67).  
From the early years of the Republic, the reforms directed each and every 
aspect of political, social, and economic as well as religious practices. The 
underdevelopment and corruption discourse was deployed to convince people with a 
created sense of protecting the pureness of religion, the sacred and people.   For 
instance, as it was argued by Ziya Gökalp  –one of the most important ideologue of 
the Turkish Republic- for the sake of religion and nation, the judicial authority 
should be given to the secular courts of the state.  The law should not be derived 
from religious principles but from the needs of the society.  
The aim of adopting secularism and nationalism was to create a modern, 
homogenous, rational state and it became more and more militant against Islam 
(Ahmad, 1991, p.3). The fear of Islamist activism prevented political actors to use 
Islamism as a political project; instead an official Islam was conceptualized in which 
every  approach  to  Islam  except  the  state’s  had  been  precluded,  and secularism meant 
a struggle against the  devout  and  nationalism  was  blessed  (Hanioğlu,  9  July  2012).  In  
1928, the article that described Islam as the religion of the state was removed from 
the Constitution.   
The rulers of the new Republic were insistent to remove the religion from 
public life. In addition, they used mechanisms and institutions to form a version of 
Sunni Islam such as Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet   İşleri   Başkanlığı), 
ordering the Turkish translation of the Qur’an  to  Elmalılı  Muhammed  Hamdi  Yazır  –
an important theologian of the time- through a protocol that shows the expectations 
of the regime from the translation, establishing religious vocational high schools 
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(İmam  Hatip  okulları) in order to generate the clergymen who meet the needs of the 
regime and cultivate this version of Islam among the people. The series of reforms 
directed to the religious institutions varied from the removal of the Caliphate to the 
ban on religious dress codes7, and from the ban on going to the Holy sites8 to the 
change in the Arabic letters, and so on. In a way, nationalism became the new 
regime’s  religion.   
 
3.3.3. Islamism in the Republican Turkey 
 
Zubaida argues that reformed religion would be based on reason and text 
which would be interpreted through the angle of modernism and modern law (2004, 
p.409). In other words, religious reformers despite being on different poles have 
overlapped  with  secular  nationalists  including  Atatürk  and  Rida  Shah,  as  well  as  with  
fundamentalists, radicals such as the Salafis and Wahabbis. All religious reformers 
were aiming at the purification of the religion in order to ensure progress within the 
society.  By doing so, they were rejecting the existing status of religion in quest of 
transforming it with a top-down manner.  
This is what happened in the experience of the Turkish state. As the reforms 
were intensified, the bonds among Muslim people within the country were 
weakened.  The  Republic’s  radical  secular  reforms  caused  Islam  to  move  away  from  
the public sphere and intolerance towards any possibility that might have awakened 
the Caliphate and the sultanate resulted in the absence of an Islamist opposition. This 
enabled Turkish Islamists to be closer to a nationalist line which in the long run 
might share a similar ground with Kemalists (Çetinsaya,  Duran and others, 2010, p. 
135).  
As Mardin states, the Republic adopted Western educational systems and 
cultural   practices   without   understating   that   they   were   “the   tip   of   an   iceberg   of  
meanings,  perceptions  and  ontological  positions”  (1997, p.65). The Republican elite 
missed the fact that Islam established bridges between different ethnic groups. And 
                                                          
725 November 1925 Hat Act and 3 December 1934 act which forbades clerics to 
wear religious clothes places except for the mosques and prayer sites. 
8 During the Second World War years, through claiming the economic difficulties 
and foreign currency deficits, making pilgrimage to the Holy Sites in Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia  was  prevented  by  the  regime  until  1947  (Özdemir,  2013,  p.71). 
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perhaps the fear of this bond made the Republican elites anxious for the survival and 
continuity of the new Republic. 
For Kurdish people, the institution of the Caliphate was one of the strongest 
ties with the Turkish state in which Kurdish notables and religious leaders had felt 
themselves  responsible.  As  Kirişçi  and  Winrow  points out the Caliphate had been the 
source of legitimacy for the Ottoman Empire and self-definition mechanism for the 
Empire’s  Muslim  people  (1997, p.99). One year after the removal of the Caliphate, 
one of the most important Kurdish rebellions in Kurdish history started in 1925 and 
lasted from 13 February to 15 April: Sheikh Said Rebellion.  
Kirişçi  and  Winrow  trace this rebellion back to the Azadi Movement which 
was established in May 1923 as a Kurdish nationalist movement that aimed to found 
an  independent  Kurdish  state  and  antagonized  the  Turkish  state’s  dissolution  of   the  
Caliphate and other nationalistic and secular reforms led by Colonel Halid Bey and 
Bitlis MP Yusuf Ziya Bey and followed by Kurdish nationalists and Kurdish officers 
in the Ottoman army (1997, p.109).  
Özbey   argues   that   Azadi’s   real   motivation   was   the   realization   of   the   new  
Republic’s  projects  of  Westernization  and  secularization  and   its  non-recognition of 
Kurdish people (2009, p.119).  Kurdish people who believed that they fought for the 
Caliphate’s   and   the   state’s   liberation   during   the   Independence  War  must   have   felt 
they were cheated  with  the  Republican  secular  reforms  (Çevik, 2012, p. 90).  Kirişçi  
and Winrow point out Mustafa  Kemal’s  efforts to get the Kurdish  people’s  support  
by emphasizing the bond of religion during the Independence War (1997, p.95). 
Sheikh   Abdulbaki,   Sheikh   Abdurrahmane   Şernexi,   Sheikh   Mahmud   Berzenci,  
Sheikhs of Norshin and many other important Kurdish scholars, leaders and 
prominent figures received letters from Mustafa Kemal in which he was asking the 
Kurdish   people’s   help   for   “saving   the   Caliph   and   Islam   from   the  
enslavement”(Özbey, 2009, p.64). This was not surprising; since for Turkish Muslim 
scholars and ideologues of the new regime supporters such  as  Ziya  Gökalp,  Yusuf  
Akçura,  and Ahmed  Ağaoğlu. Islam should be used to promote the interests of the 
state   (Balcı, 2008, p.6). Therefore, during the Independence War the discourse of 
religion was frequently used to increase the number of people to support the cause. In 
this argument, Islam and nationalism were compatible and the feeling of nationalism 
was based on the power of Islam. 
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In the meantime, policies deployed for the suppression of the Kurdish people 
did not resolve the Kurdish issue; on the contrary, they resulted in a chronic and deep 
Kurdish problem which in turn led Kurdish people to appeal to violence in order to 
express their demands. Insurrections had been perceived as threats to the foundation 
of the new Turkish state and shook the confidence of Mustafa Kemal and his 
followers  on  their  efforts  of  social  conversion  in  Turkey  (Kirişçi  and  Winrow, 1997, 
p.105).  However, this confidence loss resulted in harsher reforms following the first 
years of the 1920s and 1930s. The failure of the Kurdish revolts is considered to be 
result of the irregularity and disorganization which can be attributed to the structure 
of the Kurdish society (divided along tribes, religious and linguistic affiliations) 
(Kirişçi   and   Winrow, 1997, p.111). In 1939, all the Kurdish rebellions were 
suppressed and the Turkish state reinforced its sovereignty in the region.   
After the transition to the multiparty system, an Islamist line came about from 
a nationalist-spiritual discourse by Necip   Fazıl Kısakürek9 and other Islamist 
intellectuals (Çetinsaya,  Duran  and  others,  2010,  p.154).  According  to  Çetinsaya,  in  
contrary to the common belief, Islamists and Turkists have never been deadly 
enemies (Çetinsaya,  Duran  and  others, 2010, p.420). He argues that Islamist criticism 
was not towards nationalism, but towards secessionism, which ended with Arab 
revolts  in  1916.  On  the  other  hand,  Çevik  suggests  that  this  emphasis  on  nationalism  
made by Turkish Islamists after the foundation of the Republic had caused the 
emergence of a different Islamic version in which Kurdish Islam had been 
considered as a reactionary movement (2012, p.89).  According to Zubaida, Turkish 
Islamism is national and often nationalist (2004, p.414). In the new Republic, Sunni 
Islam considered as a criterion for Turkish citizenship in truest sense. Shafi Kurds or 
Alevis of Central and Eastern Anatolia constituted a distinct and somehow heretical 
position in the eyes of the Republican elites which enabled further merge of Turkish 
Islamism with nationalism of the state.  
Islamists were not able to be active between 1924 and 1950 as an expected 
result of the Republican regime’s  restrictions. After the continuous state suppression 
for decades, in 1950, Kurdish nationalism and Islamism were reduced to a very weak 
                                                          
9 Necip  Fazıl  Kısakürek  (1904-1983) is one of the most important Islamists thinker, 
poet,  novelist,  philosopher  and  publisher  of  “Great  East  – Büyük  Doğu”  magazine.  
Kısakürek  was  and  still  is  very  influential  figure  for  a  large  spectrum  of  people  and  
especially the conservatives and Islamists of Turkey. 
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position and almost nonexistence while Kurdish religious and tribal leaders were 
articulated  to  Turkish  political  system  (Kirişçi  and  Winrow, 1997, p.112). However, 
during this time period, other parts of the Islamic world were witnessing the 
emergence of powerful and demanding voices of Islamists such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and Jamaat al-Islami in Pakistan. 
In the years following 1945, with the end of WWI and the triumph of the 
Allies, especially the USA, the idea of democracy became a powerful call among the 
ordinary people. In this environment, since the regime was violating the freedom of 
religion Turkey’s Islamists were able to present Turkish secularism as 
antidemocratic. With a multiparty system starting in 1946, opposition movements 
had increasingly found space for their activities. Remaining Islamist and Turkist 
intellectuals started their publications again.  Political parties with Islamic themes 
emerged. Between the years of 1924 and 1950 at least eight parties had reference to 
Islamic   values   in   their   party   programs   (Eligür, 2010, p.52). Islamic responses had 
been directed to the reforms imposed on people by an authoritarian regime. 
According to Ahmad concessions made after 1945 although they were neither a 
counter-revolution nor a partial return to Islamic law, were acknowledgments of this  
disturbance and also efforts to reestablish the relations between the state and society 
(1991, p.8). Ahmad argues that Islamists –sophisticated ones- did not ask to end 
secularism; they claimed true secularism - where the state would not interfere with 
any course of religion, religious institutions and vice versa – this was not applied in 
Turkey because the religious system was tied to the state (1991, p.8). According to 
Ahmad, this argument became an important constituency of the Islamist discourse in 
Turkey.   Similarly,   Duran   argues   that   the   Republic’s   deeds   had   caused   loss   in   the  
demands among Islamists regarding Sharia; contrary to the general trend in the 
Islamic world, Turkish Islamists could not realize their quests of returning the Sharia 
rule openly (Çetinsaya,  Duran  and  others,  2010,  p.133).  
Bulaç  argues  that  the second generation of Islamists between 1950 and 2000 
saw  “nation-state”  as  their  reference  framework. For them, the real concern was the 
preservation of Islam in the state rather than problems of the Muslim world or 
matters of jurisprudence (Çetinsaya,  Duran  and  others,  2010,  p.453).  Their political 
themes and inclinations were towards the Islamic state and Islamic society rather 
than the unity of the Muslim  world  (Bulaç,  23  July  2012).  Duran  points  out that since 
the radical reforms of the Republic had excluded Islamists from the public sphere 
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and there did not remain any possibility of publicly being at opposition, the Islamists 
appealed to nationalism as a shelter (Çetinsaya,  Duran  and  others,  2010,  p.135).  
In 1950 and onwards, the Democrat Party (DP)’s  tolerance  towards  religious  
values resulted in Sufi orders’  growth,  increase  in  the  number  of  the  Qur’an schools, 
construction of mosques, and religious organizations (Atasoy, 2009, p.74). However, 
the Islamist agenda was not politically expressed. According to Atasay, Menderes –
the leader of the DP and prime minister between 1950 and 1960- was not about to 
allow   anything   close   to   an   Islamist   “counter-revolution against secular Kemalist 
principles” (2009, p.74). As a result of continuous disappointments, throughout the 
end of the 1950s Democrat Party’s  position  among people who could be categorized 
as Islamists such as sheiks, landlords, and prominent leaders in especially the east 
and southeastern region in Turkey deteriorated. Expectations were not met.    
With the 1960 military coup, democracy in Turkey was interrupted once 
again. Despite the 1961 constitution’s  relative  openness  to civil and collective rights, 
Article 19 became an obstacle for political expression of religious values and was 
abused by the political authorities in times of political crisis with Islamists. 
According to the article: 
No individual can exploit religion in order to change the social, 
economic, political, or legal structure of the state according to 
religious principles; neither can he use religion to further his personal 
or political interests. (Eligür, 2010, p.60) 
 
Turan expresses that after the 1960 military coup, the spread of socialism was 
supported by the state among Kurdish people in order for them to break away from 
Islamic identity in the context of a dis-identification project (2011, p.290). Thus, 
contrary to a rise in Islamism among Turkish counterparts, Kurdish political 
expressions were leftist in the 1960s. 
Islamist intellectuals of the period seemed to have shared the idea of 
nationalism. However a bold line had been drawn between an atheist Turkism and 
Muslim  Turkism.  For  Turkish  Islamists,  the  Prophet’s  hadith  of  “a person cannot be 
punished   for   loving   his/her   nation”   proves   the   existence   of   nationalism   in Islam 
(Çetinsaya,   Duran   and   others,   2010,   p. 437). Nonetheless, this nationalism has 
limitations. Ayoob argues that political Islam comes in different shapes and sizes 
(2007, p.154). These differences were not only observed among Islamists in different 
countries, but also among Islamists of the same country as well. This is considered to 
 
 
36 
 
be related to the fact that Islamists within a specific country, ideologically and in 
terms of their goals might have different strategies in the political arena. While some 
Muslim thinkers consider nationalism a form of idolatry (such as Qutb), others 
deploy a tempered view on nationalism bringing its benefits to the forefront.   
Throughout the late 1960s, Islamists were inspired by domestic religious 
leaders and intellectuals  such  as  Said  Nursi,  Süleyman  Hilmi  Tunahan,  Necip  Fazıl  
Kısakürek,  Hüseyin  Hilmi  Işık  and  so  on  (Çetinsaya,  Duran  and  others,  2010,  p.477). 
After the second half of the1960s Islamists of Turkey met with their counterparts in 
other parts of the Muslim world and were influenced deeply from their publications. 
Most of these publications were written in a reactionary Islamic context (Uslu, 2009, 
p.216). This knowledge has played a significant role in shaping the political 
discourse of Islamists in Turkey (Eligür, 2010, p.62). It is importnt to note that 
Islamic internationalism was supported by Saudi Arabia,  in the mid-1960s, Saudi 
Arabia started   financing   the   Union   of   the   World   of   Islam   (Rabita’t   ul-Alam ul-
Islami) (Ahmad, 1991, p.13). Kara perceives this influence troublesome since 
Turkish Islamists were unsuccessful in returning their own resources and 
internalizing the new items with the existent accumulation through the critique and 
process  of   filtering   (Özkan,  12  August   2012).     However,  unlike  parties from other 
ideologies, Islamists were not able to form their political parties before the 1970s. 
Until the 1970s they were participating in existing political parties.  
1969 saw the emergence of the National   Outlook  Movement   (Milli   Görüş  
Hareketi) led by Necmettin Erbakan which can be considered one of the longest 
continuing and important Islamist political movement in Turkey. The movement was 
a call for activism and this was dividing the Organization from the previous religious 
social-political organizations (Ahmad, 1191, p.13). According to Mert, the National 
Outlook Movement in general terms is a salvation ideology such as the movements 
in the Constitutional Period of the late Ottoman Empire (Çetinsaya,   Duran   and  
others, 2010, p.414). The Movement put great emphasis on the moral renewal and 
restoring religious values. The survival of Turkey was directly related to the moral 
status of the society. They also brought strong criticism towards Westernization in 
terms of moral perspective. The projects such as Islamic Common  Market   (İslam  
Ortak  Pazarı)  and  D-8 (Developing Eight which consisted of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt and Nigeria) excited Islamists and enabled 
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the vision of the ideal of the Islamic World (Çetinsaya,  Duran and others, 2010, p. 
477). 
The National   Outlook   Movement’s   political   wing, the National Salvation 
Party (Milli Selamet Partisi –the MSP) had been founded in 1972 following its 
predecessor’s   (Milli Nizam Partisi – the National Order Party) closure by the 
Constitutional   Court’s   decision.   The   decision   was   based   on   the   protection   of   the 
secular   order   and  Atatürk’s   reforms.   Starting   from   the 1973 general elections, the 
MSP  became  “the  organized  Islamist  expression  of  discontent”  (Eligür, 2010, p.71). 
Mert suggests that after the 1980s, the Movement started to keep itself distant from 
nationalism. The Party had a strong electoral base not only among Turkish Islamists 
and conservatives, but also in predominantly Kurdish populated regions 
Other than the National Outlook Movement, Turkish Islamism positioned 
itself close to the center. The 1980 military coup had different consequences for 
Islamists. For coup makers, Islam was transferred and articulated to the official 
ideology as in the version of Article   136   of   the  Constitution   “mission   of   national  
solidarity  and  unity”  (Çetinsaya,  Duran  and  others,  2010,  p.527).  
The military regime’s   Turkish   Islam   Synthesis   (TIS)   project   transformed 
Islamism and its demands deeply. The project envisioned the social engineering 
through the creation of citizens who are nationalist, loyal to the state, and respectful 
to the moral values of Islam –but certainly not political Islamists- (Balcı, 2008, p.6). 
Cizre argues that enlightened Islam was considered as the best protection against 
communism and even religious fanaticism (Cizre, 1196, p.239). Even though 
military rulers were not sympathetic to political Islam in anyway, they needed the 
power of religion to legitimize their acts. The TIS was a drift from Kemalist 
ideology, but nonetheless was much more unifying than any of the Kemalist 
principles.  The military rulers implemented the TIS through a new reinterpretation 
of Turkish-Islamic history and incorporation of it to the nationalistic view. 
Introduction of religious courses obligatory in public schools, allowing Imam-Hatip 
school graduates to attend all departments of universities are some of its practices 
(Eligür, 2010, p.95).   
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3.3.4. Kurdish Issue and Kurdish Islamism 
 
For the sides of Kurdish issue, the 1980 military coup became a turning point.  
In the end of the 1960s, large scale protests were organized in order to emphasize the 
problems of the Eastern Anatolia. “East  Rallies10”  which  enabled  the mobilization of 
a conscious who problematized the Eastern Anatolia and the Kurdish. The 
emergence of this conscious group resulted in the foundation of cultural and 
students’ organizations that drove forward Kurdish ethnicity such as Revolutionist 
Eastern Cultural Hearths11 (Kirişçi  and  Winrow, 1997, p.116).  These  organizations’  
primary concern was the recognition of the Kurdish language and cultural rights by 
the state. In the 1970s as result of the TIP’s   (Turkey   Worker’s   Party)  
acknowledgements   of   Kurdish   people’s   existence,   an increase in the number of 
radical leftist Kurdish organizations was observed and Kurdish voters inclined 
toward the  leftist  parties  (Kirişçi  and  Winrow, 1997, p.114). A parliamentary report 
also reveals that some security operations such as burning villages as a military 
strategy, and forced migration resulted in raising Kurdish nationalism. This in turn 
triggered the foundation of the PKK and its ability to attract supporters (Kirişçi  and  
Winrow, 1997, p.135). With the 1980 coup, members of Marxist separatist Kurdish 
organizations were subjected to heavy torture in prisons. Their organizations were 
banned. Moreover, expression of an identity other than Turkish was limited by the 
1982 constitution and foundation of associations and political parties were 
complicated  (Kirişçi  and  Winrow, 1997, p.118). 
Item numbered 2932, which was written on 19 October 1983 states: 
Except the first official language of the recognized countries by the 
Turkish state, it is banned to express, spread and publish of the ideas 
with another language. (Özbey, 2009, p.110) 
 
In   the   meantime,   PKK’s   establishment   can   be   considered   one   of   the   most  
important  turning  points  in  the  Kurdish  issue  in  Turkey.  Kirişçi  and  Winrow  trace  its  
foundation  to  a  meeting  that  was  organized  by  Öcalan  in  Diyarbakır  in  1977  where  it 
was agreed on a document  “the  Way  of  Kurdish  Revolution12”  which  would  become  
the   PKK’s   program   after   its   official   foundation   in   November   1978   (1997, p.117). 
                                                          
10 Doğu  Mitingleri. 
11 Devrimci  Doğu  Kültür  Ocakları. 
12 Kürdistan  Devriminin  Yolu. 
 
 
39 
 
After  the  1980  military  coup,  PKK’s  use  of  violence13 made the Kurdish issue one of 
the most important issues in the Turkish political agenda.   
In  addition  to  the  state  policies,  PKK’s  impact  on  transformation of Kurdish 
nationalism and Islamism   cannot   be   denied.   As   Abdülmelik   Fırat   –grandson of 
Sheikh Said- states, the state’s  suppressive  policies  in  the  East  played  a much more 
important role in the awakening   Kurdish   national   consciousness   than   the   PKK’s  
activities.  However, the PKK has been in realizing the problematic approach of the 
state in terms of the Kurdish issue and strategize its discourse over these deviances.  
For the Kurdish society, religion has been an important regulatory force. In 
the East and Southeast region, the percentage of belonging to a religious order 
exceeds 30 %; whereas among Turkish people this ratio is only 6 % (Kırmızı   &  
Bölme,  2007).  Given to the conservativeness of Kurdish people, throughout the late 
1980s PKK had to tone down its view on Islam and religion in order to attract more 
supporters in the region.   For instance, on 26 December 1990 the PKK founded the 
Union of Kurdistan Pious People; in Syria they had established the Kurdistan Islamic 
Party   (PIK)   (Çevik, 2012, p.96). These organizations were established in order to 
compete with the TIS and created the Kurdish version of the TIS. Recognizing the 
fact that 50 % of the Kurdish votes were affected by religious leaders, PKK 
embarked on quest of finding young sheikhs and religious leaders who would 
support  their  cause  (Kırmızı  &  Bölme,  2007). 
 Another reason for this visional change may be attributed to the success of 
Islamist parties in the Kurdish region as well as relative moderation of government 
leaders’   expression   towards   Kurdish   identity.  It can be exemplified by President 
Özal’s   acknowledgement   that   he   had   blood   of   Kurdish,   his special consideration 
regarding the advancements in Kurdish rights and his intimacy with Kurdish leaders 
(sheikhs   and   tribal   leaders)   (Kirişçi   and  Winrow, 1997, p.120). However, after the 
death   of   Özal,   the following governments failed to approach the Kurdish issue 
peacefully and rather preferred to see it as a matter of national security and terror 
rather than identity and culture which resulted in further polarization of the sides. In 
mid of 1990s, giving cultural concessions to the Kurds was seen as a dangerous step 
that would lead to the  dissolution  of  the  state  (Kirişçi  and  Winrow, 1997, p.124). 
                                                          
13 Before 1980 coup, their targets were consisted of the colloborators with Turkish 
state, feudal land lords, Turkish nationalists, and social chauvinist groups. After, 
their targets were enlarged through social, economic and political means. 
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After  the  death  of  Özal  in  1993,  a  political  vacuum emerged in terms of the 
Kurdish  issue.  Although  Süleyman  Demirel  (the  president  of  Turkey  at  that  time)  and  
Tansu  Çiller   (the new leader of the  DYP   (Doğru  Yol   Partisi)   and   prime minister) 
appeared to be promising for the Kurdish issue, however; their accession to their new 
posts proved the other way around. The priority was given to handling terror issue 
rather than resolving the Kurdish issue in socio-political terms. For instance, Demirel 
defended that it would harm the unity of the state to allow education in Kurdish 
language and a concession to be made would be understood as a concession granted 
to the terrorist organization (Wilson and Kirişçi, 1997, p. 145). This understanding 
dominated the decade for the most part. 
In the meantime, by trying to develop a unity of Islamist understanding with 
nationalism, the PKK and political parties associated sought to gain the sympathy 
and votes of Kurdish  Muslims.  Bozarslan  argues  that  the  Welfare  Party’s  success  in  
the Kurdish region is linked to the Kurdish protest and by uniting Kurdish people 
with the rest of Turkey (1996, p.18). The RP had been one of the most critical voices 
of Kurdish policies of  the  state  (Kirişçi  and  Winrow, 1997, p.151). According to the 
Party, the Kurds and Turks are the pieces of the Islamic world and the Kurdish issue 
could only be resolved via an Islamic bond. Although not in a continuous mood, the 
RP defended broadcasting in Kurdish, education in Kurdish, the abolishment of 
emergency rule and the village guard system in the region, which in return ensured a 
large segment of Kurdish votes in the elections of the 1990s.   Also,   the   RP’s  
accurateness in picking candidates from the region was effective in obtaining votes 
from Kurdish people. As Bozarslan points out the  RP’s  cadres  in  the  Kurdish  region  
were mostly Kurds and predominantly Kurdish nationalists (1996, p.18), who present 
a contradiction of Turkish Islamists in terms of their toleration to nationalism. When 
the PKK-state struggle intensified in the 1990s, the Turkish governments started to 
revise the policies of compulsory settlements through the evacuation of villages in 
mountainous Kurdish regions. Both the RP and the PKK had probably politically 
gained more support from these policies (Yeğen, 2009, p.604).  
Çaha   argues   that   since the 1980s, rising visibility of Islam in the public 
sphere and the public institutions’  transformation  to  a  more  Islamic  shape  as  well  as  
returning to the idea of Islamic unity has been the two trends among Islamists 
(Çetinsaya,  Duran  and  others,  2010,  p.477).  Şengül  suggests  that  after  12  September 
coup, from the environment which was created in the context of the TIS, Islamist 
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movements that did not favor the regime itself also benefited (Çetinsaya,  Duran  and  
others, 2010, p.528).  The success of political Islam after 1980 can also be attributed 
to the Turkish Islam Synthesis (TIS) as well as the malfunctioning of the state since 
the  1990s   (Eligür, 2010, p.3). These political opportunity structures were used and 
incorporated with new practices of social networks and became the pillar of success 
for  political  Islam  in  Turkey.  Eligür  incorporates all political Islamists (from the RP 
to the Hezbollah, and IBDA-C) and claims that they aim to bring Sharia law to 
Turkey by the Iranian top-down fashion by the use of violence or non-violence 
means  (Eligür, 2010, p.4).  However, the ‘existence  of  a secular-democratic regime 
and   its  acceptance  by   the  vast  majority  of  people   (?)’   limited   Islamist  movements’  
mobilization tools to peaceful strategies. Given the superficiality of the explanation, 
Eligür  does  not  reason  why  from  the  1990s  and  despite  being  AKP’s  governmental  
power there has not been any attempt to bring Sharia rule to the country.  
 
3.4. Islamism and Kurdish Cause in Contemporary Turkey 
 
According   to  Bulaç,   the era of the third generation of Islamists starts in the 
first years of the twenty-first century. He argues that the exact year for the 
transformation is 1997 when in Turkey the 28 February post-modern coup had been 
experienced and in Iran, Hatemi had been president (26 July 2012). One of the 
biggest handicaps of the third generation of Islamists is the lack of intellectuals and 
scholars who possess knowledge of Islamic philosophy (Kelam) and methodology 
(Usul). Rather Bulaç says that the third generation was consisted from the poets, 
storytellers and man of letters. According to Kara, one of the biggest problems of the 
contemporary, activist and intellectual Islamism is its indifference to local values 
(where it is grounded) through the emphasis of  internationalism and pan Islamism 
(Özkan,  12  August  2012).  He  attributes   this  problem   to   the  enthusiasm  of   learning  
others more than insiders according to which brings a mental drift and loss in 
intellectual center. This loss at the end causes a strategic mistake since there is no 
possibility of rooting in other lands, and at the same time, keeping position without 
being  related  to  its  own  resources  first  (Özkan,  12  August  2012).   
Aktas agrees with Kara by stating that Islamism through criticizing the 
previous generations’  perception,  understanding  and  living  the  religion  extended  to  a  
total denial of the local culture (2014, p.7). She also points out that one of the 
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divisive features of Islamism is its attempt to appropriate politics for the people by a 
councilor/democratic method rather than aristocracy. Uslu problematizes 
Hezbollah’s   appeal   to   violence   and sees a very important external factor that the 
organization relied heavily on, which is imported ideologies, incorporating the 
outcome of the Iranian revolution and the principles of the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood rather than domestic Islam (2009, p.222).   
The contemporary Islamists are criticized to be unprepared to confront with 
the modernism and what it brought with itself (capitalism, liberalism, secular life 
styles, etc.) and satisfied with conservatism. The opportunity of being in being power 
is wasted and even worse transformed them. The ideals of the Islamism such as 
returning back to Quran and Sunnah, truly challenging the Western world, redefining 
the societal  and  political  relations  on  the  context  of   Islam,  etc.  are  forgotten  (Bulaç  
26 July 2012).     
Tuğal   suggests   that   the  RP   in   the  1990s,   included  ex-radicals into the party 
and changed its tone from the Turkish nationalist line to a more comprehensive 
cross-national and cross-ethnic Islamic unity; however still claiming Turkish 
superiority over leadership (2009, p.43). This attitude caused problems within the 
Party.   First   and   foremost,   the   National   Outlook   Movement’s   inclination   towards  
Turkish nationalism caused a division among Kurds who had been voting for the 
Movement. For instance, Altan Tan, an important Kurdish Islamist politician, left the 
RP  because  of  the  Party’s  alliance  with  the National Action Party (MHP) during the 
1991 national elections.   However,   the  WP’s   success   relied   on   Kurdish   votes   that  
were not in favor of right-wing nationalists and seeing Islam as more overarching 
(Eligür, 2010, p.78).  
Şengül   pays   attention   to   another   contradiction   of   Turkish   Islamists.   In  
addition to the years of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia there happened to be ethnic conflicts in 
Central Asia and in the Balkans of which the victims were mostly Muslims. 
Attention and sympathy to the victimized Muslims of other parts of the world  
caused Kurdish Islamists to pose the question of why the same sympathy had not 
been presented towards Kurdish people who had suffered in the same way as other 
Muslims of the world (Çetinsaya,  et al., 2010, p.529).  
The Islamists of Turkey were unsuccessful in founding ‘a  vision  of  political  
unity’  that  could  take  precedence  over  nationalism  of  every  kind.  In  its  first  years  of  
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governance   the   AKP   also   took   the   RP’s   contradictory   and   problematic   vision   of  
Turkish nationalism and used it to   enforce   Turkey’s   integration   to   the   European  
Union  (Tuğal, 2009, p.242).  This  transformation  in  the  ideals  is  criticized  by  Bulaç.  
He  condemns   that   the   Islamists’   ideal   of   returning   to the Qur’an and Sunnah have 
been forgotten; instead the EU map and liberal policies are adopted. He attributes 
weaknesses of the third generation of Islamists to the unexpected victory in attaining 
the government   and   the   perception   of   “power   for   the   sake   of   power”   (26   July  
2012).On the other hand, Kara suggests that leaving Islamism started with Erbakan 
himself (former leader of the National Outlook Movement and its subsequent 
political  parties)  (Özkan,  12  August  2012).  The  process  that  started  with  the  RP can 
be read as the process of the abandonment of Islamism that can be observed in the 
texts of election manifests and banners in 1991, 1994, and 1995 for Kara. The AKP 
did not abandon Islamism, which had been already abandoned by former leaders of 
political  Islam.  Bilici  attributes  this  to  the  Islamist  intellectuals’  works.  According  to  
him, in the 1990s and 2000s Islamist intellectuals had been marginalized compared 
to the past; however Islam became the subject matter of the whole country 
(Çetinsaya,  Duran,  and  others,  2010,  p.803).  
While in the first and second generation of Islamism, the debates centered on 
being at the opposition;;  with  the  AKP’s  ascendance  to  the  government  a completely 
new era  emerged  for  the  Islamists.  Bezci  and  Miş  argue  that  historically,  the  idea  of  
Islamism was heavily contested in times of dissolution in the Islamic world or in case 
of survival (2012, p.2). In Turkey, with the AKP government, debates on Islamism 
have been intensified. Old Islamists, who have been now experiencing the power and 
governance, came into state of crises. They started  seeing  Islamism  as  “useful  other”  
and   even   sometimes   refused   it   (Bezci   &   Miş, 2012, p.4). Since the Islamists 
legitimize their cause from the text, abandoning the textual claim could mean opting 
out   of   the   sphere   of   Islamism.  According   to  Bezci   and  Miş   this   is  what   happened  
among Turkish Islamists when the AKP came into power. Islamists have turned into 
conservatives. Since Islamism’s  political  ideals  have  been  making  Islamic  provisions 
livable in society, coming to power has been realized at the expense of letting the 
former Islamist political ideals go.   Bulaç   holds   a   similar   view.   He   argues   that  
Islamism in Turkey did not lose its intellectual importance and assertion; however its 
political form turns into conservatism and even within itself inclines towards the 
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secularization and protest where religion and affairs of state and economy are 
separated and too much weight was put on the financial development (19 July 2012).   
Aktaş  differs  from  Bulaç.  For  her,  the  AKP  governments, in order to focus on 
the recovery and realization of the peace process, they could not opt out of 
reconciliation with the global liberal system; this is why the analysts state that the 
AKP actors have been transformed into   “Muslim  democrats”   (2014, p.365). Duran 
states that under the compelling conditions of the Republican period, Turkish 
Islamism though reluctantly has been articulated to conservatism (Çetinsaya, Duran, 
and others, 2010, p.130).  Bilici  conceives  this  transformation  in  Bourdieu’s  sense  of  
symbolic and intellectual capital accumulations of Islamist masses through education 
and economic resources (Çetinsaya,  Duran,  and  others,  2010,  p.800). According to 
Bilici, this accumulation eroded the protest and reactionary stands of Islamists 
instead deployed pragmatism and capitalism. 
According  to  Eligür,  the  success  of  the  AKP  in  the  Kurdish  populated  regions  
should be attributed to the ethnic Kurdish nationalism’s   weakness   in   catching   the  
electorate in comparison to Islamic rhetoric (2010, p.260). In addition, she argues 
that tribal affiliations matter greatly for voting preferences. Starting from the 2000s, 
the status of Kurds in the political realm started to be changed. Ease in the 
restrictions on the Kurdish culture, thanks to the Copenhagen criteria for EU 
membership   as  well   as  Kurdish   citizens’   sue   the  Turkish   state   in   the  EHCR  made  
their status vis-à-vis  Turkisness  uncertain  (Yeğen, 2009, p.609). The idea that Kurds 
may become Turkish has gradually been replaced by the involuntary acceptance of 
the  Kurdish  identity.    AKP’s  appeal  to  the  Islamic  universality, and unity especially 
in ethnically mixed and problematic regions, and presenting Islam as the antidote for 
ethnic struggle has clearly attracted the voters.  
The  AKP’s  practices  such  as  change  in  the  anti-terror law in 2003 as part of 
the EU harmonization process, revoking the state of emergency in the Southeastern 
region on 30 November 2002, liberalizing the broadcast in Kurdish language with 
4928 Law in 2003, partial amnesty to former PKK militants with the Kurdish 
Initiative in 2009, and introduction of cultural rights has been implemented in the 
context of Kurdish initiative. These practices enabled the ceasefire between the PKK 
and the Turkish state and therefore contributed the peace (Ulusoy, 2011, p.412). 
Kırmızı  and  Bölme  argue that conservative Kurds who chose to vote for center right 
parties have been the most important obstacle for the secessionist political parties in 
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the region. For example, the votes that made the AKP the first party in the 2002 
elections came from this fraction (2007). On the other hand, despite the 
assimilationist  policies  and  Turkish  state’s  success  in  defeating  Kurdish  resistance  in  
1990s,  Kurdish  people’s   resistance   to  keep   their   identities  and   the HDP/the  PKK’s  
continuous support by the Kurdish people had been a major disappointment for the 
Turkish  Republic  (Yeğen, 2009, p.612).  
Contrary   to   Turkish   Islamists,   Kurdish   Islamists’   transformation   to  
conservatism has not fully occurred yet. It can also be said that the Kurdish Islamists 
are much more hard-liner than their Turkish counterparts. Not only the Hezbollah 
and/or the Huda-Par, there are other Islamist groups in the form of a religious group 
and non-governmental organization in the region. One of these groups is Med-Zehra. 
After  Said  Nursi’s  death,  his  movement  split  into  different  groups.  Med-Zehra is one 
of those split groups that centered in the southeastern region of Turkey and that is 
pre-dominantly Kurdish. Contrary to Nursi’s  other  followers,  the Med-Zehra group is 
considered to be more fundamentalist as it can be seen in   its   leader   Seyhanzade’s  
views  on  democracy:  “anyone  who  accepts  democracy  as  a  governing  system  should  
be considered as a non-believer. This is because democracy was created as a reaction 
to  Quran,  Islamic  law  and  revelation”  (Çevik, 2012, p.93). From this point of view, 
the Med-Zehra holds an even  stronger  stand  on  democracy’s  place  in  Islam  than  that  
of the Huda-Par   line.   Çevik   compares   Med-Zehra’s   ideas on nationalism and the 
state with Turkish Islamists. According to him, Med-Zehra  underlines  “every  ethnic  
group should have its own state however these states bring about an Islamic 
federation”  which  is  obviously  unacceptable  to  what  Turkish  Islamists  could imagine 
(Çevik, 2012, p.93). By giving  reference  to  Said  Nursi’s  works,  Med-Zehra proposes 
that positive nationalism in which each and every nation has the right to express its 
characteristics and politically manage itself in opposition to negative nationalism, in 
which one nation has superiority over other ethnicities. Another difference of Med-
Zehra from their Turkish Islamists counterparts is the idea that only an Islamic state 
can benefit Muslims and with this state Islamic unity can be sustained.  
In  explaining   the  Hezbollah’s  position  on  ethnic  Kurdish  nationalism, Tutar 
states that Hezbollah opposes all kinds of nationalism. The Hezbollah although 
consists mostly from Kurds also includes Zazas, Turks, Arabs, and Chechens which 
this variety disables Kurdish nationalism: 
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According to us, a Muslim Turk is much more valued than all other 
non-Muslim Kurds and a Muslim Kurd is much more valued than all 
other non-Muslim Turks. (2011, p.141)   
  
Nonetheless, opposing to Kurdish nationalism would not mean staying silent 
on the Kurdish issue or the sufferings of Kurdish people. However, Hezbollah 
considers this problem as a regime issue that has not aroused from Muslim Turkish 
people  (Yılmaz,  Tutar  and Varol, 2011, p. 143). 
Çetinsaya  asserts   that   the  current   status of nationalism for Turkish Islamists 
was  developed  by  Ismet  Özel  since  the  1980s  and  heavily  debated (2010, p.529). As 
it was stated by  one  of  the  writings  of  Özel:   
I am proud to be a Turkish nationalist who do not look for any frame 
other than National Anthem for his ideology. I am proud to be a 
deadly enemy of the ones who sees Turkism different from being 
Muslim.  I  am  proud  to  have  nothing  in  common  with  racists.  (…)  I  am  
proud to not to serve Kurdish and Alawi separatism and other sort of 
separatism.  (Çetinsaya,  et al. 2010, p.529) 
 
According  to  Özel,  Islam  does  not  contradict  with  Turkism  as  it does not turn 
into racism and Turks have been able to protect their identities thanks to their 
acceptance of Islam. Özel makes distinction between Turkism and Islam, and 
considers that the ethnic nationalism and ethnic separatism serves to imperialism and 
capitalism.    
For Turkish Islamists, the unity of the state has an important place. Although 
political Islam portrays a homogeneous Islamic community as “ummah”,   it is also 
true that the religious nationalism has the strongest sense of belonging to a 
community (Altuntaş,   2010,   420). She attributes the powerfulness of religious 
nationalism to its inclusiveness to a wider community. This can also be understood in 
terms of justifiability of nationalism linked to religiosity.  While for Kurdish 
Islamists, Sharia is a way out to express their Kurdishness in the legal space, for the 
Turkish Islamists, secessionist claims of their Kurdish counterparts have been 
violating the idea of the unity of Islam. Cizre expresses this difference as:  
Kurdish-Islamist writers tend to search for a space for Kurdish ethnic 
distinctiveness within the framework of the suggested formula of 
ummah, the Islamist community of the faithful, while the position of 
the Turkish Islamist writers leans heavily toward defending the 
integrity of the Turkish state rather than acknowledging a Kurdish 
ethnic distinctiveness. (Sarıgil,  2010,  p.543) 
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Sarıgil  argues  that  for the Turkish Islamist discourse the Muslim Brotherhood 
offers the withdrawal of separatist claims in the name of the Muslim unity and 
submission of Kurdishness to a higher and comprehensive identity. This discourse 
became a successful strategic tool in obtaining substantial support from the Kurdish 
regions during the 2002, 2007, and  2011  national  elections  (Sarıgil, 2010, p.536)14. 
The AKP’s   success   can   also   be   attributed   to   the  Kurdish   view of   the  AKP   as   “an  
anti-Kemalist and anti-system   party”   that   has   been   repressed by the same actors 
(Sarıgil, 2010, p.544). 
For the Turkish Islamists, one thing that has to be understood regarding the 
Kurdish issue is the defeat of Kurdish people to nationalism who once belonged to 
the Islamic World (Çetinsaya,   Duran,   and   others, 2010, p.529). This unhealthy 
projection of the Kurdish issue has been the common denominator in the Turkish 
Islamists’   minds.   Şengül   argues   that   the   reason   for the indifferences of Muslim 
Turkish people to the Kurdish issue is the issue’s nationalistic feature and its 
antipathy towards Universalist Muslims. Turkish Islamists’ view regarding their 
Kurdish counterparts seems conformist and top-down though. While Turkish 
nationalism does not take Turkish Islamists from the sphere of Islam, Muslim Kurds 
are considered to be out of line with their commitments to Kurdish nationalism. 
Furthermore, through ethnic nationalism Kurdish Islamists are considered to be 
damaging the religious bond that binds them to other Muslims, since they 
increasingly identify themselves on the basis of ethnicity rather than religion.  
In a utopian  sense,  Bulaç  offers  the  unification  of  Islam  (İttihad-ı  Islam)  as  a  
solution that brings all ethnic variations together through the participation in terms of 
equal rights (Çetinsaya,  Duran, and others, 2010, p.530). For him, highlighting the 
(Kurdish) ethnic identity neither benefits Kurdish people nor the Ummah. Despite 
individual variations, Islamist thinkers portray the system of the former Ottoman 
Empire as the solution of the Kurdish issue. 
In order to respond to the criticisms made by their Turkish counterparts, 
Kurdish Islamists appealed to the religious arguments which possess religious 
grounds for the justification of rights of nations and nationalism/patriotism.  During 
my interviews with the Huda-Par leaders, when the subject came to nationalism, they 
immediately  chose  to  appeal  to  the  verses  of  the  Qur’an,  which  state  the  diversity  of  
                                                          
14Although the AKP’s  votes  from  the  region  did  not  follow  a  steady  line,  it  did  
became the first party in all the elections. 
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human communities rather than stressing a total rejection or acceptance based on 
their personal deductions. As  such  Şengül  draws attention to the views of Mehmet 
Pamak –an important Islamist Kurd- on nationalism (Çetinsaya,  Duran,  and  others,  
2010, p.533). Pamak   refers   to   Qur’anic   verses   and   hadiths   in   order   to   show   the  
struggle of Kurds as a struggle for rights rather than ethnic nationalism. Secondly, he 
sees nationalism as the cause of wounds of the Islamic world that has been most 
damaging for the Kurds. In this view, Turkish nationalism made Kurdish people 
suffer by abandoning their cultural rights. Thirdly, Pamak condemns the position of 
Muslims in terms of the Kurdish issue. According to him, the Muslims of Turkey 
choose   to  be  silent  about   the  state’s  Kurdish  policies  however  when  others  express  
their thoughts on the issue, they are immediately blamed for Kurdish nationalism.  
This collection of opinions holds similar parallelism with Huda-Par  leaders’  view  on  
nationalism which reflects resentment towards the Muslim brotherhood in Turkey.   
 Huda-Par leaders blame the state for its denial of the responsibility to solve 
the problems of the Kurdish Muslims by seeing the PKK and its co-organizations as 
the only accountable authorities for speaking in the name of the Kurdish people, and 
this has resulted in more supporters of the PKK line and ethnic nationalism. For  
Huda-Par  leaders,  problems  have  to  be  resolved  in  an  Islamic  way.  Similar  to  Bulaç’s  
opinion, Kurdish Islamists advocate the unification of Muslims on the basis of the 
equality  of  all  ethnicities  (Çetinsaya,  et  al.,  2010,  p.535). 
According to Kara, the Muslims of Turkey should reconsider their approach 
towards the Kurdish issue in terms of recovery of the rights through the lens of 
Islam: 
It is a hadith of the Prophet that one person cannot call himself 
Muslim unless he wants what he wants for himself and for his Muslim 
brotherhood. Muslims -who do not want the rights for Kurdish people- 
want what they want for themselves and cannot call themselves 
Muslims. Kurds are deprived of all the rights in the world. A human 
being with honor and dignity cannot claim that Kurds are not under 
oppression and they have the rights with what other people have. 
Kurdish language and culture are banned; they have been desolated. 
(Çetinsaya,  Duran  and  others,  2010,  p.535). 
 
Çevik  argues  that  Muslim  Turks  did  not  have  a  successful  position  about  granting  
Kurdish people their rights; they have chosen to be silent on the injustices made by 
the state. Even the enemies of the regime spoke the representatives of the regime 
when  it  comes  to  Kurdish  people’s  rights  (2012, p.19). According to Islamist writers, 
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Kurdish   Muslims’   acknowledgments   of   their   identities   on   the   grounds   of   ethnic  
features rather than religious bonds have served the interests of imperialist forces. On 
the other hand, Islamist Kurdish people do not see similarities between the Kurdish 
struggle and the ideology of nationalism. For them, their objection is directed to the 
system that was founded as a result of the nineteenth century nationalism, because in 
the first place this system ignores the Kurdish people and their rights through 
establishing four states over the lands of the Kurds (Çetinsaya,  et  al.,  2010, p.538).  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the introduction to the main themes of the thesis is presented. 
Islamism and nationalism concepts and their provisions in the late Ottoman Empire 
and the Turkish Republic, the transformation of the state in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century and its effects on the Islamists of Turkey are examined. Sources of 
Kurdish nationalism, its relationship with the Kurdish issue, Kurdish Islamism, and 
Turkish Islamism in the Republican Turkey are analyzed. Throughout the chapter 
evidence for the   Kurdish   Islamism’s   appeal   to   violence,   and its’ divergent points 
from the Turkish Islamism are examined. By doing so, it is seen that the Kurdish 
Islamism and the Turkish Islamism might not evolve in the same direction. It is 
contested that armed struggle is not a preference by itself but rather outcome of a 
collection the social and political conditions. As it is argued by moderation theorists, 
political inclusion has positive influence on moderating the marginal radical groups; 
while exclusionist and suppressive methods do the opposite. 
 In the following chapter, the Hezbollah movement, its foundation, principles, 
major events and its tragic end are going to be covered in the light of developments 
within the Turkish political system. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TURKEY’S  HEZBOLLAH 
 
 
The 1980s are considered to be a period when the revelation of religious 
radical ideology and practice had been observed more than ever in the history of the 
Turkish  Republic   (Büyükkara, 2006, p.130). Kurdish Muslims/Islamists, after great 
rebellions of the early Republican era went into a deep silence in the following 
decades. With the 1980s, Kurdish Islamists revealed themselves in several 
organizations. One of the most important and sounding one was the Kurdish 
Hezbollah. In order to examine the transformation of Kurdish Islamists, 
understanding contemporary Kurdish Islamists, especially the Huda-Par and the 
Hezbollah carries great importance. In this chapter, the ideal of the Islamic state 
among Islamists, the foundation of the Hezbollah in Turkey, its ideas and activities, 
its distinctiveness from other Islamist structures and organizations in Turkey, and its 
end in the 2000s will be examined.  
 
4.1. The Ideal of Islamic State and Its Reflections  on  Turkey’s  Hezbollah 
 
The necessity of attaining the Islamic state has been a controversial subject 
among Muslim thinkers and activists especially after the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire. The abolition of the Caliphate and the emergence of nation states across the 
Muslim world generated a vacuum in terms of Islamic state and rule. Ruling by the 
principles of secular, and to an extent, democratic norms rather than Islamic norms 
produced a space for questioning the Islamic prerequisites of Islamic state. However, 
this necessity has been grounded on some specific forms. First and foremost the 
foundation of a society based on the“Sharia  law”  took  precedence. 
 Many Islamic jurists degraded Islam to Sharia law (Ayoob, 2007, p.63). This 
resulted in the reproduction of legal scholars but hardly any political theorists and/or 
scientists to explore and answer the political needs of the contemporary world in line 
with the norms and spirit of Islam. According to Khan, this intellectual deficiency 
has declined Islamic thought to an outmoded legal tradition (Khaled, 2004, p.63). 
Sharia’s  domination over Islam resulted in Sharia being the forerunner of the Islamic 
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state and policies. Therefore, Islamist movements were based on the mixed demands 
of the Islamic state and Sharia law.   
From the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire to the early 2000s, Muslim 
resistance and disturbance has been generally related to the aspiration of a society 
based  on  Islamic  law  and  rule.  According  to  Özdenören,  in  Islam,  the  law  forms  the  
basis of social structures to the extent that in line with the law, all other social 
structures are formed (Çetinsaya,  Duran   and  others,  2010,  p.153). Moussali argues 
“good  politics”  seeks  attaining  an  Islamic  state  founded  on  “philosophy  of  normative  
principles   and   set   of   methods   applying   remedies   to   the   societal   problems”   (1999, 
p.19).  
According to Moussali, fundamentalism and modernism are two dominant 
Islamic discourses and modern interpretations of Islam that aim to find remedies to 
the problems of Muslim societies by revitalizing Islam. As other religious 
fundamentalisms, Islamic fundamentalism is much affected by its devotion to the 
text (Choueiri, 1990, p.9). Fundamentalist thought looks to reveal the divine text for 
extracting political concepts and even system. According to Sidahmed and 
Ehteshami, the fundamentalist approach has two main features; first, a strong belief 
in the infallibility of divine text, and second, the conceptualization of a world divided 
between true believers and others (1996, p.2).  For Islamic fundamentalists, jihad 
(holy struggle) is the only way for bringing the sovereignty of God. Although known 
as an armed struggle, jihad is more than only militaristic struggle. As a concept, it 
envisages the struggle of the believer against its inner world (nefs), the struggle with 
knowledge (ilim), the struggle with assets (mal), and lastly struggle with arms.  Thus, 
although armed struggle is only a particular way of jihad, Islamic fundamentalists 
saw armed struggle as the most important part and highlighted it in their discourse. 
Supposedly, fundamentalists saw jihad in armed sense as more practical and useful 
for their causes (Sidahmed and Ehteshami, 1996, p.22).  
Modernism on the other hand, differs from fundamentalism in several ways. 
It is more open to the different and modernist interpretations of the texts fitting into 
the needs of the day. It mainly opposes traditional and religious discourses and 
brings a more rational way of thinking.   
Islamic modernism/reformism was championed by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, 
Muhammed  Abduh,  Muhammad      Iqbal,   and  Ali   Shari’ati;;  while   important   Islamic  
fundamentalists were Abu al-A’la   al-Mawdudi, Hasan al-Benna, Sayyid Qutb and 
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Ayatollah al-Khumayni who have had profound impact on Islamists all over the 
world as in the case of Kurdish Islamists. As fundamentalism is considered to be a 
reactionary phenomenon to existing social, political, and economic problems, 
Kurdish Islamism might as well be categorized under this banner.  The early Muslim 
Brotherhood was deeply influenced by the Qutbian development of the Islamist 
activism, which perceived societies as being responsible for their  governments’  un-
Islamic practices as well as called for a revolution against all secular systems that 
have been very influential in radical and violent groups as in the case of Kurdish 
Islamists (Moussali, 1999, p.21). 
Cemal Tutar who had been tried for his inclusion in activities of Hezbollah 
explains Hezbollah’s  exposure  from  other  Islamists  movements  as:   
Hezbollah examined, studied and adopted practical aspects of all 
Islamic movements that had been struggled before us and also are 
struggling at the same period of time with us. Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, struggle techniques before Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
Mawdudi and Iqbal who made great effort for the foundation of 
Pakistan and other Muslim scholars, leaders, strugglers who have 
worked for making Islam dominant in their countries and spread its 
justice   globally   have   been   Hezbollah’s   source   of   inspiration. (2011, 
p.163)     
 
Turan in explaining Islamic awakening among Kurdish Muslims after the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic and its secular reforms puts special emphasis on 
the publications of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: 
Although limited in madrasahs, publications of Muslim Brotherhood 
from Egypt arrived; scholars made connections from these books with 
Sheikh Said Rebellion, made deductions, time to time criticized the 
sufistic line that was purified from politics. The question  of  ‘what  can  
it be done to reestablish Sharia? posed openly. (2011, p.291)  
 
Banna states that Islam should determine all human affairs and interactions, 
and influence all forms of conduct (Moussali, 1999, p.47). He continues by 
proposing that only worshipping without ideological and philosophical commitments 
deter the progress of Muslims and their religion. Islam provides all necessary rules 
for the benefit of a nation (Moussali, 1999, p.54). Islam is the only system that meets 
the needs of human disposition. Thus for the fundamentalists, ideologies such as 
socialism, liberalism and others might have some benefits; but their costs and 
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harmful effects outweigh those benefits. A revolution, which aims at the salvation 
from un-Islamic governments, is seen as a moral duty for Muslims. 
Moussali argues that many of the fundamentalist groups in the Muslim world 
had  been  influenced  by  Qutbian  sense  of  ‘radical,  exclusivist  discourse  and  his  idea  
of   paganism   of   the   other’   (1999, p.101). According to Qutb and Mawdudi, 
compromise prevents the possibility of reshaping the world and enables Muslims to 
give up some principles and adopt others (Moussali, 1999, p.36). In other words, old 
establishments and institutions cannot be renovated; therefore, they need to be 
destroyed.  
According to Khan, the idea that in Islamic governance God is the law giver 
whereas in democracies humans are the law makers comes from the understanding of 
Mawdudi (Khaled, 2004, p.65). In this understanding, since in Islamic states only 
God is sovereign; democracies are corrupted because they are ruled by the wishes of 
the majority. Thus, the main obstacles before the fundamentalists to achieve their 
goals are the governments and/or regimes that are based on un-Islamic rules and 
institutions. On the other hand, they do not openly advocate using force, and instead 
underline the necessity of a gradual transformation of the society (Enayat, 2005, p. 
104). This system would produce Muslim scientists, philosophers, historians, 
economists, jurists, and politicians, who would, in turn, constitute the Islamic state. 
For instance, even though Banna saw the Islamization of the state as the final goal, 
he demanded inclusion to the political system and competed with other political 
parties (Moussali, 1999, p.36).     
Another continuity between Islamic fundamentalists and Kurdish Islamists 
are their emphasis on the notion of justice in general and Islamic justice in particular. 
Since there is no clear definition of how an Islamic government/regime should be, an 
Islamic rule is basically the systematic rule of Islamic Sharia. Through Islamic Sharia 
the Islamic rules and philosophy of principles define the societal relationships and 
regulations of the state. Both in the books written by people close to Hezbollah 
organization and also in the party program of Huda-Par   and   the   party   leaders’  
statements, a special emphasis on justice and rights is obvious. While the term justice 
(adalet) is repeated thirtytwo times, the term right (hak) is repeated one hundred and 
forty four times in the Party Program.  It can also be claimed that Hezbollah and 
Huda-Par establish their discourses on what they consider as injustices that arose in 
the late Ottoman period with the emergence of Westernization and nationalism. 
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Our cause is; 
Freedom, 
Justice, 
Fairness, 
The end of oppression, 
Peace, 
Harmony of people, 
Brotherhood… 
Our purpose is only these. 
With all our existence we struggle for these.  
(The Huda-Par Party Program, 2013)    
 
The   Party   Spokesperson   Said   Şahin   also   claims that   the   Party’s   foremost  
purpose is to ensure the justice: 
We have some moral duties in the earth. Foremost among these is 
building justice that was commanded to the Prophets. Securing justice 
can be done with holding power, obtaining power can be done through 
sharing governmental authority, and sharing governmental authority 
can  be  done  by  founding  a  political  party.    (The  author’s  interview,  27  
May 2014, [Appendix 2]). 
 
Ayoob argues that even though Islamist groups are in theory committed to 
transforming their polities to Islamic states through societal Islamization and 
adoption of Sharia law, this does not mean that these groups are all anti-regime. In 
most cases, Islamist groups are willing to compromise and work with the national 
authorities within constitutional limitations (Ayoob, 2007, p.34). Although the idea 
of universal ummah preserves its effect over Islamist groups, they mostly do not 
challenge  with  nation  states  they  inhabit.  Ayoob  perceives  Islamists  group’s  loyalty  
to nation-states with what   he   calls   “Islamo-nationalism”   (2007, p.34). Once an 
Islamist group becomes an exponent of Islamo-nationalism, then it starts to operate 
as an opposition group that aims to change the moral conditions of the society they 
live through the approximation of governance to Islamic law and/or norms. About 
the metamorphosis the Islamist groups have experienced, perhaps the idea of a 
political party and its place in the mind of Islamists is striking. Once political parties 
were considered as a source of unrest (fitne), since they were thought of as causing 
the division of the umma by the traditionalist interpretations of Islam, now political 
parties are considered as legitimate mechanisms to achieve an Islamic society and 
political order (Ayoob, 2007, p.78).  
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Mawdudi, Banna, Qutb and others, opposed all sorts of nationalism whether it 
is linguistic, ethnic, or liberal (Enayat, 2005, p.115). Only legitimate grounds for 
such inclination would be resistance to foreign domination. However, even such kind 
of impulse does not have to be formulated in nationalism. Islam has enough 
resources to mobilize people for their independence. Even patriotism is left aside, 
since   the   only   homeland   they   legitimize   is   the   global   “abode   of   Islam”   (Enayat, 
2005, p. 115). For them, the world consists of two parts:  dar al-Islam (abode of 
Islam), and dar al-harb (abode of law).  At this point, Hezbollah and Huda-Par line 
only slightly differs from that of the twentieth century fundamental Islamists. 
Although the division between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb is accepted by the 
Kurdish Islamists, Kurdistan and its salvation has its important place. Nonetheless, 
they do not consider this attitude to be part of nationalism. They explain their stress 
on the Kurdish issue not as a form of nationalism but as a way of supporting the 
struggle for the rights of Kurdish people who have been denied for decades.  
Moussali argues that as fundamentalists have been unsuccessful in founding 
an Islamic state and getting rid of corrupted regimes, the majority of them are now in 
a quest for Islamization of democracy and pluralism (1999, p.67). The reason for this 
transformation is the view of undemocratic institutions, tyranny, and oppression as 
the main facilitators for the underdevelopment of the Islamic world. Now democracy 
is seen as beneficial for the rise of Islam, which will be stressed more in the next 
chapter on the Huda-Par. 
 
4.2. The Foundation of Turkish Hezbollah  
 
According to Uslu, the first violent Islamist organization in Turkey was the 
Hizbu’t  Tahrir  established  in  Ankara  in   the 1960s (2009, p.217). However the most 
famous organization in terms of its violence was the Kurdish Hezbollah. The 
Hezbollah of Turkey is an Islamist movement, which was formed and centered in the 
Kurdish region in Turkey in 1979, and the majority of its members consisted of 
Kurdish people (Bagasi). The organization laid its references on Islam and its 
provisions. Therefore, Kurdish  people’s  density  in the organization did not transform 
its structure to a nationalist movement; on the contrary, given Islam’s   universalist  
call, the organization’s   sphere   of   influence   reached   all Muslims in the region and 
Muslims worldwide (Bagasi). 
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The Hezbollah movement was certainly unique; it was not a simple follower 
and imitation of any other   Islamic   movement   (Yılmaz, Tutar and Varol, 2011, 
p.159). The legacy of former Islamist scholars and movements affected its 
development.  Most  importantly,  ‘two  Saids’,  Sheikh  Said  and  Said-i Nursi were the 
most influential figures for the movement.  Writings of Said-i Nursi, Risale-i Nur 
were considered as the most significant resource of the organization from an 
intellectual perspective (Yılmaz,  Tutar  and  Varol,  2011,  p.162).  
In the same year the movement was founded, the Iranian Revolution occurred 
across the borders.  The 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution became a turning point not 
only for the Hezbollah, but also for Islamists and Muslim intellectuals all over the 
world. An  autocratic  and  secular  regime’s  collapse  due to the Islamist forces and the 
construction of the Islamic governance and system had been a utopia for decades; 
and then the utopia became attainable in the eyes of Islamists. Throughout the 1980s, 
Islamists’   were   inspired   by   the   success   of   their   Iranian   counterparts.   Turkey’s  
Islamists were also affected by  the  Iranian  Revolution.  Büyükkara  argues  that  given  
the proximity of Southeastern Turkey to Iran,  as well as the ease in entrance and 
exists between two countries, Iran bound radicalism should have affected the region 
more in than other regions in Turkey (2006, p.146).    
According   to  Çiçek,   the  founders  of   the  Hezbollah  were  close   to   the   line  of  
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (2000, p.122). Thanks to relative toleration of the 
1980 military coup makers towards religion –in a pragmatist sense- the number of 
religious  communities/organizations  and  writings  increased  (Çevik, 2012, p. 97).  
According to Turan, the Islamic movement never ceased to exist with the 
violent repression of Sheikh Said rebellion and others in the region among Kurdish 
Muslims (2011, p.291). Over the years, Kurdish Islamists were influenced by the 
developments   among   Turkey’s   Islamists.   In   the 1970s, organizations such as the 
MTTB15 and  Akıncılar   and   political   initiatives as the National Outlook Movement 
were influential among Kurdish Islamists. Not only these, but also a heritage coming 
from  the  region’s  underground religious schools (madrasahs) and prominent religious 
scholars resulted in the emergence of an Islamist community and movement.   
The Turkish Hezbollah could be mixed with the Lebanese Hezbollah. 
However they have no organic ties (Aras & Bacik, 2002, p.149). The Turkish 
                                                          
15 National Turkish Student Union, an organization with a conservative and 
nationalist orientation.  
 
 
57 
 
Hezbollah is consisted of predominantly Sunni Muslims, whereas the Lebanese 
Hezbollah consists of Shia Muslims. However, the sympathy for the Iranian 
Revolution can be observed in both of them as other Islamist groups. Another is their 
targets. While the Lebanese Hezbollah placed Israel and Western oriented Lebanese 
groups as the main enemies, and chose its enemies from an external source; the 
Turkish Hezbollah chose its main target from an inside source (the PKK, fellow 
Muslim groups and the regime itself). Western countries and supporter groups were 
second in the line for the Turkish Hezbollah. According to Kaya, founders of the 
Hezbollah might have wanted to   take   advantage   of   the   Hezbollah’s   reputation  
throughout the Muslim world (02 February 2011). 
  Despite being known as a terrorist organization, realities surrounding the 
Hezbollah are not limited to this (Aras & Bacik, 2002, p.148).  The Hezbollah and/or 
Kurdish Islamism was considered as one of the expressions of Kurdish conservatism, 
which was deeply rooted and consisted of an entanglement of religious sense with 
ethnic   consciousness   (Kırmızı   &   Bölme, 2007). The majority of Hezbollah's 
members were Kurdish Muslims. The basic reason for this is the historical 
characteristics of the region.  Southeastern Turkey was historically populated mostly 
by  ethnic  Kurds  (Yılmaz, Tutar and Varol, 2011, p.140).  
Turan   identifies   the   organization   as   “a   faithful   one  who   sacrifices   itself   for  
the  Creator,  Allah”  and  works  relentlessly  for   the Islamic awakening for the Kurds, 
Turks, Arabs and other people in the Kurdish geography (Turan, 2011, p.292). This 
Islamic Community16 differed from others in terms of not inclining towards 
Wahabism in cultural rejectionism, opposing nationalism and racism, a modest 
attitude towards Iran and Shia, and lastly neither defending partisanship nor 
declaring political parties as non-Islamic (Turan, 2011, p.292). According to Turan, 
these qualities enabled the Community/Organization to quickly attract people and 
supporters from the region.  Then the Organization would be a candidate for being 
the greatest and most representative organization in the region (Turan, 2011, p.292).  
Despite having roots in the 1970s National Turkish Student Union17 of the 
Batman  branch  (Çiçek, 2000, p.61),  Turkey’s  Hezbollah  was  founded  by  the Kurdish 
Islamists   such  as  Hüseyin  Velioğlu,  Fidan  Güngör,  Ubeydullah  Dalar, Mehmet Ali 
Bilici   (Çevik, 2012, p.97). According to Kaya, bookstores that sold religious 
                                                          
16 Turan  calls  it  as  İslami  Camia  in  his  book.   
17 Milli  Türk  Talebe  Birliği. 
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published works during the 1980s were the centers, which  brought  “radical”  religious  
people together and enabled the exchange of ideas (02 February 2011). Most of the 
time, they served as centers where people of the same opinions met, discussed 
important topics and organized activities. First works of existential preparations of 
the Hezbollah were made in such a venue.  Participants came together primarily for 
intellectual discussions centered on an Islamic Kurdish statehood in the Kurdish 
region   in   Diyarbakır   (most   probably   in   Menzil bookstore because of its early 
foundation)  (Çevik, 2012, p.97).   
 From another account, according to the Report dated 9 August 1993 of the 
Parliamentary  Commission  of  Unidentified  Murders,  Hezbollah’s  roots  are  based  on  
Yurtsever   İmamlar   Birliği18, an organization that derived from the PKK whose 
members were trained in the PKK camps in Bekaa and aimed an Islamic Kurdish 
state   (Kırmızı  &  Bölme, 2007). The same report goes on by saying that the Union 
was  split  when  its  leader  Mullah  Abdallah  died  and  one  of  its  imams’  was  murdered  
by the PKK. This meant the end of collaboration and the beginning of a mutual 
destruction.   The first council of the organization was made with the participation of 
Abdulvahap Ekinci,   Ahmet   Tufan,   Fidan   Güngör,   Hüseyin   Velioğlu   and   Veysi  
Kaykaç   in  Diyarbakır   (Çiçek, 2000, p.131). After 1983, the organization started its 
activities  and  propaganda,  and  quickly  attracted  supporters  (Yılmaz, 13 April 2013). 
  Cemal  Tutar,  who  was  captured  after  Hüseyin  Velioğlu’s  death    -an important 
leader of the Hezbollah-, summarized the reasons for the Hezbollah’s   foundation 
before his trial as, the abolishment of the caliphate, the enactment of the Hat Act 
(Şapka  Kanunu),   the Law of Unification of Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu), 
and   the   regime’s  pressures  over   the  Muslim  community   (Yılmaz,  Tutar   and  Varol,  
2011, p.58). His statements regarding the reasons of foundation continue as follows: 
In order to protect from the evils of the time and non-Islamic way of 
living, Muslims have to follow a path of cemaat.19 At the same time, 
Muslims, who have to conserve their honor and overcome the 
hardships   of   the   regime’s   cruelty,   harassment,   obstacles  while   living  
an Islamic   life,   should   obey   Hezbollah.   (Yılmaz,   Tutar   and   Varol,  
2011, p.58) 
 
                                                          
18 Union of Patriotic Imams. 
19 Cemaat is a religiously group of people who came together generally under 
leadership of an important religious figure and differs one another on ground of 
interpretation of Islam. 
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According to Aras and Balcik, Hezbollah did not evolve into a homogeneous 
organization, and there were differences which caused fierce discussion among the 
group members (2002, p.150).  Questions and ruptures aroused around the methods 
of   operation.   Most   importantly,   Fidan   Güngör   opened   the Menzil Bookstore 
immediately before 1980, which later became the second most important wing within 
the Hezbollah movement after the İlim wing and started to represent a bloc within the 
whole20. According to the İlim group members, the Menzil group was not present in 
the beginning but joined later, and harmed the unity and harmony of the 
organization. Therefore, at the end, it had to be cleaned out from the Community of 
Hezbollah (Bagasi).  
After many splits, the İlim and Menzil wings were considered as the most 
important  ones  (Çevik, 2012, p.97). The İlim wing  was  led  by  Hüseyin  Velioğlu.   It 
claimed that an armed   struggle   for   the   Islamic   Kurdish   state   should   start   (Çevik, 
2012, p. 97).  Fidan  Güngör  and  Mansur  Güzelsoy  were  the  forerunners  of  the Menzil 
group which was considered as more distant to the idea of armed struggle. The 
Menzil had the idea that the process was still in the tebliğ (invitation) phase (Yılmaz, 
13 April 2013). Given to the support of important religious figures of the region such 
as   Ubeydullah   Dalar   and   Mansur   Güzelsoy,   the Menzil group was in a more 
prestigious position; however its mass base was weaker in comparison to the İlim 
group  (Büyükkara, 2006, p.147). Although the İlim group lacked the support of the 
mullahs named, it was powerful in organizational aspects. It was successful in 
bringing their organization to distant villages and in organizing as many mosques as 
possible   for   their   use   (Büyükkara, 2006, p.147).  According to Kaya, although the 
crisis between the two groups was reflected as a matter of strategy, it was rather a 
problem of leadership (Kaya, 02 February 2011). After 1983, the İlim and Menzil 
groups became important elements of the Hezbollah organization and operated in the 
region independently, and at times, cooperatively (Kaya, 02 February 2011).  
However, by 1987, controversies between the two deepened and evolved into a 
violent  struggle  (Yılmaz, 13 April 2013). In the following years, the groups fought 
                                                          
20 There are different accounts regarding the dates of foundations of Vahdet, İlim and 
Menzil bookstores. Close accounts argue that Vahdet bookstore (1986) was founded 
later than İlim (1982) and Menzil bookstore (pre 1980). Therefore two bookstores 
cannot be derived from Vahdet bookstore. Other accounts put forward that Vahdet 
bookstore  had  been  founded  before  the  two.  Nonetheless  becuase  of  its  founder’s  
relatively young age at the time, the first acount seems more plausible.  
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one another as well. Throughout this fight, the İlim wing repressed the Menzil and 
grew stronger.  The İlim’s  superiority  over Menzil was a result of its more organized 
and homogeneous structure and branded itself as the true Hezbollah, and excluded 
deviant groups from the center. For instance, the İlim wing did not use the name of 
İlim; rather it preferred the Hezbollah in order to eliminate the Menzil group and 
maximize its base (Kaya, 02 February 2011).    
There is not much evidence regarding the organizational structure of the 
Hezbollah  Movement.  The  existing  information  could  be  biased  given  the  suppliers’  
ideological   affiliations.   According   to   Çiçek, the Istanbul   branch’s   organizational  
model consisted of the Organization General Director, the Head of Military Section, 
the Head of Internal Affairs, the Head of Intelligence, and the Head of Communique 
(2000, p.44). He also mentions a hierarchical order among the members of the 
organization in which Musaid (helper), Müntesib (participator), Amil (hardworking), 
Mücahid (fighter), Nakip (high rank officer), and Naib (head or deputy) bring about a 
sixth degree of order, which resembles the structure of Muslim Brotherhood, the 
Lebanese Hezbollah in terms of division of power between Spiritual and Political 
leader, and to some intelligence services such as the CIA or Mossad (Çiçek,  2000,  
p.44).  In addition, Uslu presents the organizational structure of the Hezbollah, as can 
be seen in the Figure.4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Administrative Structure of the Hezbollah (Uslu, 2009, p.224)  
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The Hezbollah is organized through a dual leadership: The spiritual leader 
and the political leader. The spiritual leader did not have authority over the decision 
making of political affairs. His power lied in religious affairs. The same applied to 
the political leader. He would not intervene in religious decision-making. The second 
most important body of the Hezbollah hierarchy was the top committee, which 
consisted of members of high-ranking political and military members. In cities and 
villages a similar body was actualized. The military wing operated the armed 
confrontations. The political wing, on the other hand, was responsible from 
recruiting new members and propaganda.   
 
4.3. Operations and Ideas 
 
The Hezbollah categorizes its activities into two periods: the first period is 
from the foundation year (1979) until 1991, and the second period is between the 
years of 1991 and 2000 (Bagasi). In the first period, the congregation was completed, 
and then the invitation and education phases were carried out. During the second 
period, armed struggle against the PKK, the Menzil group,“deep  state’s  intelligence  
services”   and   gangs   were   initiated   (Bagasi).   Menzil group’s   basic   argument   for  
refusing  the  armed  struggle  was  the  belief  that   the  phase  of  Tebliğ   (Invitation) was 
not completed and the infrastructure works for the next phase was not at a sufficient 
point. On the other hand, the İlim group was insistent and determined to precipitate 
in an armed struggle against the PKK and to use violence. Certainly, after the defeat 
of  ‘the  infidel  organization  (the  PKK)’,  the  main  goal  would  be  to  fight  against  the  
state whom it hold responsible from the  adoption of secular and infidel practices and 
at the end, to found an Islamic state in the region.  
The   Hezbollah   was   effective   in   Diyarbakır,   Batman   and   Istanbul on the 
Kurdish basis of which the inclinations were powerful towards Islam and its values 
(Yılmaz, 13 February 2013). Starting from the 1990s, its primary target was the 
PKK. While practicing the first phase (tebliğ),   Hezbollah’s   activities   caught   the  
attention and sympathies of Kurdish people in the region. However, the existence of 
a rival organization bothered the PKK (Bagasi). Thus, harassments of the PKK 
towards the Hezbollah organizations came to a critical point in 1991. According to 
Bagasi, Hezbollah either would permit the harassments made by the PKK, deny its 
responsibilities arousing from Islam and give up the activities it had been involved 
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since 1979 or it would start responding in a similar fashion. It chose the second 
option and both sides gave fought against one another until the end of the 1990s. 
Uslu   argues   that   Hüseyin   Velioğlu   was   much   influenced   by   the   Syrian   army’s  
massacre in Hama, in 1980. After this incident, Molla Ahmed, an important leader of 
the Brotherhood in Syria, crossed the border and resided in Mardin in Turkey and 
became  effective  in  Velioğlu’s  mental  construction  (2009, p.223).   
The  Hezbollah’s  motivation   against   the  PKK  was   its  denial of the religious 
values and sensitivity of the Kurdish people as well as their contribution to the 
sufferings and suppression of the Kurdish people side by side with the state forces 
(Çevik, 2012, p. 98). For them, the PKK was the greatest obstacle for the Islamic 
development   in   the   region   (Büyükkara, 2006, p. 148).   Yılmaz   argues   that   the  
Hezbollah’s   first   open   reaction   to   the   PKK   was   after   the   latter’s   entrance   to  
organizations as the “Kurdistan   Union   of   Imams”21, which addressed the 
conservative people in the region (13 February 2013). According to the Hezbollah, 
the  PKK’s  move  was  tactical  and  insincere  and  directly  aimed  the monopolization of 
the representation of the   Kurdish   people.   The   Hezbollah   case’s   attorney   and   the  
Huda-Par’s   first   party   leader  Hüseyin  Yılmaz argue that the Hezbollah’s   appeal   to  
violence  was  the  result  of  the  PKK’s  impositions  (Göksu, 15 August 2014). In other 
words,   if   there   was   not   the   PKK,   Hezbollah’s   purpose   would   have been a civil 
revolution in line with the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and similar 
to what happened  in  Iran,  1979  (Göksu,  15  August  2014). 
  In defending their position against the PKK, Yilmaz, Tutar and Varol mention 
about an extermination process of the Muslims of the region by the PKK (2011, 
p.226). They argue that before initiating an armed  struggle  against  the  PKK’s  forces,  
the Hezbollah had warned the PKK leaders and asked them to stop enmity towards 
Islam and Muslims which would not benefit either the parties or the Kurdish people 
(2011, p.226). The Hezbollah claimed that their killings were most of the time 
retaliatory for the killings of the PKK as well as its humiliation of Islam (Yilmaz, 
Tutar and Varol, 2011, p.231).   
Similarly,  Büyükkara  argues  that   the İlim group’s  struggle  towards  the  PKK  
was not a matter of process rather it was a timely reaction, and a compulsion of the 
conditions of the time (2006, p.148). There were increasing numbers of assaults to 
                                                          
21 Kürdistan  İmamlar/Dindarlar  Birliği. 
 
 
63 
 
the members of the Islamist  movement  made  by  the  PKK.  As  Çitlioğlu  puts  forward, 
“Hüseyin  Velioğlu  was  conscious  that  if  they  would  not  target  the  PKK,  they  would  
be  the  PKK’s  target”(2001, p.93). The Menzil group did not approve the İlim group’s  
debut. According to them, the Hezbollah-PKK fight would harm the Islamist cause; 
the main target should have  been  the  state  (Büyükkara, 2006, p.148).  
In the first half of the 1990s, street assaults of the Hezbollah supporters 
against PKK sympathizers were intensified especially in Nusaybin, Cizre, Batman, 
and Silvan (Kaya, 02 February 2011). Both organizations appealed to street murders 
and used violent methods (such as hogtie) against their captives (Kaya, 2 February 
2011). However, the cruelty of the methods used by the Hezbollah caused internal 
disagreements.   According   to   Kaya,   Gonca   Kuriş’s   murder   was   a result of such 
internal clash (Kaya, 02 February 2011). Kuriş  was  known  to  be  a  Muslim  Turkish  
feminist and a former member of the Hezbollah who later criticized the organization 
openly. The Hezbollah side claims that their scope did not include Kurdish 
nationalists outside of the PKK  organization  with  rare  exceptions  (Yılmaz, Tutar and 
Varol, 2011, p.231). Apparently, they went into a classification/segmentation process 
among people. Their actions were directed at influential people. Common people 
with opposite ideas were not in their targets. As  put   forward  by  Yılmaz, Tutar and 
Varol (2011, p.245), the Kurdish Hezbollah differentiated militia from sympathizers, 
and rulers from commoners, and directed their actions towards effective people. 
Therefore it can be concluded that they used violence systematically rather than 
randomly.  
  The Hezbollah perceived the events after 1995 as the PKK and state 
apparatus’   entering   into“an unofficial alliance via international powers and local 
intelligence structures”, starting a joint operation against conservative structures in 
the region (Turan, 2011, p.292).  The  Hezbollah’s  struggle with the PKK resulted in 
a systematic and educated military wing, which the Hezbollah had obtained. Also, 
the group entered into a phase where it was much more disciplined and it organized 
its activities more than before (Bagasi). In the fiercest time with its struggle with the 
PKK, the İlim and Menzil group started an   inter   group   fight   (Yılmaz, Tutar and 
Varol, 2011, p.247).  
According to Bagasi, the İlim and Menzil’s  struggle  was  a result of a security 
and intelligence issue. Inside the organization, there was a channel in which 
information regarding the organization was leaked to  the  state’s  services, which were 
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used by the state for their operations toward the Hezbollah (Bagasi). The Hezbollah –
İlim wing- justified its struggle with the Menzil group in this context.  
The Hezbollah did not only fight with the PKK. It also struggled against the 
state forces and competing groups. Journalists and Islamists whose ideas were not 
found  permissible  were  also  on  the  death  list  of  the  Hezbollah  (Yılmaz, 13 February 
2013). People who were considered committers of immoral acts according to Islamic 
norms (alcohol consumers, people who do not fast in Ramadan, thieves, prostitutes, 
etc.) were also attacked by the Hezbollah members. After 1995, the number of this 
sort  of  punishment  activities  increased.    According  to  Aras  and  Balcık,  however,  in  
the   Hezbollah’s   development and fame, its move into larger cities and Istanbul 
should be considered an important phase (2002, p.152).  
The Hezbollah choses to call its struggle with the state   “efforts   to   make  
precautions  in  order  to  survive  the  destruction  war  of  state’s  forces”  (Yılmaz, Tutar 
and Varol, 2011, p.248). The Hezbollah denies the help and/or toleration of the state 
forces in any period of its existence, on the contrary complains about the 
impossibility of having a free area for activities (Yılmaz,   Tutar   and   Varol,   2011, 
p.248). 
  Especially after 1995, the   state’s   pressure on Kurdish people was felt 
intensely.   The   state’s   conflict   with   the   PKK   in   the   region   caused   much   more  
sufferings than any time before. Villages were burnt and emptied. Kurdish people 
were compelled to migrate. Unidentified murders, executions without due processes, 
tortures, destroying goods and animals, long period custodies become the routine of 
the  day.  The  PKK’s  cruel  methods   to  attain  new  members  and  supporters   from  the  
villages together with the  state’s repressive practices made Kurdish people are caught 
between  two  fires.  The  Hezbollah’s  choice  to  be  standing  aside  from  the state and the 
PKK and its emphasis on moral and religious values made it a viable option for those 
people.    
Aras and Balcik (2002, p.152) explain the Hezbollah's development strategy 
in two phases. The first phase is the invitation (tebliğ) phase. In this phase, people 
are invited into the Organization. In the second phase, once they believe that they 
have enough supporters they start aggressive competition with other organizations in 
the region. In order to finance the Hezbollah activities, kidnaping important people 
had been used as an effective tool. According  to  Çiçek (2000, p.67),  the  Hezbollah’s  
strategy   consisted   of   three   phases:   Tebliğ   (invitation),   Cemaat   (community)   and  
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Cihad (Jihad-fight in the name of Allah). In the first phase, as in the classification of 
Aras and Balcik, people are invited into the organization by propaganda.  In the 
second phase, the Cemaat members are organized through education. In the latest 
phase, the fight for the cause is realized via different means and strategies. Thus, 
according to the overall strategy of the Hezbollah, when a sufficient number of 
people and efficient conditions were met, the phase of Jihad was to be initiated and 
armed struggle would be a viable option (Kaya, 2011).    
According  to  Yılmaz, Tutar and Varol (2011, p.128), there is no possibility of 
success through individualistic struggle; therefore cemaat-ization is the only solution 
to fight back. In other words, for the leaders of Hezbollah, and for the struggle 
against the enemies of Islam, the foundation of the Hezbollah was necessary. This 
understanding opposes the “Protestanization”  of  Islam  through individualization. For 
the Hezbollah, Islam cannot be realized individually.  It needs to be performed 
communally in all aspects in societal norms, and ways of worships etc. Since humans 
can be influenced by the environment in which they live, in the case of an 
environment that is shaped by a non-Islamic way of preferences, of life,  an 
individual salvation is unlikely to occur (Yılmaz, Tutar and Varol, 2011, p.129).    
The PKK and the Hezbollah fight lasted five years and resulted in the death 
of 200 Hezbollah followers and 500 PKK militants in addition to hundreds of civilian 
casualties   (Çevik, 2012, p.98).   Following   the   PKK’s   leader   Abdullah   Öcalan’s  
capturing on 15 February 1999, operations, which aimed to destroy Hezbollah, had 
been  intensified.  According  to  Kırmızı  and  Bölme,  the timing signalled the end of the 
Hezbollah’s  usefulness against the PKK in the eyes of the government (2007). As a 
result, thousands of Hezbollah members were arrested.  
As it has been the case for other armed Islamist groups who have been using 
violent methods for their cause, the Hezbollah justified its actions and position from 
Qur’anic verses and Hadiths. For instance, in explaining their violent struggle against 
the PKK, they used the example of a Prophetic answer. In the example, Prophet 
Mohammad responds to a question of how to help brutality. The answer implies the 
prevention of it through help.  (2011, p.129).  For the Hezbollah, Islam is neither 
only religion of sword, nor religion of mercy; it includes both in right place and time 
(Yılmaz, Tutar and Varol, p.154). 
The leaders of the Hezbollah had always refused any type of nationalism. 
However, this does not mean that they ignored the sufferings the Kurdish people had 
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been through since the new Turkish Republic was established. This was not limited 
to  Turkey’s  reality.  Kurdish populations of neighboring countries such as Iran, Syria 
and Iraq also had similar problems (Yılmaz, Tutar and Varol, p.144). According to 
the Hezbollah, nationalism does not fit the Islamic doctrine. Nonetheless, recruiting 
from ethnically Kurdish people resulted in a sense of Kurdish nationalism, which 
turned the group against the Turkish Islamists. They developed their discourse on the 
issue of nationalism in a negative sense. Their problem was not with Muslim Turkish 
people, but with the Kemalist regime (Yılmaz,  Tutar  and  Varol,  p.143).  
As  it  was  mentioned  before,  the  Hezbollah’s  main  problem  was  the  regime’s  
character and its anti-Islamic demonstrations. According to the Hezbollah, the 
Turkish state is religion-less. For eighty years or more, secularism had been invented, 
deployed, and propagated for the place of religion (Yılmaz,  Tutar  and  Varol,  p.147). 
The Hezbollah, at least in its discourse, had been against secularism and management 
of the state with non-Islamic laws and codes (Yılmaz,  Tutar  and  Varol,  p. 150). For 
them, in a Muslim society, governing must be shaped by the Islamic norms; the 
constitution and all the laws must be in line with Islam. Most importantly, 
jurisdiction should be based on Islamic Sharia, a principle that had been the most 
important denominator of the Islamists since the early 1900s.   
Apart from its violent struggle, the Hezbollah organization materialized 
extensive activities especially in the areas of moral awakening and social life. A 
considerable number of mosques and schools were embraced by Hezbollah activists.  
For instance, drug dealers were sought to be removed from the school areas. The 
PKK threats to the schools, students, and teachers were to be diminished. Mixed 
gender meetings and gatherings were another target.   In  Yılmaz, Tutar   and  Varol’s 
book (2011, p.196), it is seen that these gatherings were tried to be organized in 
separate occasions. The Hezbollah worked for reviving and awareness-rising and 
reintroduction of Islam in the villages. It also organized reading and writing classes 
especially for women in the region (Yılmaz,  Tutar  and  Varol,  p.200). The Hezbollah 
also aimed to heal the deep seated social and cultural problems of the Kurdish 
society. Animosities that lasted decades with blood revenges, conflicts over the 
distribution of land, disputes over the use of water, matters of pudicity, abductions of 
girls, and inter-family disputes which could not be fully resolved through modern 
jurisdiction mechanisms had been the Hezbollah’s   topics   of   interests.   The 
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Hezbollah’s   offer for the problematic cases was solve the issues on the basis of 
Islam.  
Nonetheless, the universality of Islam and its provisions does not mean total 
indifference and/or insensitivity to local/regional problems. On the contrary, Islam 
prioritizes the resolution of each  and  every  Muslim’s  problems  and  troubles  arousing  
in the social life. Thus, the Hezbollah, although it emphasizes the universal 
brotherhood of the Muslims all over the world, prioritizes the Kurdish issue because 
they resided and centered in  Turkey’s  Kurdish  region.     
According   to   the   Hezbollah’s   understanding,   God,   the   Creator, has given 
humans different qualities (nationality, language, skin color, family, etc.) from birth, 
which should be considered as the right of humans to have and maintain them. 
Abolition of cultural rights with oppression is against the will of Islam and therefore 
such practice should be corrected (Bagasi). Struggling in order to reach a free, 
honorable and happy life in the  shadow  of  Islam’s  justice  is  considered  to  be  the  duty  
of a Muslim and the reason of existence of an Islamic movement (Bagasi).  
 
4.4. The  Hezbollah’s  Valuable  Loneliness 
 
It could be said that the Hezbollah’s   eternal   goal   had   been   to establish an 
Islamic government.  However, this –one might say political- goal is shared by 
almost   all   Islamist   organizations.   The   Hezbollah’s   distinctiveness   arouses from 
several   features.   The   most   important   is   its   appeal   to   violence.   Among   Turkey’s  
Islamists, armed struggle against one another or towards state structures is a rare 
phenomenon. After the failed rebellions of Kurdish Islamists and the violent 
suppression of Muslims by the Independence Courts in the early years of the 
Republic,  Turkey’s   Islamists’ choice has been a participation to the political realm 
via publications in magazines, newspapers, books etc. Islam and violence had not 
been the words that could be put together side by side in the Turkish society prior to 
the Hezbollah. 
Secondly, the Hezbollah was successful in constructing a strong sense of the 
idea of the “other”.   As   it   was   put   forward   by   Aras   and   Bacik (2002, p.152), the 
Community separated itself from other groups, and preferred to live in an isolated 
community that aimed the destruction of the other and build what they believe was 
“just”.   In   other   words,   they   were   not   willing   to   compromise   in   a   constructive  
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manner. The category   of   “unjust   others”  did not only consist of non-believers, but 
also Muslims who do not follow the same path with the Hezbollah (Aras & Bacik, 
2002, p.152).    Kırmızı  and  Bölme  (2007) argue that when the PKK sought to include 
Kurdish conservatives in their activities by using a religious discourse, the Hezbollah 
movement had been the most disturbed ones. This disturbance resulted in the 
procurement of an in-group   organization   called   “Hareketçi”22 that did not want to 
give up their claims on religion and appealed to the punishment of religious people 
who did not support their methodology as well as directed their activities towards the 
state apparatus rather than the PKK   itself   (Kırmızı   and   Bölme, 2007). This 
otherization worked out for other Islamist groups as well. The Hezbollah wanted all 
Islamist groups in the region to join in its  structure  (Büyükkara, 2006, p.149). Groups 
that did not participate voluntarily were punished. The deaths of Mullah Ubeydullah 
Dalar,   Mehmet   Sümbül   and   İzzettin   Yıldırım   were   reflected   in the media as 
Hezbollah  murders  (Büyükkara, 2006, p.149).   
In addition, the Hezbollah was considered a proxy of fighters from different 
organizations by different segments. The PKK saaw the Hezbollah Movement as a 
tool used by the state for specific purposes and especially  to  reduce  the  PKK’s  sphere  
of influence in the region. Since the PKK had been a Marxist organization, using an 
enemy Islamist organization against it might have been a logical strategy for the 
state.  Çiçek,  for  instance,  argues  that  the  Hezbollah  was supported indirectly by the 
military rulers of the 1980 coup who considered religion as a bond for people and  
adopted the Turkish-Islam synthesis for political calculations (2000, p.123). Further, 
the Hezbollah could be considered a   “super-NATO organization”   with   the CIA 
supervision  (Çiçek, 2000, p.126). Others and especially secular groups perceived the 
Hezbollah as a fundamentalist threat which could be supported by an international 
power –most importantly Iran-. Interesting enough, Turkish Islamists interpreted the 
activities of the Hezbollah as a “deviation   from   true   Islam”   (Aras  &  Bacik, 2002, 
p.156;;  Kırmızı  &  Bölme, 2007). Even the Menzil group perceived the İlim group’s  
decision to appeal to the use of violence against the PKK as being used by the state, 
which caused aggression between the two   (Büyükkara, 2006, p.149). In short, the 
Hezbollah in Turkey was not interpreted as an authentic establishment; rather it had 
been interpreted as being the tool of another player within the country and/or region 
                                                          
22 Can  be  translated  as  “Conductor”. 
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and even   the   Islamists  doubted   the  Organization’s sincerity. This projection can be 
seen in the approach of the state bureaucracy, and in the media  and  society’s  dealing  
with the issue of the Hezbollah. Perhaps, this was the most problematic issue in the 
whole process and enabled the further marginalization of the group. 
 
4.5. The End of Hezbollah 
 
The Turkish state, by 2000, began to carry out large-scale operations against 
the   Hezbollah   especially   in   Istanbul   and   Diyarbakır.   According   to   Bagasi,   these  
operations  were  due  to  the  deep  state’s  intolerance  of the Hezbollah’s  uncoverings  of  
what had been happening in the Southeastern region of Turkey, the real dimension of 
the war between the PKK and the Turkish state (Bagasi). With the 17 January 2000 
police   operation,   the  Hezbollah’s   leader   Hüseyin  Velioğlu   was   captured   dead   and  
important  leaders  such  as  Edip  Gümüş  and  Cemal  Tutar  were  arrested.  This  date is a 
milestone for the organization, which is followed by trials in which so many people 
were tried (Yılmaz, 13 April 2013). Almost all the activities of Hezbollah were 
suspended. The community fell into deep silence.  
After  Velioğlu’s  death,  the Hezbollah’s  political  wing, and operation channels 
were  eliminated   to  a  great  degree   (Güner, 17 February 2001). According to  Güner,  
its military wing did not take a major blow; rather they chose to remain in their cells 
(17 February 2001).  However,   the  Hezbollah’s inertia since then proves otherwise.  
In the meantime, the assassination of Gaffar Okkan who was at the time the 
Diyarbakır  Chief  of  Police, and his colleagues on 24 January 2001, were believed to 
be realized by the Hezbollah supporters.  This belief resulted in an increase in the 
pressure against   the  organization.  According  to  Çiçek,   the  Hezbollah  operation  was  
the most successful implementation of the 28 February process, after the enactment 
the law of the eight-year compulsory education and ban on the Welfare Party (200, 
p.125). 
Withdrawal from any of the activities and the deep silence of the Hezbollah 
protected its members from long prison sentences. In 2009, the Hezbollah case where 
16 persons were trialed ended with a life-time   prison   sentence   (Yılmaz, 13 April 
2013). However, due to the Code of Criminal Procedure23, 23 of the Hezbollah 
                                                          
23 Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu (CMK). 
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suspects were released from prison as a result of their ten year long imprisonment 
without  a  court  decision  (Yılmaz, 13 April 2013). 
Although these releases were welcomed by the Hezbollah sympathizers and 
bases, some groups did not react the same way. Especially the PKK and its 
supporters   criticized   the   court   decision.   In   Dicle   Universtity   (Diyarbakır),   clashes  
between student groups who supported the PKK and Hezbollah sympathizers have 
occurred  since  then  (Yılmaz, 13 April 2013).   
According to Turan (2011, p.294),   the   Hezbollah’s   contribution   to   Islamic  
Community were: 
International   powers’   calculations   regarding   pulling   apart   Kurdish   people  
from Islam was destroyed. 
State’s  suspicions  on  conservativeness  of  Kurdish  people  were  proved  to  be  
right and went deeper.  
Socialist   Kurds’   efforts   on   producing   “one-type   Kurdish”   which   had   been  
supported by international powers were defeated. Socialist Kurds attacked 
Islamic development. 
Islam became a dominant force among Kurdish people. Beneficiaries from 
the use of religion were abandoned.  
 
According to the published works from   the   Hezbollah’s   official   website  
(huseynisevda.com), the Turkish State presumed its success after the 17 January 
2000 operations against the Hezbollah organization. Operations were realized after 
28 February process. The process had already put pressure on Islamists but especially 
political Islamist groups and personalities of the country. Therefore, operations 
included and punished as many people as possible without clear evidence of 
connections to Hezbollah’s  crimes.  According  to  Bagasi,  not  only police operations 
but also large-scale psychological, financial, political and cultural extermination 
processes were deployed by the state. For this end, all opportunities and specifically 
measures were used in order to present the Hezbollah as a terrorist organization 
without public support and ineffective to the masses (Bagasi).  
  
4.6. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, the place of the Islamic state for Islamists, the foundation of 
the Hezbollah, its organization structure, its ideas, operations and struggles, its 
distinctiveness   and   the  Movement’s   end with the 17 January 2000 operation were 
examined. The Hezbollah Movement had a unique place in the political history of the 
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Turkish State since its  emergence.  Turkey’s  Islamists  preferred  to  go  along  with  the  
regime, although both had grievance for one another. The trajectories of the Kurdish 
region in the 1990s and a high tempered period of the Islamists after the Iran Islam 
Revolution   1979   resulted   in   a   “radicalized”   organization   that   justified   the   use   of  
violence for their purposes and based its arguments on Islam. In the next chapter, the 
Huda-Par, which is considered as the successor of the Hezbollah will be examined on 
the grounds of transformation. The main question will be whether Kurdish Islamists 
in Turkey have been moderated or not in terms of ideology and or behavior. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE FREE CAUSE PARTY (THE HUDA-PAR)   
From the 17 January 2000 operation in Beykoz, Istanbul until the 
establishment of the Huda-Par in 2012 the Hezbollah Community was not active 
politically. Throughout the period, Turkey has experienced a deep political, financial 
and social transformation. First and foremost, as the result of 3 November 2002 
general elections, a conservative –one might say Islamist- and democrat party in 
Turkey took over the governmental authority. The Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) was founded  by  Recep  Tayyip  Erdoğan  and  his  associates  from  the  National  
Outlook Movement. Successive AKP governments enabled the realization of a great 
sum of reforms regarding many aspects in the structures of Turkish society. After 
years of economic, political, and social crises, the economy and standards of living 
and more importantly the expression of basic human and social rights were 
improved. The Hezbollah community and its sympathizers have benefited from the 
new initiatives and environment as other social, religious and political groups did. 
However, until 2012, the community revealed itself only in the shape of NGOs 
and/or mass religious gatherings.  
 In this chapter, the events following the dispersal of the Hezbollah and the 
process leading to the foundation of the Huda-Par are examined. Most importantly, 
the main question of this work, whether a moderation has taken place for the Kurdish 
Islamists, if taken in which degree and what aspects this moderation has taken place 
are analyzed through interviews. The interviews are made   with   Said   Şahin   -the 
spokesperson of the Party-, Mehmet Yavuz -vice president of the Party-, Aynur 
Sülün   –member   of   the   Party’s   General   Management   Council   and   Vice   President  
responsible from Family and Social Policies, and Faruk Bildirici –a journalist from 
Hürriyet  Ankara  office  and  follower  of  the  subject- . The social media (twitter.com) 
sharing  of  the  Party’s  official  channel  and  the  Party’s  leader  Zekeriya  Yapıcıoğlu  are  
also examined. The chapter ends with concluding remarks that review and 
commentate on what has been discussed throughout the Chapter. 
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5.1. The Aftermath  of  the  Hezbollah’s  Disappearance 
 
As it was discussed in the previous chapter, operations against the Hezbollah 
intensified following February 28th post-modern coup   d’état,   the  National   Security  
Council’s  declaration  of  Islamism  as  the  greatest  domestic  threat,   the resignation of 
the Welfare Party from office, and the capturing of the head of the PKK, Abdullah 
Öcalan  on 13 February 1999 in Kenya. The final and most important operation took 
place on 20 January 2000, in Beykoz, a district in Istanbul, and resulted in the 
capturing of the dead body  of  Hüseyin  Velioğlu,  the  top  leader  of  the  Hezbollah  of  
the time, the arrest of leaders such as Edip   Gümüş   and   Cemal   Tutar   and   the 
acquisition of many documents of the organization. In the basement of the house 
buried bodies of the Hezbollah victims were found, in addition to 600.000 pages of 
documents revealing the details of the operations and the organization, photographs, 
and video records of the torturous investigations (Nugent, 2004). These small and 
large-scale operations resulted in the arrests of nearly 6,000 Hezbollah sympathizers 
(Uslu, 2009, p.239).   
In the meantime, the Hezbollah community went into deep silence, previous 
activities were suspended, and all entities were eliminated to a great degree.  
Although for years, the community was still blamed for operating secretly and/or 
cooperating in major terror events (such as the assassination of Gaffar Okkan in 
2001, and Istanbul bombing in 2003), after a certain point, it succeeded in making 
itself forgotten by the Turkish public and the media.  
As Uslu points out, these operations were an important setback for the 
Hezbollah, but the community still survived and remained alive (2009, p.239).   In 
addition to the arrests, many Hezbollah sympathizers had to leave the country; some 
chose  to  seek  asylum  in  Syria  and  Iraq,  while  others  went  to  Europe.  At  the  end,  İsa  
Altsoy who escaped to Germany captured attained the leadership for some time 
(Uslu, 2009, p.240). His new initiative started organizational activities in Europe. 
According   to   Özeren   and   Voorde,   Hezbollah’s   new   strategy   was   to recruit new 
members and to establish connections with non-violent mainstream Islamic groups in 
Europe in order to be seen as one of them and escape the repression of the police 
(2006, p.89). In other words, the Hezbollah returned to the first and second phases of 
the  organization’s  development  strategy:  invitation and education. Uslu explains the 
new strategy of the Hezbollah Community as twofold: firstly, returning back to the 
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initial phases of development, dealing only in legal activities like publishing books 
and magazines, designing websites, and secondly, managing the Organization from 
Europe   and   benefit   from   the   “arrest-free”   environment   (2007, p.136). Thus, the 
organization turned from violence to peaceful activities, more strategically, keeping 
the support base and if possible enlarging it.  The Turkish as well as the Kurdish 
diaspora in the European cities enabled the realization of these goals. 
In the years following the dispersal of the Hezbollah, Turkish political sphere 
was experiencing a profound transformation. Although the AKP specifically chose 
not to be called as an Islamic/Islamist party, as a conservative democrat party it was 
founded and took the government in November 2002 elections. The founders and 
important figures of the AKP were members of the National Outlook Movement.24 
Especially people with secular tendencies claimed that the AKP has an Islamist 
agenda. This assumption proved to be wrong during the initial years of the AKP 
government. Rather than immediate pursuit of revenge for the 28 February 1997 and 
its concomitants on the conservative Muslim people, the AKP started reform 
processes in the fields of economy, human rights, relations with the European Union, 
and Turkey's neighbors, etc. Most importantly, the AKP government “changed   the  
anti-terror law, lifted the state of emergency in the Southeast, allowed the private 
media to broadcast in the Kurdish language, and granted a partial amnesty to Kurdish 
militants”   all   of   which   directly aimed to correct the   state’s   problematic   stand  
regarding the status of the Kurdish identity and resolve the turbulent relationship 
between the state and the PKK by sustaining permanent ceasefire (Ulusoy, 2011, 
p.412).  The introduction of cultural rights including the establishment of a state 
broadcasting in the Kurdish language as well as permitting the private media 
channels to broadcast in the Kurdish language were operated as extensions of the 
process  of  “democratic  openings”.   
                                                          
24 National  Outlook  Movement  (Milli  Görüş  Hareketi)  is  the  one  of  the  oldest  
Islamist political movement in Turkey. It was founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 
1969 and produced several political parties all of which except the last one (Felicity 
Party) were banned by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that they violated the 
secular principle of the Republic and were being the focal point of anti-secular 
activities.  Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,  Abdullah  Gül,  Bülent  Arınç,  Cemil  Çiçek,  
Abdüllatif  Şener,  Salih  Kapusuz  and  Numan  Kurtulmuş  were  only  some  of  former  
important members of the Movement who left it after a troublesome election for the 
party presidency between the reformist and conservative wings on 14 May 2000 and 
found the AKP.  
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Naturally, the AKP benefited from these reforms in the successive elections. 
It became the first party in the 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2014 elections in the Southeast 
region, defeating a strong aggressive regional party, the Peace and Democracy Party 
(Formerly the DTP, then the BDP, and today the HDP) (Erdem, 10 September 2014).  
However, reforms were not the only factor that helped  the  AKP’s  gain  in  the  overall  
calculation. Apart from the extension of cultural and political rights, this opening 
resulted in the emergence of political opportunity structures for the political actors in 
the  region,  as  in  the  rest  of  Turkey.  Yavuz  acknowledges  “structural  conditions  either  
shrink or expand opportunity spaces, which in turn shape the goals and strategies of 
Islamic  movements  as  withdrawal,  confrontation  or  participation”  (2003, p.27).  
The appearance of the former Hezbollah community once again in the public 
sphere and media was neither in the form of a direct political confrontation nor 
participation; rather, it was in the shape of a collection of pro-Islamist, conservative 
and charity organizations, which  have  hundreds  of  branches  in  the  region’s  districts.  
Apart from its political agenda, the Community is now very active in social services. 
As they are listed in Table 5.1., through tens of NGOs, they reach out to a large 
spectrum of the conservative Kurdish people. The community organizes funding and 
recruitment activities in the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, and in Turkey, as well hand 
prints books and magazines, operates websites, establishes radio and TV broadcasts, 
opens bookstores, organizes wedding ceremonies, brings thousands of people 
together for the birthday celebration of the Prophet etc. and socially and culturally 
exists in the lives of the conservative Kurdish people (Uslu, 2009, p.241).   
Foundations such as Mustazaf-Der,  Özgür-Der and Toplum-Der are known to 
be ideologically close organizations and differ from   the   former  Hezbollah   (Çevik, 
2012, p.98). These organizations are different in that they serve by hymnal chorus, 
monthly magazines, and by communication channels, and charity organizations, 
which deal with the issues of the poor as well as moral issues and problems such as 
drug abuse and   prostitution   (Kırmızı   and   Bölme, 2007)). The most important and 
somehow umbrella organization of the other NGOs of the community was Mustazaf-
Der.25 Its name was heard with the organization of a mass protest in  Diyarbakır  for 
the Danish cartoons showing the Prophet Mohammed and attended by 130.000 
                                                          
25 Mustazaf  is  originally  an  Arabic  word.  The  word  points  to  “the  ones  who  are  
oppressed”  with  a  powerful  sense  with  regard  to  the  existence  of  an  oppressor  and  
continous suffering for a holy cause.  
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people  (Kırmızı  and  Bölme, 2007). Mustazaf-Der was found on  2003,  in  Diyarbakır.  
Its   name   derived   from   the   Iranian  Revolution’s   “Revolution   of   Battereds”   (Çevik, 
2012, p.98). Mustazaf-Der started its activities primarily in the Kurdistan region; 
then it steadily became organized in cities such as Istanbul, Konya, and Adana, etc. 
(Yılmaz, 13 April 2013).  The foundation continued its activities until a court 
decision on 11 May 2012 that closed down the organization. Many prominent figures 
in the organization were the members of the former Hezbollah.  
Below is listed some of the organizations/associations that are part of the 
former Hezbollah community: 
 
Table 5.1: List of Organizations Related to Huda-Par 
Field Name of the organization Current Status 
Human Rights - Education – 
Culture Mustazaf-Der Passive 
Human Rights - Education – 
Culture Mustazaflar Cemiyeti Active 
Charity İhya-Der Active 
Charity Umut-Der Active 
Religious Education Bilge-Der Active 
Knowledge – Religious 
Education Hira-Der Active 
Human Rights – Education Sevgi-Der Active 
Charity Şefkat  Eli  Derneği Active 
Social Solidarity Köy-Der Active 
Health – Nature Sağ-Çev Active 
Charity Enfa-Der Active 
Education – Social 
Responsibility Hizmet-Der Active 
Religious Publishing – 
Education İlim  Derneği Active 
Charity Rahmet  Pınarı  Derneği Active 
Social Solidarity İmam  Hatip  Der Unknown 
Religious Gathering Kuran Nesli Platformu Active 
Religious Gathering Peygamber  Sevdalıları  Platformu Active 
Broadcast Kervan FM Active 
Broadcast Serhad FM Active 
Magazine İnzar  Dergisi Active 
Magazine Nisanur Active 
News Website dogruhaber.com Active 
News Website Hurseda.com Active 
News Agency İlkha Active 
Broadcast Rehber TV Active 
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The benefit of founding and operating such societal organizations is at least 
twofold for the Hezbollah community: on the one hand, the Movement found a 
chance to adjust, moreover, the new cadres of the movement found opportunity to 
increase knowledge in managing organizations that are bound by law and operate 
legally.  
Interestingly enough, Hezbollah has also become more visible recently. Its 
former  leader  İsa  Altsoy  published  the book Hizbullah in its Own Words: Selections 
from the History of the Struggle under the pseudo name I. Bagasi. In addition, Cemal 
Tutar and one of the most well-known lawyers of the Hezbollah case as well as the 
first president of the Huda-Par Hüseyin  Yılmaz  wrote  the joint book The Hezbollah 
Main Case: Defences. Lastly, the website, huseynisevda publishes online 
commentaries of the Hezbollah on recent events and books of the religious inspirers 
of the Movement.  
Although the Mustazaf-Der journey did not end well, it gave great pulse to 
the former Hezbollah community to establish the political party, the Huda-Par. 
 
5.2. The Foundation of the Huda-Par 
 
Some people see Islam as the religion that produces terrorism for the rest of 
the world. Thinking that Islam, Christianity, Judaism or any other belief system can 
cause the problems among people is a diverting idea from the realities surrounding 
the real phenomenon. It is rather difficult to explain Hezbollah violence based on 
religion. If religion itself does not explain the occurrence of violence, then there 
needs to be other explanations, which might be both internal and external to the 
group and lead the group to violent or peaceful activities.  
 Uslu (2009) presents following developments as the stages of changing 
opportunity spaces for the Hezbollah: process of   the  1980  military  coup  d’état, the 
state’s imposition of Martial Law, involuntary withdrawal to underground existence 
(which  resulted  in  expansion  of  opportunities  and  protection  from  the  PKK’s  harm), 
the  state’s   inability   to  maintain  order   in   the  southeastern   region,   the  PKK’s  attacks  
on the Hezbollah sympathizers, local feudal structures and relations ( which enabled 
promotion of the interests),  the  state’s  hardship  in  implementing  religious  bans  in  the  
region and also using religious brotherhood to encounter Kurdish separatism. These 
are certainly some of the variables, which   resulted   in   the   Hezbollah’s   drive   for  
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violent struggle. However, they are not able to help us understand why the 
community stopped armed struggle and became involved in the recent party politics.    
In a more explanatory sense,   Özeren   and  Van   De  Voorde   argue   that   three  
conditions must exist to motivate believers to use violence: first, there should be 
threat to the values, second, theology must be transferred to dogma with a fitting 
textual interpretation, lastly, believers must face violence as a way of protecting 
values (2006, p.76). If one is to apply these conditions in the case of the Hezbollah, it 
can be found that (1) the Turkish Republic made enough impositions for pious 
people, which made them feel threatened in terms of their religion, (2) as it is 
continuously claimed, the Hezbollah embraced a great sum of theological 
accumulation derived from local and international Islamic groups (Said-i Nursi, 
Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic revolution in Iran, etc.) and transferred them to the 
group’s   interpretation   over the years in reading chambers via gatherings in 
bookstores and mosques, (3) the substantial rise in the PKK threats to the religious 
people in the region and its pragmatic discourse for the use of religious items for 
political gains. As these three conditions were met, the Hezbollah, which was 
established in 1979, started its armed struggle in the 1990s. As Uslu points out, the 
Hezbollah was a result of shrunken opportunity spaces in Turkey and an Islamic 
ideological phenomenon (2007, p.126). These spaces shape the strategies of the 
groups via “withdrawal,  confrontation,  or  participation”.  During the first years of the 
Hezbollah, as a result of shrunken opportunity spaces, the organization chose to 
withdraw from the existing system and to go back underground. After some internal 
and external developments, the organization had to confront the rival groups, the 
PKK and the state. Now, after a period of imprisonment and silence with changes in 
the Turkish political environment, the organization now prefer participation in the 
political system. 
As Uslu argues this formula does not explain why some organizations in the 
same geography, time period, and sociopolitical surroundings chose to appeal to 
violence while others did not (Uslu, 2009, p.220). Perhaps, this can be attributed to 
the differences among Islamist groups in Turkey. There might be methodological 
differences among the Islamists as well as their goals in terms of attaining the 
Islamic state. Despite the fact that secularism has been one of the major and strongest 
principles of the regime since its foundation, the successive governments used 
religion for their causes and this in turn benefited conservative, Islamist groups time 
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to time. While   the   Hezbollah   had   been   suffering   from   the   state’s   attack   on   its  
existence, groups such as Nurcus, and Süleymancıs. could have been better off for 
practical purposes. These purposes include election concerns as well as the fear of 
taking all Islamists to one front facing and dealing all together.  
In order to examine the reasons for the moderation of the Kurdish Islamism in 
the case of Hezbollah, one can look at three conditions. First of all, with the 
successive AKP governments, there has been steady liberalization in terms of human 
rights and especially the expression of religious values. This changed the perception 
of threat for conservative people in terms of their values. Second, theological 
accumulation derived from textual interpretation and other resources are still there 
with only slight changes. Lastly, the relative peaceful status of the Kurdish issue and 
the  PKK’s  transfer  of  its  power  to  more  legal  grounds  especially  to  political  parties  
lessened the burden on the Hezbollah community.  
The success of gathering large segments of people together bolstered the 
Hezbollah community’s  morale.  This   in   turn,   resulted   in  more  crowded  gatherings.  
The closure of Mustazaf-Der after  a  court  verdict  did  not  stop  the  Community’s  aim 
to legalize its structure (Yılmaz, 13 April 2013). On the contrary, the community’s  
leaders came to understand that without a legal political initiative, their causes could 
not be realized.  Perhaps, if Mustazaf-Der were not closed, the community would 
continue to function with its non-governmental organizations for some time. 
However, as it was stated by the party officials that the community grew out of its 
container.  
As  Aynur  Sülün  expresses: 
Before, we were actively engaged in NGO activities. Our purpose was 
to contribute to the recovery of the society which suffered from 
retrogression and moral crisis. But we reached to the conclusion that 
these activities were not enough and we should have carried them to 
the sphere of politics. Cause, the system was giving fight against the 
values of the society for years. As the family of the Huda-Par, we 
were aware of the unresolved and long-standing problems as we were 
engaged in non-governmental organizations hand-in-hand with people. 
Therefore, the Huda-Par was born due to the needs of the society. In 
addition, it is not formed by the elite, but rather composed of people 
who suffered from same problems. (Author’s  interview,  10  June  2014,  
[Appendix 3]) 
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With this enlightenment on hand, and the suitable conditions of the political 
environment in Turkey, the Free Cause Party was established on 17 December 2012. 
In January 2013, its head quarter in Ankara was opened.  
The emergence of the Huda-Par was not an expected outcome. On the 
contrary, the sides of the Kurdish issue (the PKK, the HDP, and the state) got used to 
being the sole representatives in the conflict. Therefore, the Huda-Par might have 
been well considered as a positive development in terms of creating plurality and 
finding a more democratic solution to the Kurdish issue. Nonetheless, as in the case 
of Hezbollah,  the  Party’s  emergence  created  speculations.  First  of  all,  the  PKK  side  
blamed the Party for being the subcontractor of the AKP in the region. The PKK 
would eventually lose its power to the Huda-Par, which would benefit the AKP and 
its status in the region. It also feared that the secular Kurdish nationalism would be 
replaced by Kurdish   Islam   (Kırmızı   and  Bölme, 2007). Secondly, the Huda-Par is 
seen as the extension of the radical groups in the Middle East such as the al-Qaeda, 
the ISIS and Iranian authorities.   Lastly,   despite   the   Party’s   contrary claims, it is 
perceived as the carrier of the devastated Hezbollah with a hidden agenda. 
Estimates suggest that the adult population of many villages in the region is 
composed of mostly Hezbollah sympathizers (Uslu, 2009, p. 242). In addition, 
NGOs’ services to those in need in the region guaranteed potential sympathizers in 
the near future. These associations have branches even in the remotest and smallest 
towns and villages that enable interaction and communication between the 
organization and the people and furthermore ease the administrative reorganization 
of the party in the region.   
The Huda-Par is a new legal political actor in the region. It promises to be the 
third power besides, the AKP and the BDP and change the scene of politics in the 
region  (Coşkun,  5  February  2014). 
The first party leader of the Huda-Par, Huseyin Yilmaz, explains the 
transformation of Mustazaf-Der to become a political movement:  
We are showing a civil struggle under the roof of an association 
(Mustazaf-Der) since 2004. Yet, there are other problems of the 
community; the issues of the country are well-known; it is impossible 
to engage in political issues through foundations. We faced a big 
societal support in the region. The court verdict that closed our 
organization led us to form a political entity. We will take pulse of 
society in days ahead. We will make meetings with the society to hear 
comments and suggestions. We will decide and disclose name and 
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identity of a political entity after those meetings which will be done 
soon. (Mehmet  Sabri  Akgönül,  04.06.2012) 
 
Other party leaders, the vice president responsible for the foreign affairs, the 
spokesperson  Said  Şahin, and the general secretariat and the spokesperson Mehmet 
Yavuz all make similar remarks. In my interview with him on 27 May 2014, Said 
Şahin  explained the foundation of the Huda-Par and the events triggered as such: 
There are couple of factors and motives which pushed us to found the 
Party. First of all, after the closure of Mustazaf-Der, the need of the 
masses became evident. There was victimhood because of central 
administration.  There was not a struggling political organization to 
represent us. Within the country, conditions were fulfilled which gave 
us impulse to effect   the   state’s   administration.   On   the   other   hand,  
representation of the Kurdish masses had been a problematic issue. It 
is in   the   PKK’s   hands.   However, their ideology is based on anti-
Islamic values and does not represent the mass ideology in the region. 
In addition, there was not any single political party which takes Islam 
as reference and struggles for Islamic values. This vacuum can be 
filled by the Huda-Par. Lastly; Islamic world is under the influence 
and subcontractors of the Imperialist forces. The Huda-Par aims to 
protect the wealth and values of its people as well as the existence of 
Islam in this geography. (Author’s   interview   with   Şahin,   27   May  
2014, [Appendix 2])  
   
As  it  can  be  seen,  Şahin  links the reasons of the timing of the foundation of 
the Huda-Par to internal and external causes. He feels responsibility towards not only 
to  the  party’s  potential mass base, but also towards a greater realm, the spirits and the 
existence of Islam and its domination in the region. This sense of responsibility 
brings us back to the Islamist thinking and its transformation over the decades. Such 
a universalistic claim is relevant to the first period of Islamists. In the second period, 
Islamist claims are reduced to national borders. In the third phase, after embracing 
governmental power, the Islamism moves on to a completely different realm, debates 
are reduced to some degree and the conformity given by a conservative government 
has been experienced. On the other hand, it can be seen that Kurdish Islamists might 
not be experiencing the same line of development parallel to their Turkish 
counterparts. A similar deduction can be made from Mehmet  Yavuz’s  explanations  
regarding the reasons of the foundation of the Huda-Par: 
In the regional aspect, the Middle East and Islamic world is under 
continuous conflicts. The borders in the region are not natural, which 
create sufferings. From an international perspective, it is a call for 
ummah. Consciousness of ummah… Quest   for  uniting…      In Turkey, 
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Muslims suffered from the establishment of the Republic. Kurdish 
Muslims suffered more because of their ethnic belongings. (Author’s  
interview with Yavuz, 29 April 2014, [Appendix 1]) 
Both leaders present the reasons of the foundation as categorical and local as 
factors well as international contexts. Although the party seems to address a small 
and local group of people –namely the Kurdish Muslims in southeastern Turkey-, its 
discourse is based on the unity of Muslims and its call is universal.  
Aynur  Sülün,  who  is  a member  of  the  Party’s  General  Management  Council  
and is the vice president responsible for family and social policies, is more direct 
regarding the  reasons  of  the  timing  of  the  Party’s  establishment: 
The conditions changed a lot. Especially, environment in Turkey is not 
similar to what it was in 1990s. Today, the system can be criticized 
easily for its problems. Even partially, some of the obstacles before 
the freedom of thought and expression are removed. Therefore, we are 
thinking that the time and conditions are more suitable now in 
comparison to the 1990s. (Author’s   interview   with   Sülün,   10   June  
2014, [Appendix 3]) 
 
The reasons for the timing and the foundation of the Huda-Par can be 
categorized into two parts which can be seen in Figure 6.2: Political opportunity 
structures and internal causes.  Political opportunity structures have increased over 
the last ten years in Turkey. This benefited many small and divergent groups. The 
Hezbollah community also benefited from the relative progress in terms of freedom 
of expression and thought as well as in cultural rights and religious rights. This is 
surely a result of one single phenomenon, the ascendance of the AKP to the 
governmental postulate. Extension of the usage of human rights and determinacy on 
resolving the Kurdish issue helped the Hezbollah community for reorganizing. The 
Kurdish Initiative enabled many policies that restored cultural rights for Kurdish 
people including broadcasting in Kurdish language, returning original names to the 
Kurdish  villages  and  towns,  etc.  Yıldız  adds  that   the  PKK’s  ceasefire period which 
started  with   the   capturing   of  Öcalan   in   1999   and   continued   until   2004   provided   a  
suitable environment for the Kurdish Islamist movement in which it manifested its 
thesis openly and started appearing as an independent movement (p.30, 2014). 
In terms of internal causes/dynamics, the most important item is the learning 
process of the former Hezbollah members. After the police raid to the head quarter in 
Beykoz in 2000, hundreds of organization members were arrested, and some of them, 
including the leader of Hezbollah, died. The period until the openings of the 
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foundations in the region should have passed by reconsidering the former deeds. The 
activities and relative transparency of the group proves the same. From what I have 
read and gathered from the interviews, the Hezbollah learned that armed struggle is 
not a proper way of achieving the goals of the organization. It brought more harm 
than benefit. Secondly, the Kurdish issue that lasted for decades and the assumption 
of the PKK, the sole representative of the Kurdish side of the problem revealed the 
inconvenience for the community, since  the  PKK’s  ideology is not close to what the 
community stands for. Lastly, the closure of Mustazaf-Der became a turning point 
for the community; since it taught the lesson that a community with political 
ambitions cannot be contended with charity associations or cultural foundations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: What caused the foundation of the Huda-Par? 
 
5.3. Moderation Contested 
 
The literature on the moderation of the radical Islamic groups is growing 
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practices of the Islamist group changed over time, and (2) which mechanisms, 
institutions, and processes have enabled the moderation (Schwedler, 2011, p.348). 
Another important aspect of examining moderation is in terms of its revelation. In 
other words, whether the moderation is in behavior, ideology of the group, or 
ideology of the individuals are examined. Since for this work, interviews have been 
conducted with the leaders of the group, it is not possible to examine the dimension 
of the overall group and directly talk about the mass base. Therefore, in order to 
make conclusions, the behavioral moderation of the group and ideology of the 
individuals will be analyzed. 
  For the behavioral part, the Huda-Par’s  approach  to  the 6-7 October events26 
and campaign process during the local elections on 30 March 2014 are considered to 
be responsive. In order to examine the ideological change of the individuals, 
comparisons are made with the comments in the Hezbollah publishing and the 
interviews I have conducted. To compare, I look at three subjects in order to see 
whether transformation has taken place: position vis-à-vis regime, position vis-à-vis 
the PKK and the Kurdish issue, and political pragmatism. If -at least rhetorically- the 
Party chooses a system friendly stance vis-à-vis the regime, unarmed confrontation 
with the PKK and is willing to compromise for political ends, then it can be 
considered that a high level of moderation has taken place. If the discourses are 
developed in the opposite direction, moderation has not taken place for the 
movement. If one or two factors are changed, partial moderation has occurred. 
 
5.3.1. Behavorial Moderation 
 
5.3.1.1. 30 March 2014 Local Elections in Turkey 
 
The Free Cause Party was established on 17 December 2012. With its 
foundation, speculations began. The common expectation was that the Hezbollah 
would be reborn in the region and conflict between the PKK and the Hezbollah 
                                                          
26 On 6-7  October  2014,  in  order  to  protest  the  Turkish  government’s  reluctance  to  
help the Syrian Kurds in Kobani who are threatened by the ISIS forces, the PKK 
sympathizers  went  into  streets  in  Diyarbakır  and  started  assaults  to  the  Huda-Par and 
the Hezbollah siders whom they see as the collaborators of the ISIS.  Assaults 
resulted in the deaths of 50 people and tens of wounded 
(http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/27525777.asp).  
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sympathizers are almost inevitable. The Party decided to participate in the local 
elections, which took place on 30 March 2014. It announced this decision on 12 
October 2013 on the  Party’s website.27  
After the foundation of the Party and especially after the announcement 
regarding the participation to the election, more news about the assaults to the Huda-
Par offices in the region and  small scale conflicts between the PKK and the Huda-
Par sympathizers accumulated.  According   to  Coşkun,   since 2000 until today, there 
has been no interaction between the PKK and the Hezbollah (5 February 2014). They 
did not pass through a reconciliation process about what happened in the past. 
Because of this, they are ultra sensitive to one another’s  acts.  Therefore,  between  the  
Huda-Par and the HDP tension continues. Some of these events are; 
 On 3 October 2013, a wedding celebration in Batman was attacked by armed 
people, in which one person died, several were wounded. The BDP blamed 
the Huda-Par  for  the  assault.  (Coşkun,  11  October  2013) 
 On 11 Februrary 2014, an assault took place in one of Huda-Par Mersin 
branch  members’  home. 
 Between the HDP and the Huda-Par sympathizers clashes happened during 
the celebration   of   the  Holy  Birth   in  Diyarbakır  Dicle  University.   (15  April  
2014) 
The Huda-Par published the list of 40 assaults with the start of the New Year 
in 2014 until June 2014, which they blame the BDP and the PKK sympathizers for. 
In the website of the Party, between 03 November 2013 and 02 June 2014 before and 
after the local elections on 30 March 2014, 33 announcements were made. From 
these announcements, 14 of them are condemnations about the assaults to the 
branches of the Huda-Par. Only three of the announcements are rebuttals about the 
accusations regarding the Huda-Par   sympathizers’   involvement   in the street events 
and/or assaults.28 
When the language of the announcements is analyzed, it can be seen that there is 
constant emphasis on common sense and peace. The Party also ensures that they will 
not  give  credence  to  the  “conspiracies  and  plots”  that  are  planned  and  played  by  the  
HDP and the PKK. In the press announcement their answer regarding the accusations 
                                                          
27 http://hudapar.org/Detay/Haber/272/basina-ve-kamuoyuna.aspx. 
28 10 December 2014, http://hudapar.org/. 
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of 2 November 2013 events, which ended with the death of one person in Batman, is 
below: 
Real perpetrators of the event will be found eventually. We have faith 
on it.  We are against the suppression and tyranny whoever commits it. 
We do not obey any sort of suppression and tyranny. We are trapped 
by the deepest dirty alliance. Batman police department permit this 
dirty alliance from the beginning.  Our people should know that none 
of the plots will hold us back from our works. (12 November 2013, 
hudapar.org)  
 
Again on 3 March 2014, a press declaration after an assault to the Mardin 
branch members of the Party and to the BDP sympathizers is as follows: 
We as the Huda-Par are condemning both the bomb attack on the local 
BDP electoral bureau and the attacks to our members and bureau. 
These are nothing but the games of the deep and dark forces. Public 
opinion must know that as the Huda-Par, we will not be deceived and 
provoked; and we will never be the attacking side. (3 March 2014, 
hudapar.org) 
 
Lastly, the press declaration of 5 March 2014 states that: 
As the Huda-Par, we have declared in each and every platform that we 
are  working  for  our  people’s  peace  and  security  since the date of our 
foundation.  (…..)  Peace  shall  not  be  wasted  for  ideological  or political 
interests. There will be no winner of the possible conflict or chaos 
among the oppressed Kurdish people. (5 March 2014, hudapar.org) 
 
As it can be seen from the press declarations, despite the tens of assaults to 
the Huda-Par branches in the region throughout the election process, the Party 
officials seemed to be careful and sensitive in picking their words in order not to 
cause any confrontation between the PKK and the Huda-Par supporters.  From their 
discourses, it can be seen that, they try to stay out of any sort of physical 
confrontation with the PKK, value peace and order for the Kurdish people in 
particular, and in the region in general, and the ideology and politics should have 
been of secondary importance. For the former Hezbollah on the other hand, ideology 
–religion- came first even at the expense of lives. This was a similarity of the group 
with other fundamentalist groups.  
 
5.3.1.2. 6-7 October Events in Turkey 
 
The 2014 summer was long and painful for the entire Middle East. The 
Syrian conflict entered into its fourth year, and a new phenomenon namely the ISIS 
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(the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) made to the international headlines. The group 
declared worldwide caliphate on 29 June 2014 in Iraq. Its immediate purpose was to 
establish a Sunni Islamic state in Iraq and Syria. For this goal, its militia started 
operations and took over villages, towns and cities in the region. These operations 
resulted in the fleeing of the people from the region to wherever they could seek 
asylum, especially in Turkey. In addition to the Syrian refugees, Turkey started to 
host Iraqi immigrants. 
The ISIS started to move towards places populated by the Kurdish majority 
and under the control of Kurdish leaders. From early September, the ISIS started its 
attacks on Kobani, a Syrian town at the border of Turkey where the PYD29 (the 
Democratic Union Party-Syria) is deployed. This caused disturbances among the 
PKK/BDP   sympathizers   in   Turkey.   Protests   started   demanding   the   Turkish   state’s  
involvement in the conflict helping the PYD in this fight. Despite the growing public 
conviction that the state should not remain blind to the conflict nearside its borders, 
the Turkish state chose the opposite and did not directly challenge the ISIS. In 
addition, the Huda-Par started to be considered as the natural adherent to the ISIS by 
the PKK/BDP  supporters.     The  state’s   reluctance  for   the   involvement   in the crises, 
the Huda-Par’s  image  as  the  proponent  of  the  ISIS  in  the  region  and  lastly  the  HDP’s    
“call   for   continuous   action”30 resulted in further disturbances throughout the 
Southeastern towns and cities among the PKK/BDP sympathizers (Akbaba, 22 
October 2014).  
 This tension   resulted   in   a   “witch   hunt”   on 6-7   October   2014   (Oğur, 10 
October 2014). Because of the events, 30 people died and hundreds were wounded in 
more than 40 cities and temporary curfew was declared. During the events the HDP, 
the Huda-Par, and the Turkish nationalist groups came across (Akbaba, 22 October 
2014). 
                                                          
29 The PYD is a Kurdish political party that was found in 2003 in Syria and led by 
Salih Muslim. The party is considered to be a sister organization to the PKK in the 
region. 
30 The HDP Central Executive Committee in its written declaration in 6 October 
2014 stated  that:  “We  invite  all  our  people  from  7  year  old  to  77  year  old  to  the  
streets , to keep position and mobilize for the massacre initiation in Kobani. From 
now  on,  every  place  is  Kobani.”  and  ignited  the  wick  of  the  events  
(http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/hdpden_sokaga_cikma_cagrisi-1217350, 
06.10.2014). 
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 While being a sad event for the country, the events also became a test point 
for the Huda-Par.  The  Party’s  approach to the events was closely observed. Whether 
the Party would appeal to violence or not become an object of interest.    
  The Huda-Par’s   leaders   invalidated   the   suspicious   expectations   toward   their  
sides and once more called for common sense.  On 8 October 2014, Zekeriya 
Yapıcıoğlu,  the  leader  of  the  Huda-Par, in his messages on Twitter complained about 
the assaults of the  PKK  supporters  and  the  state’s  inability  to  sustain  security: 
 
Tweet  1:  “At  the  moment,  despite  the  curfew  declaration  in  Kızıltepe,  
masses are in the streets.   Our   party   residence   and   our   friends’  
workplaces  are  on  fire”  8  October  2014,  08:26  a.m. 
 
Tweet   2:   “It   is   said   that   our   party   members’   homes   are   signed   and  
showed as targets to the mass. We cannot reach to the Mardin 
Governor, the district  governor  and  the  head  of  police  department”  8  
October 2014, 08:27 a.m. 
 
Tweet   3:   “The  Mardin   Governor   says   that   police   department   is   not  
sufficient and they cannot do anything. There is no state authority in 
Kızıltepe,  Nusaybin  and  Dargeçit”  8  October 2014, 08:31 a.m. 
 
Tweet  4:  “The  massacres  cannot  be  prevented  through  calling  for  the  
common sense. The state shall declare its dissolution, tell its citizens 
to take care of yourselves”  8  October  2014,  08:38  a.m. 
 
Tweet  5:  “The  ones  who  called  masses to the streets through showing 
the  possibility  of  massacre  in  Kobani,  will  you  be  happy  for  Kızıltepe  
massacre?”  8  October  2014,  08:42  a.m. 
 
 From the official twitter account of the Party, any provocative or directive 
messages were not twitted during the days when the events took place. In fact, during 
6-8 October 2014, no tweets were written down. On 9 October 2014, there was a call 
for the funeral prayer for the victims of the events that took place in Diyarbakır,  
Mardin, Van, and Adana, and the PKK attackers were blamed.  
 After the events, the first press declaration was made on 09 October 2014. In 
the declaration, a list of the assaults to the Huda-Par members and the Party offices 
and an explanation regarding the perception of the events were published.  The 
second declaration was published on the website on 27 October 2014. The 
declaration was in reply to the rumors over the meeting of the Huda-Par and the PKK 
/ the HDP. The party refused the claims and stated that there had not been any 
official meeting with any one mentioned. For them: 
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If the HDP is sincere about the de-escalation of the tension, stopping 
the assaults, not causing any conflict and facilitating the peace, it 
should abandon the slanderous language of accusation and insult and it 
should openly condemn the assaults and the committers.31   
 
The last official press declaration regarding the events came on 27 November 
2014.  Again, the declaration included an updated list of the attacks, casualties and 
the wounded, in which 16 deaths were of their supporters. In addition, the Party 
declared that the attacks were not limited to 6-8 October. Afterwards, the assaults 
continued for a while. More importantly they declared: 
The fact that the events took place in several places, at the same time 
and in a similar fashion shows that these events did not develop 
spontaneously, but were planned before and organized from a center. 
(…..)   In   this   organization,   the   eye   print   of   the   Israel   terror   network  
and  the  strategic  ally  USA’s existence should not be missed. 
(……)   
Unfortunately there is always the danger of living similar events. 
Because, the mentality does not change. The PKK and its units 
continue to define those who do not depend on and obey them as their 
enemies. 
(…….) 
The HDP leaders must remember this, 
From the very beginning of the Huda-Par, we said that do not make 
politics over the bloods of the Kurdish people. We said that Kurdish 
youth’s  intra conflict do not benefit none, everybody sees harm from 
it. You did not hear it, you did not understand it or you behaved like 
you did not hear and/or understand it. In order to understand this, is it 
needed for Muslim Kurdish people to say  “now  enough!”  and  run after 
your armed gangs in the streets with sticks and digging tools? 
(…………..) 
There are responsibilities for all the sides in order not to live the same 
atrocities. The greatest responsibility lies with your side. Pull yourself 
together, retreat from exposing the Kurdish youth against them. Do 
not consider yourselves the only representative of oppressed people. 
You already know that, do not pretend otherwise. We know that your 
definition of the Kurd is also troubled. When you are calling the Kurd, 
you   only  mean   the   ones  who   obey   you   and   your   leader’s   followers.  
Retreat from this definition. While you are not able to express yourself 
in Kurdish –maybe not your fault-, do not leave outside the definition 
of the Kurds and present the ones who only knows and speaks Kurdish 
but  do  not  consider  you  as  their  representatives  as   the  “enemy of the 
Kurds”.  
In   the  Kurdish   resolution   process,   do   not  make   the  Kurds’   demands  
for rights as bargaining chips for your organizational interests. 
                                                          
31 http://hudapar.org/Detay/Haber/1022/basina-ve-kamuoyunakurmanci--turkce.aspx 
 
 
90 
 
Be respectful to the people. Stop fighting their values, stop attacking 
our Party which came out of the  people’s  hearts, and stop targeting the 
NGOs.  
(17.11.2014, for full text: http://hudapar.org/Detay/Haber/1028/genel-
baskanimizin-gundem-degerlendirmesi.aspx )  
 
As it can be seen from the declarations, the Huda-Par opposed to the notion 
that Kurdish people took over the streets and transformed them into battlegrounds for 
their causes/interests by sacrificinglives. Rather, the Party called for a mutual 
understanding of the differences. The Party simply defends that the rights of the 
Kurdish people should not have been made bargaining chips for any of the 
organizations that seem to represent the people. Rather, these organizations should 
have worked for the wellbeing of the represented base.  
Throughout the events, the language of the Huda-Par leaders was temperate 
(Akbaba, 22 October 2014). At the farthest extreme, the Party officials declared that 
if they had to, they would appeal to the right to necessary self-defense.32 But most of 
the time, they called for reasonable behavior and expressed non-violent means. By 
not turning the events into a mutual destructive conflict, they showed that their 
intention is not to agitate but make politics within legal boundaries, which certainly 
is a difference from the Hezbollah line. This is an indicator of moderation, since for 
the ends, no more violent means are deployed. On the contrary, the organization 
seems to have a high level of political learning. They learned that Kurdish people 
will not benefit from shedding the blood of people and creating inter-group conflict 
among Kurdish people. This would only serve to the organizational interests. 
In addition, the approach of the Huda-Par raised questions regarding the 
PKK/the  HDP’s  ability  and  maturity  to  accept  the  plurality  in  expressing  the  Kurdish  
mass’  political   demands  as  well   as   the   importance  of   the  participation  of   the  other  
actors to the Kurdish Resolution Process (Akbaba, 22 October 2014).   
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Zekeriya  Yapıcıoğlu  after  the  funeral  prayer  in  10.10.2014  makes  a  statement:  
“We  had  never  been  the  offensive  side  and  never  will  be.  But  the  attacks  to  us  will  
never intimidate us. In every place in the world, people under death threat are 
legitimate to defend themselves. Our brothers would also use the right of necessary 
selfdefense”.    (http://www.cihan.com.tr/news/Huda-Par-Baskani-Kardeslerimiz-
mesru-savunma-haklarini-kullanacak_3225-CHMTU1MzIyNS8xMDA1 10.10.2014)   
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5.3.2. Ideological Moderation 
 
5.3.2.1. Islamism & Nationalism 
 
Both Islamism and nationalism are ideologies from which the Huda-Par 
seems to have distanced itself. However, both concepts have long been in the making 
of the political organizations in Turkey. Nationalism is a more controversial topic 
among conservative Muslims, although the religion of Islam recognizes the 
differences between ethnic groups and looks at them as the creation of God.33 
However, for Islam, tribal affiliations do not upgrade or downgrade the status 
of the Muslim. The deeds, bad or good, are determinant of the status of the Muslims. 
This doctrine caused controversies among Muslim thinkers. During the initial phases, 
nationalism was seen as a synonym for patriotism. However, since then, debates on 
whether nationalism is coherent with Islam have grown.  After the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire with the age of nation states in the Middle East, nationalism spread 
in the region. The Turkish Republic’s   repressive   policies   towards secularism and 
Turkish nationalism caused inadequacies for the Muslim Kurdish population in the 
country. In order to safeguard its values and culture, prominent Kurdish leaders 
started successive religious and ethnic revolts but did not succeed in securing the 
intended outcomes.  
After the period  of  revolts  and  the  Republic’s  persistent  reforms   towards the 
secularization of the state and society, the Muslims of the country found nationalism 
to be a safe haven. The political expressions were made into a type of conservative 
nationalism for some decades and the debate on the coherence of Islam and 
nationalism were put aside briefly.  
 In the 1960s, lots of works of Islamists from the Middle East and beyond 
were translated in Turkey. Among these translations were the works of Mawdudi of 
Pakistan and Sayed Qutb of Egypt who struggled for the liberation of Islam from 
foreign dominators in their countries. This wave affected many religious people and 
establishments in Turkey and resulted in adopting a more fundamentalist position 
among Islamists. Not too long after, the Islamic Revolution in Iran occurred and 
                                                          
33 O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made peoples 
and tribes that you may know one another (The Holy Quran, 49:13). 
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inspired millions of Muslims all over the world. Now the dream of Islamic 
governance was much more attainable. 
Until the 1990s, the Kurdish issue was politicized by Marxist leftist groups. 
For conservative masses, there was no organized political initiation. However, the 
National Outlook Movement seemed to be successful in securing a great sum of 
votes from the region. However, this  success  did  not  last  long.  The  RP’s  cooperation  
with the MHP resulted in a fall in the Kurdish votes as was symbolized with the 
famous  Kurdish  Islamist  politician  Altan  Tan’s  leave  the  RP.  
The Kurdish Hezbollah had been established in 1979, but became publicly 
known in 1990s.  The  group’s  primary  ambition  was  to  invite  people  in  the  region  to  
Islam  and  educate  them  accordingly.  However,  the  PKK’s  increasing  pressure  on  the  
conservatives of the region for years resulted in conflict between the two groups’  
supporters. Certainly, the eternal goal of the Hezbollah was to see an Islamic state 
founded; however given the conditions this was a distant possibility and the initial 
phases of invitation and education was not complete. Nonetheless, the organization 
could not continue with peaceful ways of coexistence and started a retaliation against 
the  PKK’s  disturbances  in  its  kind.  Not  only  the  PKK, but also rival Islamist groups 
and people who had been opposing the ideas of the Hezbollah had lived through the 
similar atrocities. The leader of the Menzil wing of the Hezbollah and the Med-Zehra 
group leader were also considered to be murdered by the Hezbollah.  Lately, the 
intelligence service of the state was included in the activity chamber. However, the 
dissolution of the Hezbollah came later than the 28 February post-modern military 
coup  in  1997  and  the  PKK  leader  Öcalan’s  capture  in  1999.   
During  its  active  years,  the  Hezbollah’s  ideology  was  not  understood  clearly.  
The organization did not publish any physical documents. It did not hold a legal 
foundation. Therefore there were no documents enabling the categorization of the 
organization under ideology. However, in recent years, with the new leaders of the 
Hezbollah,   İsa  Altsoy  and  Edip  Gümüş’s   initiations, a website (huseynisevda.com) 
and several books related to the ideas and histories of the organization were 
published.    
Given to the complexity of the religious groups in Turkey, it is not easy to put 
the Hezbollah into a category. Although not agreeing on being part of the Islamist 
heritage, the Hezbollah and the Huda-Par both expresses what an Islamist practically 
says. 
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Mehmet  Yavuz,   the  Party’s  General  Secretary, states his ideas on Islamism 
and Nationalism as: 
There is an Islamic path and an un-Islamic path. Except these, we do 
not find other adjectives and ascriptions correct. We do not think that 
these kinds of concepts and terms are well intentioned.  It can be well 
the idea that promoting Islam as other ideologies. Our motivation lies 
with Islam itself. Nationalism of any type cannot exist in our Party. 
The  superiority  is   in  piety.  The  Prophet’s  hadith  says  that   there  is  no  
superiority of the Persian to Arab and of the Arab to non-Arab. 
Because of having majority from the Kurds does not mean that we will 
conduct Kurdish nationalism. Because we are more subject to the 
region’s   problems,   there   might   be   such   kind   of   impression.   From  
whichever nation is, as much the Islam is the common ground, it does 
not matter. We established our organization in 55 cities. Hopefully, we 
are working to be in 81 cities. (The  author’s interview, 29 April 2014, 
[Appendix 1]) 
 
He also answers the question “where do you historically start the Kurdish 
Islamism and the Huda-Par and how do you relate them”as such: 
We do not accept these artificial terms and concepts. We do not want 
to be caught in this trap. Islam is the one. We do not accept the 
Kurdish Islamism, Turkish Islamism or Arab Islamism. (The  author’s  
interview, 29 April 2014, [Appendix 1]) 
 
In a different fashion,  Said  Şahin,   the  spokesperson  of  the  Party  admits   that  
the Party is an Islamist party: 
We are an Islamic party. The Islamism appeared two centuries ago. 
Before, there was Islam and non-Islam. Against the Western 
imperialism and colonialism, Islamism came into existence through 
the emergences of some Islamic movements. In essence, as we are 
aiming at an Islamic management, questioning the West and securing 
the religion; we have an Islamist identity. (The  author’s  interview,  27 
May 2014, [Appendix 2]) 
 
For the question “what are the differences of the Party from the mainstream 
Turkish Islamism” Şahin  tells  that: 
There is a difference between the Kurdish and Turkish Islamism. It 
should not be, but in reality there is. The reason is sickness of 
nationalism. We see it as a virus of Western illness. (The  author’s  
interview, 27 May 2014, [Appendix 2]) 
  
Said  Şahin’s  views  on  nationalism  are  similar  to  Mehmet  Yavuz: 
Each person has a race. But Islam is a roof. Under this roof, races and 
colors melt. If we push the roof aside and drive the colors forward, we 
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will suffer. We do not accept a position that will highlight Kurdish 
superiority against other races in the Party. (The  author’s  interview,  27  
May 2014, [Appendix 2]) 
  
Aynur   Sülün,   one of the members of   the   Party’s   General   Management  
Council and the vice president responsible for family and social policies, explains her 
views  to  the  question  “do you consider that the Huda-Par is Islamist and why?”: 
Our reference is Islam. We are telling this straightforward. Until the 
foundation of the Republic, our society whose head directed towards 
the West needs to be cured with Islam. Today, the Western world 
because of not handling the drug issues formulated it as legal; is the 
place where homicides, physiological crises, divorces, gambling, and 
rapes are the most common. We are going deep down as a society as 
we have been imposed by the Western values under the name of 
modernism. In order for the West to pull itself together, it needs Islam. 
Islam is the only religion which can produce solution in every era. 
(The  author’s  interview,  10  June  2014,  [Appendix 3]) 
  
As can be seen from the answers, the leaders of the Huda-Par do not consider 
the Party as the heritage of Islamism and strongly deny nationalism. However, their 
description of the purposes of the Party and approach to their mission enables one to 
see it as a product of Islamist understanding. It may be disturbing to hear Kurdish 
Islamism versus Turkish Islamism and blame the illness of nationalism for bringing 
upon the differences; there is growing emotions among the Kurdish Islamist thinkers 
over  the  Turkish  Islamists’  attitudes towards the Kurdish issue and their intimacy to 
nationalism. This created a sense that the Turkish Islamists suggest a solution in 
which   Turks   are   the   leaders   and   the   other   Muslims   are   the   helpers      (Gökalp, 9 
August 2012).  Some of the Kurdish Islamist thinkers believe that there needs to be 
separation between Kurdish and Turkish Islamism, because, the Turkish Islamism 
has some troublesome features that would not fit into the Kurdish context (Bildirici, 
18 December 2012). First and foremost, Turkish Islamism is interested in Anatolian 
Muslims  (Gökalp,  9  August 2012). Kurdish Islamism, on the other hand, cannot be 
bound by the existing borders. Second, the thinkers believe that Turkish Islamism 
has become Kemalist over the time, meaning that the proceedings of the Republican 
regime are interiorized by the Turkish Islamists and they are interested in the 
continuation of the Turkish state at the expense of the rights of other groups. Third, 
Turkish Islamists are not seen sincere for their discourse on the brotherhood and the 
Ummah because of their double-sided discourses in the Kurdish sufferings and other 
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Muslims’  sufferings  in  other  places.  Fourth  is  the  insistence  of  Turkish Islamists on 
the historical role of dominating other Muslim groups. Fifth is avoiding naming the 
Kurdish problem and sidelining with the enemies of the Kurdish people.  
According   to  Yıldız,  Kurdish   Islamism   expresses   a   line   that   legitimizes   the  
right of Kurdish people to be a nation in Islamic grounds. He argues that this is a 
precondition of the Islamic plurality (Yıldız, 2014, p.30).   Similar   to   Gökalp   and  
Bildirici,   Yıldız   agrees   that   there   is   a   division   between   Turkey’s   Islamism   and  
Kurdish   Islamism  because  of   the   latter’s  criticism of   the  former’s  spearheading   the  
project, which idealizes the creation of a prototype nation for the Republic. 
Nonetheless, Turkish Islamists are not alone in this project. Statist-nationalist Kurds 
who dream of bringing together uniform Kurdish citizens are considered to have this 
political  mind  (Yıldız, 2014, p.30). 
 Although blaming the Turkish counterparts for their inclination towards 
nationalism, the Kurdish Islamists seem to be occupied with the Kurdish issue as 
well. The Huda-Par leaders that I have interviewed are very insistent that they would 
not pursue nationalist politics. Nonetheless, when it comes to practice, they naturally 
prioritize the Kurdish issue. However, rather than seeing the problem as a matter of 
national existence and independence as it is seen by the PKK, the Huda-Par 
perceives it as a matter of improving the rights of people.  
Although in essence, Islamism should not take national schism kindly, in 
practicality there is an increasing gap between the developments of Kurdish and 
Turkish Islamisms. Turkish Islamism developed closer to Turkish nationalism and 
avoided answering important existential questions such as those regarding the 
reinstatement of the Kurdish identity and cultural rights. This created a sense of 
disillusion among the Kurdish Islamists, which resulted in a quest for an independent 
path. However, by escaping from the Turkish-Islam synthesis, now the Kurdish 
Islamists seem to depend on the Kurdish-Islam synthesis.  The Kurdish Hezbollah 
and the Huda-Par’s   distance   from the mainstream Islamists, in a way, can be 
explained via these lenses. 
It is not easy to label the community as nationalist, since the Kurdish 
Islamists are much more careful in using the language of religion despite their 
emphasis on the Kurdish case. For instance, one BDP Member of Parliament, an 
Islamist, Altan Tan states that Turkish-Islam synthesis is poison: 
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Within the Islamist movement there are plenty of Nationalists. At the 
moment,   the   Prime  Minister’s   surrounding   consists   of   these   people.  
They cover up nationalism, the Turkish Islamism and the Turkish 
hegemony with the color of Islam. Therefore, the Kurdish Islamism 
and the Turkish Islamism are both wrong. (23 April 2013) 
 
This understanding is valid for most of the Kurdish Islamists. Nonetheless, in 
practicality, they all appear as enthusiastic defenders of the Kurdish case and most of 
the time only of that case.  
Thus if one was to locate the Huda-Par’s  place  in  ideological  terms: 
 
     
Figure 5.3: Huda-Par’s  Ideological  Location 
 
Given the Hezbollah’s  persistent distance from nationalism of any kind and 
its continuous underlining of the Islamic principles, I categorized it under the hard-
liners group. The Huda-Par as a legal political organization determined to keep its 
distance from violence and anti-system activities is categorized as moderate. There 
are other hard-liner Kurdish Islamist groups as well, for instance, the former Menzil 
group,   today’s   Öze  Dönüş   Platform (Back to the Essentials Platform), Med-Zehra 
and Nubihar group, and Azadi Initiation. Although these organizations have been 
influential on their potential mass base, it is not easy to find information and 
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objective  evidence  for   them.  Yıldız  considers   that   the  Azadi   Initiation   is  more  of  a 
product of the Kurdish-Islam synthesis (2014, p.30). 
As seen in the Table 5.3., apart from the Political Groups label, I added the 
label of Orders indicating both the religious sects and Jemaahs. However, the most 
known orders such as the Nakshibendi and Kadiri orders and Jamaahs such as 
Süleymancıs,  Nurcus,  and  İskenderpaşa  are  both  statist  in  essence  and  seem  to  appeal  
both to Kurdish and Turkish people at the same time.  Therefore, I did not see them 
as diverting as in the case of Political Groups. 
 
5.3.2.2.The Huda-Par Vis-à-vis the Turkish State 
 
In order to understand whether a change in the community’s  position  vis-à-vis 
the regime/state has taken place, one should recall the  past.  The  Hezbollah’s  position  
vis-à-vis the state was its abandonment and promotion of Islamic governance instead. 
The Turkish state was seen as illegitimate, because it was rooted on the principles of 
the Kemalist ideology and based on a secular constitution and norms. The Kurdish 
people’s  support  of Mustafa Kemal was in order to save the Caliphate and defend the 
country from Western occupation. However, the Republic after its foundation was 
not shaped by the expectations of the Kurdish people or other religious people. This 
brought upon a legitimacy crisis for the state, which resulted in several insurrections. 
Although for a long time, the Kurdish conservative masses waited in silence and 
seemed to have accepted the  status  quo  regime;;   the  state’s   inability to protect their 
lives, dignities, and ways of living from the impositions of the PKK, brought into 
question  the  state’s  raison  d’etre  once  more. 
Cemal Tutar, one of the leaders of the Hezbollah, explains   the  Hezbollah’s  
view on the current regime as: 
As  an   Islamist   community,  we  are  against   secularism  and   the  state’s  
management according to un-Islamic rules. For us, in a Muslim 
society, the regime must be shaped through the Islamic norms. The 
constitution, laws and codes must be shaped in line with Islam. There 
should not be any laws, codes and organizations that are opposing 
Islam and not derived from Islam.   
(…) 
According to us, this system is a system of oppression. Imposing un-
Islamic rules of secularism to Muslims cannot be expressed but with 
the oppression and no valid ground for this can be claimed. Therefore, 
the Hezbollah community believes in removing this oppression from 
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existence or at least creates consciousness among people through 
education in order to minimize the oppression. (2011, p.150-151) 
 
The Huda-Par as a political party that is bound by law and legal forms can be 
considered as it resolved the problematic relations between the represented bases and 
the state and therefore joined political life. Nonetheless, it is still possible to observe 
that it has not fully completed this transformation. Perhaps, it is not in the direction 
of the state’s   total   abandonment,   the  organization formulates a purpose in terms of 
the transformation of the state to a more Islamic context: 
Other goals of the movement; 
 To redefine the state and the politics, 
 To carry the basic principles and values of the community into politics 
and to make them dominant, 
 To make the system harmonious with the beliefs and values of the 
community, not the community with the system, 
 To revive the humanly and Islamic values that are degenerated 
consciously  or  unconsciously…(the Huda-Par Party Program, 2013, 
10) 
 
From another perspective, the Hezbollah was not feeling bound by laws of 
the regime. Because the legal system is not based on the Sharia provisions, the 
Hezbollah did not see a legitimate ruling against itself. It did continue acting with 
what it considered correct no matter what the consequences would be. On the other 
hand, the Huda-Par, a legal foundation, and it is a well thought step with its 
envisaged results. 
Mehmet Yavuz, the General Secretary of the Party, responds to the question 
“what is the difference between the Huda-Par  and  the  Hezbollah’s   in   terms  of  their  
promises?”  as  follows: 
Except violence, the Huda-Par as a political organization limits itself 
with judicial and legal boundaries. I do not think that the Hezbollah 
accept the law as its boundary. (The  author’s interview, 29 April 2014, 
[Appendix 1]) 
 
Said  Şahin  replies  to  the  same  question  as: 
The Hezbollah and the Huda-Par are different structures that are 
nourished from the same source. NGOs, media, education, political 
organization   or   informal   structure…   They   are   all   means.   There   is  
Quran and Sunnah over them. Our means, methods and wording is 
different from the Hezbollah. But, we became the same in purpose. 
(The  author’s  interview,  27 May 2014, [Appendix 2]) 
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Aynur  Sülün  agrees on Şahin’s  position: 
As far as I know the Hezbollah is a community that works for the 
recovery of the society. We as the Huda-Par family are struggling for 
the  society’s  cohesion  to  moral  values.  Therefore,  there  are  similarities  
in terms of our purposes. The difference is we are a Party and they are 
a Community. (The  author’s  interview,  10 June 2014, [Appendix 3])  
 
It can be said that although the Party and the Community converges in their 
purposes, their means and methods for the achievements are completely different. 
However, this difference would embrace of in violent methods and top-down 
fashion, at the same time protect  and  moderate  the  other’s  position  through  dialogue  
and mutual understanding as well as being bound by law. Assaults before and during 
the 30 March local elections and 6-7 October events and the Huda-Par’s  responses to 
these events prove that the Huda-Par and its base is not in favor of fanaticism, 
extremism, or violence; but rather the existence and sustained representation for the 
moment. Thus, at least in the short run, the Huda-Par is not aiming to change the 
regime in Turkey. Their purpose is to transform the society and state toward more 
value based structures. 
 
5.3.2.3. The Huda-Par Vis-à-Vis the PKK and the Kurdish Issue 
 
The community’s  most   important  agenda  is   the  Kurdish  issue  and  the  PKK.  
The  Hezbollah’s  position  regarding  the  PKK  was  far  from  a compromise. It neither 
surrendered to the PKK nor found a safe zone to keep itself from it. Rather, it started 
to respond with  its  enemy’s  weapons:  violence,  threat  and  spreading fear. However, 
from the sources the Hezbollah published recently it can be seen that the Hezbollah, 
before appealing to violence, tried to communicate with the PKK, finding common 
grounds for mutual understanding and making their stance clear for them.34 In order 
to  observe  the  Hezbollah’s  perspective  of  the  PKK  more  closely: 
The PKK was established based on Marxist-Leninist ideas. There is no 
room for religion in this understanding. All moral values were signs of 
primitiveness and causing blindness for the humans. Religion was the 
opium of the people. The PKK that was found on this kind of heretical 
thought realized its first fight against the devotion of the Kurdish 
                                                          
34 See  İ.Bagasi, Kendi  Dilinden  Hizbullah,  PKK  ile  Çatışmanın  Önlenmesi  için  
Cemaatin  Yaptığı  Grişimler,  Direnmekten  Başka  Seçeneğimiz  Yoktu  
(http://huseynisevda.biz/viewpage.php?page_id=33 ).  
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people to religion and moral values (Yılmaz, Tutar and Varol, 2011, p. 
215).   
 
In addition, the Hezbollah justifies its position against the PKK by listing its 
activities such as establishing hegemony over people through fear and threat, raiding 
the villages, pressuring the mosques, harming the moral values of the people through 
anti-propaganda, etc.  
The Huda-Par, on the other hand, does not take the PKK as equal to itself and 
does not directly enter into communication. However, this does not mean that the 
Party  is  out  of  the  PKK’s  sphere  of  influence. The main argument of the Huda-Par in 
terms of the PKK/ the HDP front is their proclamation of the front as the only 
representative of the Kurdish side in the Kurdish issue of Turkey. Another problem 
of  the  issue  is  the  state’s  voluntary  acceptance  of  the  HDP  as  the  only  viable  actor  in  
the issue. This causes the  ‘otherization’ of all other important players and obliges the 
Kurdish masses to a monopoly of the BDP in terms of representation. This goes to 
the abandonment of plurality in political choices. 
 Aynur  Sülün  states: 
Although the BDP seems like it is defending the Kurdish rights, 
actually it is using this as a Trojan horse. Its real purpose is imposing 
the leftist ideology through drawing people away from their beliefs. 
The  government’s  is  making  a  mistake  in  addressing  only  the  BDP  as  
the representative of the Kurdish people. The government should 
listen all the ethnic groups and people. Seeing the PKK/the HDP as 
the representatives of the Kurds, surrendering to their demands and 
ignoring the oppressions they are making to the people is wrong. 
Under the name of solution, the AKP left the Kurdish people to the 
mercy of the PKK/the HDP. (The   author’s   interview,   10   June   2014,  
[Appendix 3]) 
 
Another issue is the Huda-Par’s   approach   that   the   PKK   and   the   HDP   are 
nowhere near understanding and representing the Kurdish people and their values. 
According to the Huda-Par, the HDP despises this conservative structure and aims to 
replace it with what it perceives to be more important – a socialist, atheist, nationalist 
community. This argument is parallel to the  Hezbollah’s  understanding. 
In Said  Şahin’s  words: 
The HDP is a structure that is based on racism. It is the manifestation 
of a single party mentality. The structure does not tolerate any 
differences. We do not believe that they are defending the Kurdish 
rights. They are wearing this as a mask and actually aiming the 
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alienation of people from the religion. (The   author’s   interview,   27 
May 2014, [Appendix 2]) 
 
The Huda-Par differs from the PKK and the HDP in terms of their solution to 
the Kurdish issue. While the PKK and the BDP favors an almost federal structure for 
the Kurdistan region; the Huda-Par does not offer such a structure. Rather, the Huda-
Par approaches the issue from a broader historical context. According to the Huda-
Par, the borders in the region are artificial:  
We are not demanding secessionism and/or federalism but we are 
thinking that the borders in the Southeastern region drawn after the 
First World War are one of the most important sources of the problem. 
Our demand is the abandonment of these artificial borders and to bring 
the people together. (The author’s   interview,   29 April 2014, 
[Appendix 1]) 
 
The  Party’s  solution  to  the  Kurdish  problem  is  explained  in  detail  in  the  Party  
Program. The Hezbollah did not have a program or a detailed remedy for the Kurdish 
issue: 
In order to materialize normalization and social peace; 
Firstly, because of the cruelty practiced up until now, the state must 
apologize and pay compensation to the victims. 
The identification that every citizen affiliated to the Turkish Republic 
as a Turk must be abandoned and the existence of Kurds shall be 
identified constitutionally, Turks and Kurds must be approved to be 
the constitutive founders of the country. 
Kurdish shall be accepted as the second official language and it shall 
also be an education language.  
(…) 
The   texts   sang   by   primary   schoolchildren   such   as   ‘Andımız’   (Our  
Oath) which sounds like racist shall be withdrawn.  
(…) 
The names of the schools, barracks, avenues, streets and similar places 
that have the names of the historical figures who tyrannized and 
discriminated people must be changed immediately. 
The exclusionary discriminatory rhetoric of Turkishness which 
dominates the constitution and the official literature of the system 
must be waived. 
(…) 
The aftermath of the thousands of the losses must be clarified, the 
investigations concerning the unsolved murders must be carried out 
steadily and the responsible ones must be found and punished. 
The incidents like burning the villages and forced migrations must be 
investigated and the responsible ones must be punished.  
(…) 
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It must be declared officially that the Kurdish scholars, foremost 
Sheikh Said, who is esteemed deeply by Kurds, were victimized, and 
the relatives and all the people shall be made amends. 
The burial places of the people like Said-i Nursi, Sheikh Said and 
Seyyid Riza must be declared.  
(…)   
The strong centralist administration shall be ended, the local authority 
shall be empowered and all the local officials shall be elected by the 
people. 
(…)  
(The Party Program, 2013, p.30-32) 
 
All the Huda-Par leaders that were interviewed are in the same opinion that 
with the AKP government, the problematic gap between the Kurdish identity and 
state has been filled to some degree. They also think that the AKP government 
contributed a lot to the democratization process within the country, which enabled 
them to consider finding a political party to enhance their activities and represent 
their mass base. Nevertheless, the Huda-Par and the AKP differ in their opinions 
regarding how to resolve the   Kurdish   issue   as   well.   The   AKP’s   policies   are  
considered to be empowering the BDP and the PKK front: 
The AKP has policies that are strengthening the BDP and the PKK. 
They behave like the BDP is the only representative in the issue. All 
the Kurdish rights are given because of obligation. The BDP is setting 
the scene, the AKP is returning the rights back and the BDP is 
strengthening more. The rights must be given with the constitutional 
assurance not through a sense of favor and without bargaining. 
(Author’s  interview  with  Said  Şahin, 27 May 2014, [Appendix 2]) 
 
The Hezbollah emphasizes more of the atrocities made to religious people in 
the region and problematizes its existence for the most part through Islamic offences. 
On the other hand, the Huda-Par, in addition to moral values and Islamic 
sensitivities, also problematizes what can be considered as Kurdish nationalism. 
Most of the solutions that are suggested for the normalization of the Kurdish issue 
are about the retribution of past atrocities and the cultural rights of the Kurdish 
identity.   
 As a conclusion, it can be said that in terms of the PKK and the Kurdish 
issue, a transformation for the community’s  part did not happen. Although the Party 
believes that the AKP has resolved many of the problems of the Kurdish people in 
terms of their cultural existence, there are still unsolved problems and especially 
divergences over the methodology. They  still  believe  in  the  existence  of  the  PKK’s  
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hidden agenda in which the real concern is not Kurdish rights but the changing of the 
society towards a religion-less kind. A similar situation exists  between  the  country’s  
secular republican elites and religious conservatives, each of whom suspects and 
blames one another for having a hidden purpose and/or agenda. Thus, although the 
events of 6-7 October proves that the Huda-Par this time does not volunteer to enter 
into a bloodshed with the PKK, it is difficult to say that in terms of the community’s  
perception towards the PKK there is no visible transformation at hand.  
 As it was put forward by Faruk Bildirici, a journalist interested in the region’s  
politics, the only common feature of the HDP and the Huda-Par is their weak 
democratic essence. They both have difficulty in accepting another organization 
outside their realm and aim to destroy it when possible.   Therefore their peaceful 
coexistence is improbable. 
 
5.3.2.4. The Huda-Par and Political Pragmatism 
 
One of the important aspects of moderation is the observance of compromise. 
Political inclusion is a strong tool for its user to direct an extremist group to an 
intended shape and context. However, inclusion may also lead to an unintended 
outcome, the paradox of democracy. By participating in democratic institutions and 
mechanisms, radical and extremist groups may hide their genuine goals. But this 
does not mean that these groups would make undemocratic calculations or that they 
would not impose an undemocratic agenda. Therefore, being open or close to 
dialogue   and   entering   into   bargaining   is   an   important   indicator   for   the   group’s  
moderation. 
As it was claimed before, for the Hezbollah, there were un-negotiable terms. 
The ends of the community are sacred in feature, which makes the means and 
methods unimportant. Therefore, giving them up, bargaining or compromising are 
not simple issues. As it was stated repeatedly, the organization acted from the power 
it took from the text. It followed a fundamentalist line that derived from the examples 
of worldwide Islamist figures and for some, gained a heroic and legendary position. 
However, over the years, suffering, struggling, dying and feeling unsecure 
might have resulted in an internal and external learning process and inner 
calculations.   For   instance,   Yılmaz   and   Tutar’s   book, which contains the deepest 
details  of  the  Hezbollah’s  fight  with  the state and the PKK, only devotes one single 
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page to its struggle with the Menzil wing. However, it is important in terms of seeing 
a glimpse of the regret and self judgment: 
During our fiercest struggle with the PKK, we entered into a conflict 
which we had never wanted. 
Even though we have tens of righteous reasons and items that show 
our righteousness, we know that it is no use to return back to this.  
(...) 
May Allah forgive both  our  and   their  deeds  and  sins.   (Yılmaz,  Tutar 
and Varol, 2011, p.247)     
 
“Did/Does your inclusion into democratic process result in the moderation of 
your discourse and practices?” This question was the last question I posed during the 
interviews I conducted. 
 
Aynur  Sülün states: 
We are aiming at stepping straight. We do not wish to become the 
defenders of the system after being a victim of it for so long. For this 
issue, we took necessary cautions and defined our roadmap. We 
believe that the system needs to change. Therefore, we aim at making 
peace between the system and the values of people and carry these 
values into politics, not the vice versa. (The   author’s   interview, 10 
June 2014, [Appendix 3]) 
  
Mehmet Yavuz replies: 
In terms of moderation, we will be an exception, not the rule. Until 
now, the practices in Turkey might support the theory. But when we 
look at the world, there is the example of Hamas, there is the Lebanese 
Hezbollah. Although they are participated into political system, they 
did not moderate. (The  author’s  interview,  29 April 2014, [Appendix 
1]) 
 
Said  Şahin  explains: 
“We  aimed  at  freedom  of  expression  and  invitation  (tebliğ). We have 
experienced. The Party is a powerful tool and we meant to use it. The 
system is un-Islamic. We are aiming at being with our Islamic values 
inside the system and realize our Islamic goals. We are not seeing a 
way through making concessions from our identity. We named it clean 
politics, honest politics. When a concession is asked, we cannot give it 
up. What we are going to give up will be the way of leading. We took 
the road of struggle for our  values  within   the  system”. (The  author’s  
interview, 27 May 2014, [Appendix 2]) 
 
 The Huda-Par is well aware of the possibility that the existing electoral 
system in Turkey and especially the 10 % threshold will stagnate their way to the 
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Turkish Parliament. Even though the 30 March 2014 local election was the first 
election that the Party participated in, the results were not promising. The Huda-Par 
candidates could not win any of the election districts where they had entered into 
elections. Although they became the third party in the region, they were not able to 
win any of the mayorship.   
As it was put forward before, two mechanisms cause radical tendencies to 
decline:  the pursuit of votes and organizational survival (Tezcür,  2010,  p.71). Party 
leaders make a strategic choice between their ideological thorns and large segments 
of electorates when they decide to join the elections. Willingly or unwillingly 
transformation takes place in order to stay as a political reality. In the farthest 
extreme, even a leftist party might incline towards the center and even conservatism, 
and vice versa. Thus, strategic interests might transform a radical stance towards 
pragmatism, vote seeking and consequently a more moderate position through 
behavioral change. 
 In the case of the Huda-Par, its electoral base resides in the southeastern 
region of Turkey. The region consisted of conservative people and the two dominant 
parties namely the AKP and the HDP, which are well established and supported by 
crowded masses. The Party has a small but consistent mass base. Given the situation, 
the Party by using a more moderate tone might lose the secure votes and perish. In 
addition, a more moderate stance in terms of political and religious promises might 
result  in  the  Party’s  turning  into  other  catch  all  political  parties  who are now in full 
contradiction with the Party’s   current   position.   It can be said that the party has 
completed its transformation from becoming a Community to a legal representative 
unit in terms of political pragmatism. I do not believe that further transformation and 
softer language and a more moderate and compromising approach will be used by the 
Huda-Par in the near future. The most important aim for now is to represent the 
Muslim Kurdish people in the region as an alternative to the AKP and the BDP and 
promote Islamic values among the people. By their discourse, activities and 
performance since the  Party’s  establishment   in  2012, it seems to be heading in the 
correct direction. 
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5.4. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I explained the events during the  Hezbollah’s  disappearance,  
the foundation of the Huda-Par, the reasons of the need for a new political party for 
the former Hezbollah mass base, and the timing of the foundation of the Huda-Par. 
Then I explained what I wanted to explore throughout the chapter: Has there been a 
transformation among the Kurdish Islamists? Particularly, has the former Hezbollah 
transformed and moderated itself? Through which considerations, what mechanisms 
and institutions has this moderation been realized? Is this moderation observed in the 
behavior or ideology, or in both?  
In order to answer the questions above, I looked at the events during the 30 
March 2014 elections and 6-7 October 2014 Kobani protests. In addition I examined 
three dimensions whether there has been a moderation  for  the  community’s  part vis-
à-vis the Turkish state/regime, the PKK and the Kurdish issue, and political 
pragmatism. I used four interviews, the Party Program, and social media outputs of 
the Party officials. The main question of this work is “has  moderation taken place for 
the Kurdish Islamists, if taken, at which degree and with which aspects did this 
moderation take place?”  
For the behavioral part, the Huda-Par’s  approach   to  6-7 October events and 
the campaign process during the local elections on 30 March 2014 are considered to 
be responsible. For the ideological change in the individual comparisons was 
revealed with the comments in the Hezbollah publishing and the interviews I 
conducted. For comparison, I look at three subjects. If -at least rhetorically- they 
chose a path of a system friendly stand vis-à-vis the regime, unarmed confrontation 
with the PKK and willingness to compromise for political ends, then it can be 
considered that a high level of moderation has taken place. If the discourses have 
developed in the opposite direction, moderation has not taken place for the 
movement. If one or two factors are changed, partial moderation has been deployed. 
I concluded that from the Hezbollah to the Huda-Par, Kurdish Islamism is 
partially moderated. Leaving violence behind is the most important sign of 
moderation. In terms of their position on the state and the regime, Kurdish Islamists 
are willing to participate more in comparison to their past counterparts. Therefore, 
forming a legal political party and accepting the law are also indications of 
moderation. But when it comes to political pragmatism, Kurdish Islamism is still 
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insistent on its ideological position. It is not willing to compromise regarding any of 
its political or ideological ends. Its methods are surely changed, but goals are still the 
same.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 This thesis aimed to focus on recent developments in Kurdish Islamism. 
However, its central task was to examine whether there has been moderation among 
Kurdish Islamists and more specifically in the Hezbollah community from a more 
radical and anti-system to a moderate and system friendly position. To what extent 
has the Huda-Par moderated Kurdish Islamism and what has caused this moderation? 
In order to answer my main research question, some sub-questions were posed.   Can 
one talk of a common umbrella of Kurdish Islamism?  How did Kurdish Islamism 
evolve over time?  Why did it fail to appear as a political movement until recently? 
What are the similarities and differences between Kurdish and Turkish Islamism? In 
what ways does Kurdish Islamism differ from Kurdish nationalism with regards to 
Kurdish identity debates? What is the triggering event in the establishment of the 
Kurdish Islamist Free Cause Party (Huda-Par)? Can Huda-Par be explained with the 
moderation of the radical Hezbollah movement? Have the beliefs and practices of 
Kurdish Islamists changed over time? What processes, mechanisms, events and 
institutions helped the promotion of this moderation? What are Huda-Par’s  political  
ambitions?  How  do  they  differ  from  Hezbollah’s  position?   
Islamism and the Kurdish issue have been two problematic concepts since the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic. Since both Islamism and Kurdish nationalism 
were seen as threats to the survival of the newly built Republic, for decades the ideas 
and movements somehow related to them had been suppressed and were not allowed 
to become politically active. Squeezed between leftist and militarist PKK (Partiya 
Karkeren  Kürdistani  – Kurdistan  Workers’  Party)  and  its  succeeding  political  parties  
as well as conservative and nationalist mainstream Turkish right-wing parties, the 
voice of Kurdish Islamists has been marginalized over the years. Given special 
importance to religion and power to different religious orders, Islam is an important 
binder for Kurdish people. With a government that has a common past with the 
National Outlook Movement, (which was popular among Kurdish people to some 
degree) which is conservative and liberal in many aspects, Kurdish Islamists were 
supposedly better off with the AKP government.  
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The main hypothesis of this thesis was related to the transformation of 
Kurdish Islamism. This hypothesis advocated that as a result of positive changes in 
the social, political, and economic spheres in Turkey, further democratization 
enabled the moderation of the former Hezbollah and contemporary Huda-Par in 
terms of perception towards   formal   politics.   “Moderation   theory”  was used as the 
main theoretical framework in this thesis, according to which repressive and 
exclusionary state policies may contribute to the radicalization of political Islamic 
movements, while inclusion and accommodation may have an opposite effect – the 
moderation of Islamists groups was used for testing my hypothesis (Kubikova, 2009, 
p.139).  Inclusion can be introduced via mechanisms such as political openings, the 
introduction of pluralism in multiparty systems, the guarantee of basic human rights, 
the conduct of fair elections, etc. In this case, which effects, such as political 
participation, could be observed in the behavior of Kurdish Islamists was 
investigated. Whether the behavioral or the ideological moderation of the individuals 
were in the forefront of this transformation was also investigated.  
After having reviewed the related literature, I carried out my research on the 
ideas of the prominent leaders of the Free Cause Party. I conducted three interviews, 
with   the   Party’s   Spokesperson   and General Secretary Mehmet Yavuz in the 
headquarters   in   Ankara   on   29  April   2014,   the   Party’s   Spokesperson   and   the  Vice  
President  Responsible  for  the  Foreign  Affairs  Said  Şahin  in  the  Istanbul  branch  of  the  
Party on 27 May 2014, one of the members of the Party’s   General   Management  
Council  and  Vice  President  responsible  for  Family  and  Social  Policies  Aynur  Sülün  
on 10 June 2014 via e-mail.  I also conducted an additional interview with a 
journalist who followed the Kurdish issue and its actors closely, Faruk Bildirici on 2 
December 2014, in Ankara. Additionally, I used existing newspaper and magazine 
interviews  with  Party  members,  and  commentaries  available  on  the  Party’s  website.  I  
tested especially three subjects in order to see whether a transformation had taken 
place: position vis-à-vis regime, position vis-à-vis PKK, and political pragmatism. If 
-at least rhetorically- they had chosen a path of a system friendly stance vis-à-vis the 
regime, unarmed confrontation with the PKK and willingness to compromise for 
political ends, then it could be considered that a high level of moderation took place. 
If the discourses were developed in the opposite direction, moderation did not take 
place for the movement. If one or two factors were changed, partial moderation had 
been deployed.  
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The moderation literature is vast and is fed by multiple disciplines. However, 
given the few number of in-depth case study analyses as well as the authenticity of 
each case, it makes more difficult to make generalizations. Moderation is considered 
to be connected to the inclusion and democratic openings. Moderates and radicals are 
not realities that stand alone. Even the slightest change in the political surroundings 
might prompt the internal dynamics of the organization and result in an unexpected 
manner. The Huda-Par either as a continuation of the Hezbollah or as a new initiative 
is bound by the conditions of the political environment in Turkey.  
Surely, there had to be a historical and political context for the issue. Many 
Islamic and religious groups in Turkey admit that they are not influenced by the 
Islamist figures and the accumulation they brought upon. The emergence of Islamist 
ideas can be traced back to the nineteenth century. As an ideology Islamism was 
considered as a way to sustain the survival of the Ottoman Empire during the 
traumatic dissolution process. In addition, not only in Turkey, but also throughout the 
Middle East, nationalism had been an important ideology, which shaped the borders 
and  relations  for  people.  With  the  foundation  of   the  Republic,  Atatürk’s  concept  of  
Turkish nationalism and secularism became one of the most important state 
ideologies  of  the  Republic.  Islamism  had  been  marginalized  (Hanioğlu,  9  July  2012).    
As the most conservative people of the country, the Kurdish population suffered 
from the developments. This is what happened in the experience of the Turkish state. 
As the reforms were intensified, the bonds among Muslim people within the country 
were weakened. The  Republic’s  radical  secular  reforms  caused  Islam  to  move  away  
from the public sphere and intolerance towards any possibility that might have 
awakened the Caliphate and the sultanate resulted in the absence of an Islamist 
opposition. This enabled Turkish Islamists to be closer to a nationalist line which in 
the long run might share similar grounds with Kemalists (Duran, Çetinsaya   and  
others, 2010, p.135).  
After continuous state suppression that lasted for decades, in 1950, Kurdish 
nationalism and Islamism were reduced to a very weak position and became almost 
nonexistent while Kurdish religious and tribal leaders were articulated into the 
Turkish   political   system   (Kirişçi   and   Winrow, 1997, p.112). As a result of 
continuous disappointments, throughout the end of the 1950s   Democrat   Party’s  
position among people, who can be categorized as Islamists such as sheiks, 
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landlords, and prominent leaders, in especially the east and south eastern region in 
Turkey, deteriorated.  
As Turkish Islamist groups centered on the idea of the Turkish Islam 
Synthesis, more and more Kurdish people joined the leftist groups and parties 
(Çevik, 2012, p.94). For Turkish Islamists, protecting and sustaining the unity of the 
state has an important  place.  Altuntaş  asserts  religious  nationalism  as   the sustaining 
of the strongest sense of belonging to a community (2010, p.420). While for Kurdish 
Islamists, Sharia is a way out to express their Kurdishness in the legal space; on the 
other hand, for the Turkish Islamists secessionist claims of their Kurdish counterparts 
has been violating the idea of unity in Islam.  
Kurdish Muslims/Islamists, after the great rebellions of the early Republican 
era went into deep silence in the following decades. With the 1980s, Kurdish 
Islamists revealed themselves in several organizations. One of the most important 
and sounding was the Kurdish Hezbollah.  According to Uslu, the first violent 
Islamist organization in Turkey was  the  Hizbu’t  Tahrir  established  in  Ankara  in   the 
1960s (2009, p.217). However, the most famous organization in terms of its violence 
was the Kurdish Hezbollah. The Hezbollah of Turkey is an Islamist movement, 
which was born and centered in the Kurdish region in Turkey in 1979, and the 
majority of its members consisted of Kurdish people (Bagasi). The organization laid 
its references on Islam and its provisions. Therefore, the Kurdish  people’s  density  in  
the organization did not transform its structure to a nationalist movement; on the 
contrary,   given   Islam’s   universalist   call,   the   organization’s   sphere   of   influence  
reached all Muslims in the region. 
During the first period (1979-1991), congregation was completed; then the 
invitation and education phases were carried out. In the second period (1991-2000), 
armed struggle against the PKK, Menzil group   and   “deep   state’s   intelligence  
services”   and   gangs   were   initiated   (Bagasi).      Apart   from   violent   struggles,   the  
Hezbollah organization materialized comprehensive activities especially in the area 
of  moral  awakening  and  social   life.  The  Hezbollah’s  motivation  behind  its  struggle  
against the PKK was its avoidance of the religious values and sensitivity of the 
Kurdish people as well as its contribution to the sufferings and suppression of the 
Kurdish  people  side  by  side  with  the  state  forces  (Çevik, 2012, p.98). The PKK and 
the Hezbollah fight lasted five years and resulted in the deaths of 200 Hezbollah 
followers and 500 PKK militants in addition to hundreds of civilian casualties 
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(Çevik, 2012, p.98).  Following   the  PKK’s   leader  Abdullah  Öcalan’s   capture  on 15 
February 1999, operations, which aimed to destroy the Hezbollah, intensified. The 
Hezbollah’s  distinctiveness  arouse  from  its  several  features.  The  most  important was 
its  appeal  to  violence.  Among  Turkey’s  Islamists,  armed  struggle  against  one  another  
or towards state structures is a rare phenomenon. Secondly, the Hezbollah was 
successful in constructing the strong sense of the idea of the “other”.  In  addition,  the  
Hezbollah members were considered proxy fighters of different organizations by 
different segments.  
From the 17 January 2000 operation in Beykoz, Istanbul, until the 
establishment of the Free Cause Party in 2012, and the Hezbollah was not active 
politically. During the period, Turkey experienced a deep political, financial and 
social transformation. The AKP government starting from 2003, enabled the 
realization of a great sum of reforms. After years of economic, political and social 
crises, the people experienced a bloom in the economy and standards of living and 
more importantly a recovery in the expression of basic human and social rights. The 
Hezbollah community benefited from the new initiatives and environment as did the 
other social, religious and political groups. Expanding political opportunity structures 
such as the AKP governance, the Kurdish Initiative, extension of political and human 
rights,  the  PKK’s  inertia  resulted  in  the  political  inclusion  of  the  previously  marginal  
groups. In addition to political opportunity structures, the changing internal dynamics 
of the Hezbollah Community (political learning process, decades long Kurdish issue 
and the closure of Mustazaf-Der) resulted in the moderation and foundation of the 
Huda-Par.   
In order to analyze the degree of moderation, some factors are reviewed. 
Leaving the violence is the most important sign of the moderation. In terms of their 
position to state and the regime, Kurdish Islamists are much willing to participate in 
comparison to their past position. Therefore, founding a legal political party and 
accepting being bound by the law and codes is also an indication of the moderation. 
But  when  it  comes  to  political  pragmatism,  they  are  still  insistent  on  their  ideology’s  
conclusiveness. They are not willing to compromise on any of their political and 
ideological ends. Their methods are surely changed, but their goals are more or less 
the same. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
 
Interview with Mehmet Yavuz (The Huda-Par General Secretary) on 29 April 
2014 
 
Turkish Version – Türkçe  Versiyonu 
  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : İslamcılığı  kendinize  göre  tanımlar  mısınız?  Hür  Dava  
Partisi’ni  İslamcı  olarak  niteler  misiniz?  Partinin  Türk  İslamcı  
çizgisinden  ayrıştığı  noktalar  var  mı?  Varsa  nelerdir? 
Mehmet Yavuz : İslami  ve  gayri  İslami  çizgi  vardır.  Bunun  dışında  bu  gibi  
sıfat  ve  ayrıştırmaları  doğru  bulmuyoruz.  Bu  gibi  kavram  ve  
sıfatların  iyi  niyetli  olduğunu  düşünmüyoruz.  İslam’ı  da  bir  
ideoloji  gibi  sunup  diğer  izmlerle  aynı  çizgiye  oturtma  gayreti  
olabilir. Bizim  hareket  noktamız  İslam’dır. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Hizbullah’ın  vaadiyle  Hüda-Par’ın  vaadi  arasındaki  farklar  
nelerdir?  
Mehmet Yavuz : Şiddet  dışında,  Hür  Dava  Partisi  siyasi  bir  parti  olduğundan  
kendini  hukuk  ve  legal  sınırlarla  belirler.  Hizbullah’ın  hukuku 
sınır  olarak  kabul  ettiğini  düşünmüyorum.   
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  Milliyetçiliğinin  parti  ideolojisinde  yeri  var  mı? 
Mehmet Yavuz : Hiçbir  milliyetçiliğin  parti  içinde  yeri  olamaz.  Üstünlüğü  
takva  belirler.  Acemin  Arap’a,  Arap’ın  Arap  olmayana  
üstünlüğü  yoktur,  olamaz.  Yoğunluklu  olarak  Kürt  kökenli  
olmamız  Kürt  milliyetçiliği  güdeceğimiz  anlamına  gelmez.  
Bölgenin  sorunlarıyla  daha  yakından  muhatap  olduğumuz  için  
böyle  bir  izlenim  oluşabilir.  Hangi  milliyetten  olursa  olsun  
payda  İslam  olduğu  için  milliyet  fark  etmez.  55  şehirde  
teşkilatımızı  kurduk.  İnşallah  81  ilde  de  olmak  için  çalışıyoruz. 
Allah  Teâlâ  bizi  kavimler  olarak  yarattı.  Bu  kavmiyetten  
kaynaklanan  dil  ve  kültürün  muhafazası  ve  yaşatılması  bir  
haktır.  Bunun  engellenmesi  için  yapılanlar  zulümdür.  Türklük,  
Kürtlük,  Arnavutluk…  Tüm  milletler  Allah’ın  birer  ayeti.  
Millet  olmaktan  doğan  özellikler  de  bunun  tezahürleri.  
Bunların  yasaklanması,  silinmeye  çalışılması  İslam’ın  ruhuna  
aykırıdır.  Zulümdür.   
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  İslamcılığını  ve  Hür  Dava Partisini tarihsel olarak 
nerede  başlatır,  birbirine  nasıl  eklemlersiniz? 
Mehmet Yavuz : Suni  kalıp  ve  kavramları  kabul  etmiyoruz.  Bu  tuzağa  düşmek  
istemiyoruz.  İslam  tekdir.  Türk  İslamcılığı,  Kürt  İslamcılığı,  
Arap  İslamcılığı  gibi  ayırımları  kabul  etmiyoruz.  İttihat  ve  
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Terakki,  Osmanlı  modernleşmesini  problemlerin  kaynağı  
olarak  görüyoruz.   
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  meselesi  çerçevesinde  BDP  ve  Hüda-Par’ın  ayrışma  
noktaları  nelerdir? 
Mehmet Yavuz : Birleştirici  noktayı  İslam  olarak  görüyoruz  başka  bir  ideoloji  
değil.  Ayrılıkçı,  federal  vb.  bir  talep  gütmüyoruz  ama  1.  Dünya  
savaşından  sonra  çizilen  güneydoğudaki  sınırların  problemin  
başlıca  kaynağı  olduğunu  düşünüyoruz.  Talebimiz  var  olan  bu  
suni  sınırların  kaldırılması.      Halkların  birbirine  kavuşması.   
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  meselesi  çerçevesinde  AKP  ve  Hüda-Par’ın  ayrışma  
noktaları  nelerdir? 
Mehmet Yavuz : Anadilde  eğitim,  Kürt  dilinin  resmi  hüviyet  kazanması. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : AKP  hükümetiyle  birlikte  Kürt  kimliğinin  ifadesi  ve  Kürt  
karşıtı  devlet  refleksleri  arasındaki  gerilim  ne  oranda  azaldı? 
Mehmet Yavuz : Ciddi  oranda  değişim  var.  Belli  hakların  teslimi  gerginliği  
azalttı. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Hüda-Par’ın  ortaya  çıkış  noktası  ve  bunu  tetikleyen  olay/lar  
nelerdir? 
Mehmet Yavuz : Bölgesel  boyutta,  bölgenin  içinde  olduğu  çatışma  durumu.  
Sınırların  mağduriyetler  oluşturması. 
Türkiye  bütünlüğü  içinden  baktığımızda,  Müslümanların  
cumhuriyetin  kurulmasıyla  beraber  çektikleri.  Kürt  
Müslümanlar  etnik  aidiyet  yüzünden  çifte  mağduriyet  
yaşamıştır. 
Uluslararası  boyutta  ise ümmet  çağrısı.  Ümmet  bilinci.  Birlik  
olma  isteği.   
Türkiye’de  Müslüman  halk  Cumhuriyet  rejiminin  kurulmasıyla  
büyük  sorunlar  yaşadı.  Kürt  Müslümanlar  etnik  kimliklerinin  
de  etkisiyle  daha  çoğunu  yaşadı. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  İslamcılığının  siyasi  bir  parti  olarak  ortaya  çıkması  niçin  
bu  kadar  uzun  sürdü? 
Mehmet Yavuz : Zulüm,  baskı,  yıllarca  süren  batılılaşma  politikalarına  ters  
düşenlerin  acımasızca  cezalandırılması. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Demokratik  sürece  katılımınız  söylem  ve  pratiklerinizde  
ılımlılaşmaya/yumuşamaya  yol  açtı  mı? 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kural  değil  istisna  olacağız.  Şu  ana  kadar Türkiye’de  
oluşmuş  pratikler  teoriyi  desteklemiş  olabilir.  Ama  dünyaya  
baktığımızda  Hamas  örneği  var,  Lübnan  Hizbullah’ı  var.  Onlar  
siyasi  sisteme  dâhil  oldukları  halde  ılımlaşmadılar.   
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Interview with Mehmet Yavuz (The Huda-Par General Secretary) on 29 April 2014 
 
English  Version  (translated  by  Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu) 
 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What is your definition of Islamism? Do you identify the 
Huda-Par as an Islamist party? Are there any points that the 
Party differs from the Turkish Islamist line? What are they? 
Mehmet Yavuz : There is Islamic path and un-Islamic path. Except these, we 
do not find other adjectives and ascriptions correct. We do not 
think that these kinds of concepts and terms are well 
intentioned.  It can be well the idea that promoting Islam as 
other ideologies. Our motivation lies with Islam itself.  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What are the differences between the Huda-Par and the 
Hezbollah’s  promises?   
Mehmet Yavuz : Accept violence, the Huda-Par as a political organization 
limits itself with judicial and legal boundaries. I do not think 
that the Hezbollah accept the law as its boundary.  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Is  nationalism  tolerated  in  the  Party’s  ideology? 
Mehmet Yavuz : Nationalism of any type cannot exist in our Party. The 
superiority is in piety. The  Prophet’s  hadith  says  that  there  is  
no superiority of the Persian to Arab and of the Arab to non-
Arab. Because of having majority from the Kurds does not 
mean that we will conduct Kurdish nationalism. Because we 
are  more  subject  to  the  region’s  problems, there might be such 
kind of impression. From whichever nation is, as much the 
Islam is the common ground, it does not matter. We 
established our organization in 55 cities. Hopefully, we are 
working to be in 81 cities. 
Allah created us as clans. Protection and sustainment of the 
language and culture that arouse from belonging to a clan is a 
right.  Turkishness,  Kurdishness,  Albanian…  All  nations  are  
the verse of God. Features of being a nation are manifestations 
of it. Prohibition of these features and seeking to abandon them 
is against the spirit of Islam. It is oppression. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : How do you start the Kurdish Islamism and the Huda-Par 
historically and connect to each other? 
Mehmet Yavuz : We do not accept these artificial terms and concepts. We do 
not want to be caught in this trap. Islam is the only. We do not 
accept the Kurdish Islamism, Turkish Islamism and Arab 
Islamism.  We consider that the Party of Union and Progress 
and the Ottoman modernization as the source of all the 
problems. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What are the differences between the HDP and the Huda-Par 
on the Kurdish issue? 
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Mehmet Yavuz : We see Islam as a common point, not any other ideology. We 
do not seek a secessionist, federal claim, but we consider that 
the borders that were created after the WWI in southeastern 
region as source of the problem. Our demand is the 
abandonment of these artificial borders and rejoining of the 
people.  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What are the differences between the AKP and the Huda-Par 
on the Kurdish issue? 
Mehmet Yavuz : Education in mother tongue, official recognition of the 
Kurdish language.  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : With the AKP government, in which degree the tension 
between  the  expression  of  Kurdish  identity  and  the  state’s  
reflexes against Kurdism is reduced? 
Mehmet Yavuz : There is a change in a great extent. Recognition of some of 
the rights reduced the tension.  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What is/are the triggering event/s that resulted in the 
emergence of the Huda-Par? 
Mehmet Yavuz : In the regional aspect, the Middle East and Islamic world is 
under continuous conflicts. The borders in the region are not 
natural which create sufferings. From an international 
perspective,  it  is  a  call  for  ummah.  Conscious  of  Ummah…  
Quest  for  uniting…    In Turkey, Muslims suffered from the 
establishment of the Republic. Kurdish Muslims suffered more 
because of their ethnic belongings.  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Why the Kurdish Islamism failed to produce a political party 
until recently? 
Mehmet Yavuz : Oppression, suppression, punishing to the ones who went 
against the decades-long Westernization policies cruelly. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Did your participation to the democratic process result in the 
moderation of your discourse and practices?  
Mehmet Yavuz : In terms of moderation, we will be exception, not the rule. 
Until now, the practices in Turkey might support the theory. 
But when we look at the world, there is the example of Hamas, 
there is the Lebanese Hezbollah. Although they are 
participated into political system, they did not moderate. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Interview  with  Said  Şahin  (The  Huda-Par Spokesperson) on 27 May 2014 
 
Turkish Version – Türkçe  Versiyonu 
 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : İslamcılığı  kendinize  göre  tanımlar  mısınız?  Hür  Dava  
Partisi’ni  İslamcı  olarak  niteler  misiniz?  Partinin  Türk  İslamcı  
çizgisinden  ayrıştığı  noktalar  var  mı?  Varsa  nelerdir? 
Said  Şahin : İslami  bir  partiyiz.  İslamcılık  son  iki  yüzyılda  ortaya  
çıkmıştır.  Öncesinde  İslam  ve  gayri  Müslim  vardı.  Batı  
emperyalizmi  ve  sömürüsüne  karşın  İslami  bir  takım  
hareketlerin  siyasi  olarak  ortaya  çıkmasıyla  İslamcılık  
gündeme  geldi.  Özü  itibariyle  din  İslam.  İdareyi  
hedeflediğimiz  için,  batıyı  sorguladığımız  ve  toplumu  batı  
etkisinden  kurtarmayı  hedeflediğimiz  için  İslamcılık  
kimliğimiz  vardır.  Müslüman  Kardeşler’i  de  örnek  olarak  
verebiliriz.  Kavga  emperyalist  dünyayla  Müslümanlar  arasında  
devam  ediyor.  Çoğunlukla  işbirlikçileri  üzerinden  çıkar  
sağlayacak  bir  metot  uygulanıyor.  Bazen  İslamcı  
diyebileceğimiz  gruplar  da  bunlara  dahil  olup  çanak  
tutabiliyor. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  Müslümanlarının  (İslamcı  olarak  da  düşünebiliriz)  Türk  
İslamcılarından  ayrışma  noktaları  var  mı?  Varsa  neler?  
Said  Şahin : Türk  ve  Kürt  İslamcılığı  ayrımı  vardır.  Olmaması  gerekir  
ama  vakıada  vardır.  Sebebi  ulusalcılık  hastalığıdır.  Batıdan  
kapılan  bir  hastalığın  mikrobu  olarak  görüyoruz. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Hizbullah’ın  vaadiyle  Hüda-Par’ın  vaadi  arasındaki  farklar  
nelerdir?  
Said  Şahin : Hizbullah  ve  Hüda-Par  aynı  kaynaktan  beslenen  farklı  
yapılar.  STK,  medya,  eğitim,  siyasi boyut, ya da illegal 
yapılanma…  Bunların  hepsi  araç.  Hepsinin  üzerinde  ise  Kuran  
ve  Sünnet  var.  Hizbullah’la  araçlarımız,  metot  ve  üslubumuz  
farklı.  Ancak  amaçlarda  aynileşiyoruz. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  Milliyetçiliğinin  parti  ideolojisinde  yeri  var  mı? 
Said  Şahin : Her  insanın  bir  ırkı  var.  İslam  bir  çatıdır.  Çatının  altında  
ırklar,  renkler  eriri.  Çatıyı  kenara  itip,  renkleri  öne  
çıkardığımız  zaman  biz  zarara  düşeriz.  Parti  içinde  diğer  
ırklara  yönelik  üstünlük  ve  ayrıcalık  konumlandırmayı  kabul  
etmiyoruz, bunu reddediyoruz. 
 Kürt  sorunu  yüz  yıllık  cumhuriyetten  daha  eski  bir  sorun.  
Hakların  tesisi  ve  iadesi  için  ırkını  ön  plana  çıkarmandan  
çalışanları  Kürt  milliyetçisi  olarak  görmüyoruz. 
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Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  İslamcılığını  ve  Hür  Dava  Partisini  tarihsel  olarak  
nerede  başlatır,  birbirine  nasıl  eklemlersiniz? 
Said  Şahin : Tarihsel  olarak  parti  olarak  kurulmadan  önce,  Mustazaflar  
Hareketi,  İslami  şahsiyetler  ve  farklı  sivil  toplum  kuruluşları  
olarak vardık.  Stk’larda  mücadele  veren  insanlar  olarak  
hedeflerimiz  aynıydı.  Mayıs  2012  itibariyle  Mustazaflar  
Hareketi  sona  erdirilince,  Aralık  2013  itibariyle  Partileşme  
süreci  başladı. 
 Yeryüzünde  bazı  ilahi  sorumluluklarımız  var.  Bunların  başında  
Peygamberlere teslim edilen adaleti teslim etmek geliyor. 
Adaletin  tesisi  güçle,  güç  sahibi  olmak  idari  mekanizmanın  
kontrolüne  ortak  olmak  (hüküm  verici  pozisyona  gelmek),  bu  
pozisyona  gelebilmek  için  ise  parti  kurmak  gerekti. 
 Din,  dil,  ırk…  Ne  olursa  olsun  hakları  yaşayabilmek  önemlidir.  
İslam’ı  özüyle  referans  aldık.  Yetime,  kadını  hakkını  veren,  
köleleri  özgürleştiren  bir  İslam…  Sadece  iman  ve  ibadet  
boyutuyla  uğraşan  değil,  adaleti  ve  ahireti  kazandıracak  bir  
İslam…  Sadece  Müslümanların  değil  gayri  Müslimlerin  de 
haklarını  kullanabildiği  İslam.  Bu  yüzden  parti  tüzüğümüzde  
akıl,  can,  nesil,  din  ve  mal  emniyeti  parti  tüzüğümüze  girdi.  
Şehirleri  kalkındırırken  insanlığı  da  kalkındıran  İslam…   
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  meselesi  çerçevesinde  HDP  ve  Hüda-Par’ın  ayrışma  
noktaları  nelerdir? 
Said  Şahin : HDP  ırkçılık  üzerine  kurulu  bir  yapı.  Tek  parti  zihniyetinin  
Kürtlerdeki  tezahürü.  Kendi  dışında  farklılığa  tahammülü  
olmayan  bir  yapı.  Kürtlerin  haklarını  savunduklarına  
inanmıyoruz.  Bunu  kendilerine  maske  edip  Kürtleri  
dinlerinden  uzaklaştırmayı  amaçlıyorlar. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  meselesi  çerçevesinde  AKP  ve  Hüda-Par’ın  ayrışma  
noktaları  nelerdir? 
Said  Şahin : AKP  Kürtlerin  haklarını  iade  etme  noktasında  diğer  partilere  
oranla  ileri  aşamada.  HDP  ve  PKK’yı  Kürtlerin  temsilcisi 
yalnızca  onlarmış  gibi  güçlendirecek  politikaları  var.  Kürtlerin  
tüm  haklarını  zaruret  oluşturma  şartıyla  veriyorlar.  HDP  ortam  
oluşturuyor.  AKP  hak  iadesi  yapıyor.  Bu  şekilde  iki  yapı  da  
güçleniyor.  Hakları  pazarlık  konusu  yapıyorlar.  Bizim  
AKP’den  beklentimiz  hakların  anayasal  güvenceyle  pazarlık  
konusu  yapılmadan  verilmesi.  Bu  şekilde  HDP  ve  PKK  
zayıflar. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Hüda-Par’ın  ortaya  çıkış  noktası  ve  bunu  tetikleyen  olay/lar  
nelerdir? 
Said  Şahin : Partiyi  kurmamıza  neden  olan  birkaç  faktör  ve  amaç  
bulunuyor.  Öncelikle,  kitlemizin  ihtiyacı  vardı.  Mustazaf-
Der’ein  kapanmasında  yönetim  merkezli  mağduriyetler  
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yaşanmıştı  ve  bunların  mücadelesini  veren  siyasi  bir  
organizasyon  yoktu.  İkinci  olarak,  ülkenin  idaresine  etki  
edecek  bir  istek  oluştu.  Çünkü gerekli  şartlar  oluştu.    Üçüncü  
olarak,  Kürtlerin  temsiliyeti  problemi  var.  PKK  ideolojisiyle  
taban  birbirine  zıt.  PKK’nın  önerdiği  yapı  halkın  değerlerine  
aykırı.  Dördüncüsü,  İslamı  referans  alan  ve  sorumluluk  
mücadelesi  veren  bir  siyasi  parti  bulunmuyor.  Bu  boşluğu  
Hüda-Par  ile  doldurma  ihtiyacı  var.  Son  olarak  ise  İslam  
coğrafyasının  içinde  bulunduğu  durumu  gösterebiliriz.  İçinde  
bulunduğumuz  coğrafya,  emperyalizmin  taşeron  oluşumları  
üzerinden  şekillendiriliyor.  Biz  halkımızın  zenginlik  ve  
değerlerini  ve  İslam’ın  varlığını  muhafaza  etmek  istiyoruz.     
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  İslamcılığının  siyasi  bir  parti  olarak  ortaya  çıkması  niçin  
bu  kadar  uzun  sürdü? 
Said  Şahin : Kürt  İslamcılığını  reddediyoruz.  Türkiye  halkına  hitap  
ediyoruz. Misak-ı  Milliyi  çok  önemsemiyoruz.  Yurtdışında  
partileşen  bazı  İslami  gruplarla  görüşerek  İslami  parti  birliği  
oluşturma  düşüncesindeyiz.  Ümmetçi  bir  anlayıştayız,  
çizgideyiz.  Siyasi  olarak  gecikmenin  başlıca  nedeni  Türkiye  
şartlarının  elverişsizliğidir.  Cumhuriyet  tarihi  boyunca  rejimin  
Kürtlere  hayat  hakkı  tanımayan  uygulamaları  oldu.  
Doksanlarda PKK ve devletin hedefindeydik. Kimlik olarak 
kendimizi  ortaya  koyamadık.  Koyduğumuzda  ortadan  
kaldırıldık.  Müsaade  edilmedi.  2000’li  yıllardan sonra AKP 
iler  şartlar  değişti.  Medya  ve  STK’lar  üzerinden  kendimizi  
ifade  etmeye  başladık.  Sonrasında  da  siyasi  parti  geldi. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Diğer  Kürt  ve  İslamcı  gruplar  da  düşünüldüğünde  Hüda-Par 
ve  Mustazaflar  Hareketi’nin  farklılığı  nerededir?   
Said  Şahin : Farklı  orijinli  gruplar  var.  İslam’ın  önüne  Kürt  kimliği  getiren  
siyasi  oluşumlar  var.  Farklılığımız,  İslam’ı  referans  alan  ve  
önüne  başka  bir  şey  geçirmeyen,  insana  hizmeti  amaçlayan,  
hakkı  olan  hakları  sağlayacak  olan  bir  düşünce  yapısında,  
İslami  hareket  oluşumuz.   
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Demokratik  sürece  katılımınız  söylem  ve  pratiklerinizde  
ılımlılaşmaya/yumuşamaya  yol  açtı  mı? 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Davet,  tebliğ,  ifade  özgürlüğü  hedefledik.  Bazı  problemler  
yaşadık.  Bir  parti  üzerinden  kendimizi  ifade  etmeye  başladık.  
Parti  güçlü  bir  araç,  kullanma  amacı  güdüyoruz. 
 Gayri  İslami  bir  sistem  mevcut.  İslami  kimliğimizle  içinde  
varolup  İslami  amaçlarımızı  gerçekleştirmeyi  hedefliyoruz.  
Kimliğimizden  taviz  verecek  bir  yol  gütmüyoruz.  Adını  temiz  
siyaset, dürüst  siyaset  koyuyoruz.  Taviz  istendiğinde,  
vazgeçmeyiz.  Vazgeçtiğimiz  idarenin  kapısı  olacaktır.  
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Değerlerimiz  üzerine  sistem  içerisinde  mücadele  vermek  üzere  
yola  çıktık.   
 
Interview  with  Said  Şahin  (The  Huda-Par General Spokesperson) on 27 May 
2014 
 
English  Version  (translated  by  Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu) 
 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What is your definition of Islamism? Do you identify the 
Huda-Par as an Islamist party? Are there any points that the 
Party differs from the Turkish Islamist line? What are they? 
Said  Şahin : We are an Islamic party. The Islamism was appeared two 
centuries before. Before, there was Islam and non-Islam. 
Against the Western imperialism and colonialism, Islamism 
came into existence through the emergences of some Islamic 
movements. In essence, as we are aiming at an Islamic 
management, questioning the West and securing the religion; 
we have an Islamist identity. We can give the Muslim 
Brotherhood as an example. The struggle is going on between 
the imperialist world and Muslims. Mostly, the method is 
deployed over the collaborators. Sometimes, groups that we 
can call Islamists are also involved and invite. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Are there any points that the Party differs from the Turkish 
Islamist line? What are they? 
Said  Şahin : There is a difference between the Kurdish and Turkish 
Islamism. It should not be, but in reality there is. The reason is 
sickness of nationalism. We see it as a virus of Western illness. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What are the differences between the Huda-Par and the 
Hezbollah’s  promises?  
Said  Şahin : The Hezbollah and the Huda-Par are different structures that 
are nourished from the same source. NGOs, media, education, 
political  organization  or  informal  structure…  They  are  all  
means. There is Quran and Sunnah over them. Our means, 
methods and wording is different from the Hezbollah. But, we 
became the same in purpose.  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Is  nationalism  tolerated  in  the  Party’s  ideology? 
Said  Şahin : Each person has a race. But Islam is a roof. Under this roof, 
races and colors melt. If we push the roof aside and drive the 
colors forward, we will suffer. We do not accept a position that 
will highlight Kurdish superiority against other races in the 
Party. 
 The Kurdish issue is older than a hundred year of Republic. 
We do not consider the ones who work for reinstatement of the 
rights without highlighting his/her race as Kurdish nationalists. 
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Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : How do you start the Kurdish Islamism and the Huda-Par 
historically and connect to each other? 
Said  Şahin : Historically, before the establishment of the Party, we existed 
as Mustazaf-Der, Islamic personalities and different non-
governmental organization. As a group of people who 
struggled in the NGOs, we had same purposes. When 
Mustazaf-Der was closed on May 2012, the process for 
founding a political party was started in December 2013. 
 We have some moral duties in the earth. Foremost among 
these is the building justice that was commended to the 
Prophets. Securing the justice can be done with holding power, 
obtaining power can be done through sharing governmental 
authority, and sharing governmental authority can be done by 
founding a political party.  
 Religion, language, race... In any circumstance, it is important 
to experience the rights. We referenced Islam with its essence. 
Islam that gives justice to the orphan and woman, freedom to 
the slaves... Islam that not only deal with the aspect of belief 
and worshipping, but cares for sustaining the justice and 
winning afterlife. Islam in which not only Muslims but also 
non-Muslims can find justice... Therefore, in our party charter, 
we included the principles of security of mind, life, generation, 
religion and property. An Islam while improving the cities 
cares for improving the human. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What are the differences between the HDP and the Huda-Par 
on the Kurdish issue? 
Said  Şahin : The HDP is a structure that is based on racism. It is the 
manifestation of single party mentality. The structure does not 
tolerate any differences. We do not believe that they are 
defending the Kurdish rights. They are wearing this as a mask 
and actually aiming at alienation of people from the religion. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What are the differences between the AKP and the Huda-Par 
on the Kurdish issue? 
Said  Şahin : The AKP has policies that are strengthening the BDP and the 
PKK. They behave like the BDP is the only representative in 
the issue. All the Kurdish rights are given because of 
obligation. The BDP is setting the scene, the AKP is returning 
the rights back and the BDP is strengthening more. The rights 
must be given with the constitutional assurance not through a 
sense of favor and without bargaining. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What is/are the triggering event/s that resulted in the 
emergence of the Huda-Par? 
Said  Şahin : There is couple of factors and motives which pushed us to 
found the Party. First of all, after the closure of Mustazaf-Der, 
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the need for masses became evident. There was victimhood 
because of central administration.  There was not a struggling 
political organization which represented us. Second, Within 
the country, conditions were fulfilled which gave us impulse to 
effect  the  state’s  administration.  Third,  On  the  other  hand,  
representation of the Kurdish masses had been a problematic 
issue.  It  is  on  the  PKK’s  hands.  However,  their  ideology  is  
opposite to their mass that they represent based on anti-Islamic 
values. Fourth, In addition, there was not any single political 
party which takes Islam as reference and struggles for Islamic 
responsibility. This vacuum can be filled by the Huda-Par. 
Lastly; Islamic world is under the influence and making of 
subcontractors of the Imperialist forces. The Huda-Par aims to 
protect the wealth and values of its people as well as the 
existence of Islam in this geography. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Why the Kurdish Islamism failed to produce a political party 
until recently? 
Said  Şahin : We deny the Kurdish Islamism. We address to the peoples of 
Turkey. We do not pay attentio to much to the national pact 
(misak-ı  milli).  We  are  thinking  to  build  a  union  of  Islamic  
parties via communicating other political parties abroad. We 
are in a panislamist line.  
 The leading cause for the delay in estalishment of political 
party is the impracticality of the conditions in Turkey. There 
have been practices that did not give chance to the Kurds to 
carry their culture and values throughout the  Republic’s  
history. In the 1990s, we were the target of the PKK and the 
state. We could not manifest our identity. When we tried, we 
were abandoned. We were not allowed. After 2000s, with the 
AKP, the conditions are changed. We started to express 
ourselves through media and NGOs. Afterwards, political 
party is founded.  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : If you consider the similar establishments, what is difference 
of the Huda-Par and Mustazaflar Movement? 
Said  Şahin : There are groups with different origins. There are political 
organizations that bring Kurdish identity before Islam. Our 
difference lies in referencing Islam and bringing nothing else 
before it, aiming at wellbeing of the human, an Islamic 
movement striving for its rights.   
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Did your participation to the democratic process result in the 
moderation of your discourse and practices?  
Said  Şahin : We  aimed  at  freedom  of  expression  and  invitation  (tebliğ).  
We have lived problems. We started expressing ourselves 
through a political party. The Party is a powerful tool and we 
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meant to use it. The system is un-Islamic. We are aiming at 
being with our Islamic values inside the system and realize our 
Islamic goals. We are not seeing a way through making 
concessions from our identity. We named it clean politics, 
honest politics. When the concession is asked, we cannot give 
it up. What we are going to give up will be the way of leading. 
We took the road to struggle with our values within the system. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Interview  with  Aynur  Sülün  (The  Huda-Par Vice President responsible for 
Family and Social Policies) on 10 June 2014 
 
Turkish Version – Türkçe  Versiyonu 
 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Hüda-Par’ın  kurulması  aşamasını  kendi  katılımınız  açısından  
anlatabilir  misiniz?  (sürece  ne  zaman  ne  şekilde  dâhil  
oldunuz?) 
Aynur  Sülün : Daha  önceleri  STK  faaliyetleri  içerisinde  aktif  rol  
oynuyorduk.  Amacımız  kendi  öz  değerlerinden  koptukça  
yozlaşan,  manevi  buhranlar  yaşayan  toplumun  ıslahına  katkıda  
bulunmaktı.  Fakat  bu  faaliyetlerin  yetersiz  kaldığının,  
toplumun  manevi  değerlerini  Siyasete  taşımak  gerektiğinin  
kanaatine  vardık.  Çünkü  sistem  yıllardır  toplumun  değerleriyle  
savaş  halinde.  Hüda-Par  ailesi  olarak  yıllardır  halkımızla  el  ele  
sivil  toplum  faaliyetleri  gösterdiğimizden  kangrene  dönüşen  ve  
sürekli  ertelenip  çözülmeyen  sorunları  yakinen  görüyorduk.  
Dolayısıyla  Hüda-Par  toplumun  ihtiyaçlarından  doğdu.  Üstelik  
toplumun  elit  kesimi  içinden  çıkmayıp  aynı  sıkıntıları  yaşayan  
insanlardan oluşuyor. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Parti  içinde  sorumluluk  alanınız  nedir? 
Aynur  Sülün : Aile  ve  Sosyal  İşlerden  Sorumlu  Başkan  yardımcısıyım. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Uygulamayı  düşündüğünüz  projelerin  uzun  vadede  topluma  
ne  şekilde  bir  etkisinin  olacağını  düşünüyorsunuz? 
Aynur  Sülün Öncelikle  insanı  imar  etmekten  işe  başlayacağız  inşallah.  
Özünden  kopartıldığı  için  buhranlarda  olan,  yalancı  bir  tarihle  
avutulmuş,  özgüvenini  kaybetmiş,  toplumu  yeniden  kendi  
özüne  döndürecek  projelerimiz  var.  Toplumumuzun maddi 
projelerden  çok  manevi  projelere  ihtiyacı  var.  Manevi  değerler  
bir toplumu ayakta tutan temel dinamiklerdir. Toplumumuzun 
o  dinamikleri  patlatıldığından  cinnetin  eşiğinde  yaşıyor.  %  60’  
anti  depresan  ilaçları  kullanıyor.  Karşımızda  freni  boşalmış,  
irade  hâkimiyeti olmayan,  haz  odaklı,  hedefsiz,  başıboş,  
ferdiyetçi  bir  gençlik  var.  Bu  acilen  önlem  alınması  gereken  bir  
felakettir.  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Hüda-Par’ı  İslamcı  olarak  niteler  misiniz?  Neden? 
Aynur  Sülün : Bizim  referansımız  İslamdır.  Biz  bunu  açıkça  söylüyoruz.  
Cumhuriyetten  bu  yana  yüzü  Batıya  döndürülen  
toplumumuzun  İslamla  onarılmaya  ihtiyacı  vardır.  O  Batı  ki  
bugün  uyuşturucuyla  baş  edemediği  için  yasal  kabul  etmiş;;  
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intiharların,  cinnetlerin,  cinayetlerin,  boşanmaların,  kumarın,  
tecavüzlerin  en  fazla  yaşandığı  yerdir.  Bize  Batının  değerleri  
çağdaşlık  adı  altında  dayatıldığından  beri  toplum  olarak  hızla  
batışa  doğru  gidiyoruz.  Batının  da  toparlanması  için  İslama  
ihtiyacı  vardır.  Üstelik  İslamın  tüm  toplumları  bir  arada  tutma  
özelliği  vardır.  İslam  her  dönem  kendisinden  çözüm  
üretilebilen  tek  dindir. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Size  göre  Müslüman  Kürtlerin  legal  çerçevede  siyasallaşması  
niçin  bu  kadar  uzun  sürdü? 
Aynur  Sülün : Şartlar  çok  değişti.  Özellikle  Türkiye’nin  şartları  doksanlı  
yıllardaki  gibi  değil.  Artık  Sistemin  çarpıklıkları  çok  rahat  
eleştirilebiliyor.  Düşünce  ve  ifade  özgürlüğünün  önündeki  bir  
takım  engeller  de  kısmen  kalkmış  durumda.  Dolayısıyla  
zamanın  ve  şartların  doksanlı  yıllara  göre  daha  uygun  
olduğunu  düşünüyoruz. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  Müslümanlarının  (İslamcı  olarak  da  düşünebiliriz)  Türk  
İslamcılarından  ayrışma  noktaları  var  mı?  Varsa  neler?  
Aynur  Sülün : Ayrışma  noktaları  olduğunu  düşünmüyoruz.  İslam  gibi  bir  
ortak  inancımız  var.  İslam’da  ırkçılık  kınanmıştır.  Hepimiz  
Âdem  ve  Havva’nın  çocukları  olarak  kardeşiz.  Üstelik  Kürtler  
ve  Türkler  600  sene  hüküm  süren  Osmanlı’nın  içerisinde  barış  
içerisinde  yaşamışlardır.  Dünyanın  en  uzun  İmparatorluğu  olan  
Osmanlı  İmparatorluğunda  42  etnik  grup  yüzyıllarca  barış  
içinde  yaşadıysa  bu  İslam’ın  birleştirici  özeliğindendir 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Hizbullah  ve  Hüda-Par  arasında  amaçlar  açısından  benzeşme  
ve  farklılıklar  var  mı?  Neler? 
Aynur  Sülün : Bildiğim  kadarıyla  Hizbullah  yıllardır  toplumun  ıslahı  çalışan  
bir  cemaat.  Biz  de  Hüda-Par ailesi olarak toplumun manevi 
değerlerine  kavuşması  için  mücadele  ediyoruz.  Dolayısıyla  
hedeflerimizde  benzerlik  vardır.  Ayrılık  ise  biz  partiyiz,  onlar  
ise cemaat. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Kürt  meselesi  çerçevesinde  Hüda-Par’ın,  HDP  ve  AKP’den  
ayrışma  noktaları  nelerdir? 
Aynur  Sülün : Ülkemizde  Cumhuriyetten  bu  yana  Müslüman  Kürtler  gerek  
Devletin,  gerekse  de  PKK’nın  zulmü  altında  eziliyor.  Rejim  
yıllarca  Kürtleri  dönüştürmek,  dinlerinden  uzaklaştırmak  ve  
ırklarını  inkâr  etmeleri  için  zulmetti.  BDP  her  ne  kadar  
Kürtlerin  haklarını  savunuyor  gibi  görünse  de  aslında  bunu  
Truva  atı  olarak  kullanıyor.  Asıl  amacı  onları  inançlarından  
uzaklaştırıp  sol  ideolojiyi  dayatmaktır.  Üstelik  Kürt  meselesi  
PKK/BDP  meselesi  değildir.  Hükümetin  Kürt  meselesinde  
yalnızca  onları  muhatap  alması,  onları  Kürtlerin  temsilcisiymiş  
gibi  görmesi  yanlıştır.  Tüm  etnik  grupları  ve  halkı  muhatap  
almalıdır.  PKK/BDP’yi  Kürtlerin  temsilcisi  olarak  görmek,  
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onları  isteklerine  boyun  eğmek,  halka  yaptıkları  zulümleri  
görmezden  gelmek  yanlıştır.  AKP  çözüm  adı  altında  Kürtleri 
adeta  BDP/PKK’nın  insafına  terk  etmiştir.  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Benzeri  oluşumlar  düşünüldüğünde  Hüda-Par ve Mustazaflar 
Hareketi’nin  farklılığı  nerededir? 
Aynur  Sülün : Hüda-Par Mustazaflar Hareketinden gelen siyasi bir partidir. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Sizce demokratik  sürece  katılıyor  oluşunuz  söylem  ve  
pratiklerinizde  ılımlılaşmaya/yumuşamaya  yol  açtı/açar  mı? 
Aynur  Sülün : Biz  adımlarımızı  sağlam  atma  niyetindeyiz.  Sistemden  
muzdarip olup da iktidar olduktan sonra Sistemin savunucusu 
haline gelme gibi bir niyetimiz yoktur. Bu konuda 
tedbirlerimizi  almış,  güzergâhımızı  belirlemişiz.  Biz  sistemin  
değişmesi  gerektiğine  inanıyoruz.  Onun  için  halkı  sistemin  
değerleriyle  değil,  sistemi  halkın  değerleriyle  barıştırma,  
manevi  değerleri  siyasete  taşıma  niyetindeyiz. 
 
Interview  with  Aynur  Sülün  (The  Huda-Par Vice President responsible for 
Family and Social Policies) on 10 June 2014 
 
English Version – Translated  by  Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu 
 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Would you tell us about the process of the Huda-Par’s  
foundation in terms of your participation? 
 Aynur  Sülün : Before, we were actively engaged in NGO activities. Our 
purpose was to contribute to recovery of the society which 
suffered from retrogression and moral crisis. But we reached to 
the conclusion that these activities were not enough and we 
should have carried them to the sphere of politics. Cause, the 
system was giving fight against the values of the society for 
years. As the family of the Huda-Par, we were aware of the 
unresolved and long-standing problems as we were engaged in 
non-governmental organizations hand-in-hand with people. 
Therefore, the Huda-Par was born due to the needs of the 
society. In addition, it is not formed by the elite, but rather 
composed of people who suffered from same problems. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What is your responsibility within the Party? 
Aynur  Sülün : I am the vice president responsible for family and social 
affairs 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : How the projects you want to practice would benefit the 
society in the long-term? 
Aynur  Sülün : We will start with improving the human, hopefully. We have 
projects for the recovery of the society who is in moral crisis, 
entertained with a lying history, lost his confidence. Our 
society needs more of the moral projects rather than the 
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material projects. The moral values are dynamics that support 
the  society.  Since  our  society’s  dynamics  were  blown,  it  lives  
on the verge of insanity. 60 % uses antidepressant medicine. 
We have a youth who is out of control, weak, pleasure focused, 
purposeless, rambling, and individualistic. This is disaster that 
needs to be cautioned.  
 Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Do you identify the Huda-Par as an Islamist party? Why? 
Aynur  Sülün : Our reference is Islam. We are telling this straightforward. 
Until the foundation of the Republic, our society whose head 
directed towards the West needs to be cured with Islam. 
Today, the Western world because of not handling the drug 
issues formulated it as legal; is the place where homicides, 
physiological crises, divorces, gambling, and rapes are the 
most common. We are going deep down as society as we have 
been imposed by the Western values under the name of 
modernism. In order the West to pull itself together, it needs 
Islam. Islam is the only religion which can produce solution in 
every period. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Why the Kurdish Islamism failed to produce a political party 
until recently? 
Aynur  Sülün : The conditions are changed a lot. Especially, environment in 
Turkey is not similar in what it was in 1990s. Today, problems 
of the system can be criticized easily. Even partially, some of 
the obstacles before the freedom of thought and expression are 
removed. Therefore, we are thinking that the time and 
conditions are more suitable now in comparison to the 1990s. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Are there any points that the Party differs from the Turkish 
Islamist line? What are they? 
Aynur  Sülün : We do not think that there are any differences. We have a 
common belief that is Islam. Racism is condemned in Islam. 
We are all sisters and brothers as we are sons and daughters of 
Adam and Eve. Also, Kurds and Turks had lived peacefully 
within the Ottoman realm that lasted 600 years. It is because of 
Islam’s  unifying  characteristic which enabled 42 ethnic groups 
lived peacefully for centuries in the longest standing empire in 
the World.  
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What are the similarities and differences between the Huda-
Par  and  the  Hezbollah’s  promises  and  purposes? 
Aynur  Sülün : As far as I know the Hezbollah is a community that works for 
the recovery of the society. We as the Huda-Par family are 
struggling  for  the  society’s  cohesion  to  moral  values.  
Therefore, there are similarities in terms of our purposes. The 
difference is we are a Party and they are a Community. 
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Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What are the differences between, the AKP, the HDP and the 
Huda-Par on the Kurdish issue? 
Aynur  Sülün : Since the foundation of the Republic, Muslim Kurds were 
oppressed because of the state and the PKK in our country. 
The regime oppressed the Kurds in order them to convert, 
remove the religion from their lives and deny their races. 
Although the BDP (the HDP) seems as it is defending the 
Kurdish rights, actually it is using this as a Trojan horse. Its 
real purpose is imposing the leftist ideology through drawing 
people  away  from  their  beliefs.  The  government’s  is  making  
mistake in addressing only the BDP (the HDP) as the 
representative of the Kurdish people and seeing them as it is. 
The government should hear all the ethnic groups and people. 
Seeing the PKK/the HDP as the representatives of the Kurds, 
surrendering to their demands and ignoring the oppressions 
they are making to the people is mistaken. Under the name of 
solution, the AKP left the Kurdish people to the mercy of the 
PKK/the HDP. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : If you consider the similar establishments, what is difference 
of the Huda-Par and Mustazaflar Movement? 
Aynur  Sülün : Huda-Par is a political party that is birth within the 
Mustazaflar Movement. 
 Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Did/Will your participation to the democratic process result 
in the moderation of your discourse and practices? 
Aynur  Sülün : We are aiming at stepping straight. We do not wish to 
become  the  defenders  of  the  system  after  being  victim  of  it’s  
for so long. For this issue, we took necessary cautions and 
defined our map. We believe that the system needs to change. 
Therefore, we are in purpose of making peace among the 
system and the values of people and carry these values into 
politics, not the vice versa. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Interview with Faruk Bildirici (journalist in Hurriyet Ankara office) on 2 
December 2014 
 
Turkish Version – Türkçe  Versiyonu 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Hizbullah’ı  Kürt  hareketi  içerisinde  nereye  
konumlandırırsınız? 
Faruk Bildirici : Hizbullah’ın  Kürt  hareketinin  içinde  olduğunu  
düşünmüyorum.  Hizbullah  için  ulusal  kimlik  değil,  İslami  
kimlik  mücadelesi  etkilidir. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Hizbullah  nasıl  oluştu? 
Faruk Bildirici : Öncelikle,  İran  İslam  Devrimi’nden  sonra  İslami  hareketler 
genel  olarak  güçlendi.  Buna  ilave  olarak,  bölgede  emperyalist  
güçler  kendini  hissettirmeye  başladı.  Bu  da  İslamcı  grupları  
savunma  durumuna  geçirdi.  İkinci  olarak,  PKK’nın  eylemlerini  
yoğunlaştırması  karşısında,  devletin  Hizbullah’ın  oluşmasına  
ve güçlenmesine  izin  verdiğini  düşünüyorum. 
 Bir  süre  sonra,  devlet  bu  yapıyla  mücadele  etme  zorunluluğu  
hissetti  ve  cemaat  bir  müddet  baskı  gördü. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : AKP  hükümetinin  iş  başına  gelmesiyle  Kürt  siyaseti  ve  
Cemaat  ile  ilgili  ne  gibi  değişimler  oldu? 
Faruk Bildirici : AKP  iktidarıyla  birlikte  yeni  bir  evreye  girildi.  Cemaat  
kendine  daha  rahat  bir  çalışma  ortamı  buldu.  Güneydoğuda  
CHP  ve  MHP  gibi  siğer  siyasi  oluşumlar  çekilmek  durumunda  
kaldı.     
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Sizce  Hüda-Par’ın  bir  şansı  var  mı?  Cemaat  bir  değişim  
geçirdi  mi? 
Faruk Bildirici : Güneydoğuda  muhafazakar  taban  Hüda-Par’a  yönelebilir.  Bu  
anlamda  şansları  olduğunu  düşünüyorum.  Cemaatin  
partileşmesini  yeni  bir  fikri  değişimden  ziyade  gücün  geldiği  
yeni  aşama  olarak  görüyorum. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Bölgenin  son  durumuyla  ilgili  ne  düşünüyorsunuz? 
Faruk Bildirici : Kobani’yle  ilgili  olarak  İslamcı  Kürtlerin  ve  ulusalcı  
Kürtlerin  karşı  karşıya  gelmesi  beni  korkutuyor.  Birbirlerine  
yaklaşma  ve  öldürme  şekilleri  aslında  geçmiş  olayları  geride  
bırakamadıklarını,  bir  nefret  birikiminin  olduğuna  işaret  
ediyor. Öcalan'ın  statüsünde  bir  değişim  var.  PKK  liderinden  
Kürtlerin  lideri  haline  geldi.  Gruplar  arasında  bir  nüfuz  
çatışması  oluşmaya  başladı.   
 Hüda-Par  ve  HDP’yi  destekleyenlerin  ortak  yönü  iki  grubun  da  
demokratik  nitelikleri.  Bu  nitelik  ne  yazık  ki  kendi  
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dışındakinin  örgütlenmesini  kabullenemiyor,  diğerini  yok  
etmeye  çalışıyor.  Bu  nedenle  bu  grupların/örgütlerin  bir  araya  
gelmeleri  Kürt  davası  için  bile  olsa  neredeyse  imkansız. 
 
Interview with Faruk Bildirici (journalist in Hurriyet Ankara office) on 2 
December 2014 
 
English Version – Translated  by  Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Where do you locate the Hezbollah within the Kurdish 
movement? 
Faruk Bildirici : I do not think that the Hezbollah takes place within the 
Kurdish movement. For the Hezbollah, not the national 
identity but Islamic identity struggle is important. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : How did the Hezbollah bring about? 
Faruk Bildirici : Foremost, Islamic movements strengthened after the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran. In addition, in the region, imperialist forces 
started to felt themselves. This resulted in the deployment of a 
defensive position among the Islamist groups. Secondly, 
because of the increase in the  PKK’s  activities,  i  believe  that  
the state permitted the establishment and empowerment of the 
Hezbollah. 
 After a while, the state felt necessity of combatting against this 
structure and consequently, the organization experienced 
suppression. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : With the AKP government, what kind of changes have taken 
place about the Kurdish politics and the Hezbollah 
organization? 
Faruk Bildirici : With the AKP leadership, a new era has started. The group 
found a better environment to work. In the southeastern 
Turkey, political parties such as CHP and MHP had to 
withdrawal.    
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : Do you think Huda-Par has any lack? Did the Hezbollah 
community experience a transformation? 
Faruk Bildirici : In the southeast, conservative base can incline towards Huda-
Par. In this context, i believe that they have chance. I see the 
legalization of the group as a new phase which led by change 
in power setting rather than a transformation in ideology. 
Tuğba  Yaşaroğlu : What do you think about the latest situation in the region? 
Faruk Bildirici : About Kobani, i am afraid of the idea that the Islamist Kurds 
and nationalist Kurds coming across in the streets. The way 
they approach and kill each other reveals that they could not 
leave the past atrocities behind and an accumulation of hate. 
There  is  a  change  in  the  status  of  Öcalan.  He  became  the  
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leaders of the Kurds rather than the leader of the PKK. There 
happened to start a penetrative conflict among the groups.  
 The  only  common  thing  between  the  supporters  of  the  Hüda-
Par and the HDP is their democratic quality. This quality, 
unfortunately, do not bear the idea of the organization of the 
other and seeks to destroy it. Therefore, it is almost impossible 
to expect that these groups/organizations might eventually 
bring together even for the Kurdish cause. 
  
 
